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Introduction
Pilot Jarle Gimmestad sat in the cockpit at Oslo Airport one late even-
ing, waiting for takeoff. “The flight was already delayed by one hour, 
and I was eager to get onto the runway. As usual, I was in dialogue with 
the co-pilot to make final adjustments before takeoff. Suddenly, the 
driver of the pushback tractor on the ground drew our attention to a 
wet substance that dripped from one of the wings and onto the asphalt 
below. It had already formed a stain on the ground. The driver hinted 
that there could be an oil leak from the wing or motor. He suggested 
that we should get the motor engineers out to identify the cause of the 
dripping.” Gimmestad talked with his co-pilot about it. Together they 
concluded that the stain was too small to give cause for alarm, and con-
tinued to prepare for takeoff.
The pushback tractor driver was still concerned about the dripping. 
Now he started to count the number of drops per minute that still 
came from the wing, and reported it to the men in the cockpit. He also 
measured the size of the stain on the asphalt, to indicate how serious 
he thought the matter was. Gimmestad suggested to him that contribu-
tions to the stain on the ground could have come from other planes that 
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had been parked on the same spot earlier in the day. It is normal to find 
such stains near the gate: “I tried to get the driver down below to accept 
that explanation, but he was not convinced. Now I suggested that the 
substance dripping from the wing probably was only water, and nothing 
to worry about. I asked the driver to sniff the substance. He did that, 
and his verdict was that it had a chemical smell, and so was not water.”
Gimmestad took in this information, talked with the co-pilot again, 
and decided to continue and get ready for takeoff. He had now taken 
the matter from an operations level, where you listen to advice and sug-
gestions, to a leadership level, where the person in charge has to take 
an authoritative decision. With this move, dialogue and reflection 
close down, to be replaced by monologue and action: “Conditions are 
acceptable, we proceed to takeoff.” The driver of the pushback tractor 
should now have understood that the matter was out of his hands, and 
closed. Instead, he persisted to voice his worry about the state of the 
plane. After a few seconds of hesitancy, he said: “Do you know what? I 
don’t think you should do that.” This remark woke up the pilot and got 
him to reconsider. Signals from the unassuming but persistent man on 
the ground finally got through to him. The pilot postponed takeoff and 
asked the motor engineers to do a thorough investigation of the source 
of the substance dripping down from the wing.
Once Gimmestad had made that decision, he left the cockpit 
and went down the stairs to talk to the man on the ground. “When 
we stood face to face, I got the impression that the driver thought I 
was angry and would reprimand him. Instead, I shook his hand, and 
thanked him for his professional behavior. I told him that exactly this 
sort of behavior is crucial in a proper safety culture.” The driver of the 
pushback tractor does not have a formal role in the safety procedures 
leading up to takeoff. His sole job is to push the plane out of the posi-
tion at the gate. He is normally not part of the ongoing dialogue, and 
as such has to impose himself and take a step forward to demand atten-
tion, outside the normal procedure. In this particular case, the driver 
addressed his concerns to the pilot in an apologetic manner, downplay-
ing his own importance, but at the same time repeatedly insisting that 
his observations should be taken seriously.
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Reflecting afterward on his own behavior, Gimmestad noted how 
he had addressed both the co-pilot and the man on the ground with 
the intention of getting confirmation of his own interpretation of the 
situation. “I did not ask them the open question ‘what do you think?’ 
but rather sought support for the way I saw the situation. I said: ‘it is 
probably a stain from other planes, don’t you think?’.” From his stand-
point, the incident served as a reminder of how necessary it is to seek 
out and be open to other people’s perspectives on the same situation 
(Gimmestad, 2016).
Fallibility is the tendency people have to make mistakes and errors, 
in the shape of small or large slips, mishaps, and blunders. Some of 
them can lead to serious harm, while others can create breakthroughs in 
experimental processes. One particular mistake can thus be the source 
of harm and frustration, while another can give cause to rejoice, even 
for the person who made it. The purpose of this book is to explore 
how the handling of fallibility affects the quality of what people try to 
achieve together at work. My motivation for doing research in this field 
is a curiosity about how human beings cope with fallibility at work, 
both on individual, group, and organizational levels.
The book builds on interviews with professionals from a variety of 
fields, including healthcare, aviation, public governance, engineering, 
waste management, and education. I have conducted (1) initial inter-
views and conversations with them, (2) written down their statements 
and made preliminary interpretations based on theory, and then (3) 
sent the texts to the informant to get his or her feedback, (4) written 
new versions based on that input, and (5) got the informant to read and 
comment on that version, before (6) finalizing the text from the meet-
ings with that particular informant. With some of the informants, the 
process of reaching out for narratives and interpreting them has gone on 
for several years, with others the process has taken three to four months.
I interpret the narratives about fallibility at work in the light of 
theoretical input from philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy, as these 
contribute to the understanding of organizational behavior. The dis-
cussion in this book is also relevant for leadership theory and positive 
organizational scholarship. I find theoretical tools and resources in those 
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approaches, and build and expand on them. The book reaches out to 
fellow researchers who share my curiosity about fallibility dimensions of 
organizational behavior, and to practitioners in the fields where I have 
been doing my research, and more generally in organizations where it is 
important to cope with fallibility.
The narratives of fallibility that you find in this book vary in scale 
and scope. I interpret them as attempts to make meaningful connec-
tions between past, present, and future events. Narratives about change 
have previously been interpreted in the same manner (Rhodes, Pullen, 
& Clegg, 2010). At the core of a narrative about fallibility, we often 
find one critical event. A person appears to be making a mistake and 
it can set in motion a causal chain of events that either is stopped 
through human intervention, or develops into some dramatic out-
come, either negative or positive. The term I will use for this kind of 
event is a critical quality moment, since the response or lack of it to 
the initial act will determine the quality of the work or outcome that 
emerges. The narrative about that moment can then focus on (i) what 
happened ahead of it, (ii) the moment itself, or on (iii) what takes 
place afterward.
In the narrative about the pilot and the driver of the pushback trac-
tor, there is (i) an unmentioned past, which consists in a common 
history of being trained in Crew Resource Management (Gordon, 
Mendenhall, & O’Connor, 2012; Stoop & Kahan, 2005), a preparation 
method applied in aviation, (ii) the critical quality moment or event 
itself, where the driver decides to persistently challenge the pilot about 
the dripping, and (iii) a brief encounter after the event, where the pilot 
acknowledges the initiative from the driver. It is also a part of the after-
math that Gimmestad spread the word about the encounter, to further 
confirm and strengthen the existing communication climate of inter-
vening across rank about serious incidents.
I have my academic training from philosophy, and the starting point 
for my reflections on fallibility at work is Socrates’ motto “Know your-
self ”. On the evidence of Plato’s dialogues, where Socrates was the main 
protagonist, he dismissed the idea put forward by fellow Athenians 
that he was the wisest of men, and instead advocated the view that all 
human knowledge is fallible. None of his interlocutors in the dialogues 
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is able to convince him that they are any better, since their claims to 
wisdom do not hold up under critical scrutiny. Socrates, at least, admits 
that his beliefs about the world and society may turn out to be false, 
and so he may be the wisest, in the sense that he realizes the limitations 
in his own convictions and beliefs about the world (Plato, 1966).
There is a Socratic quality to the intervention from the pushback 
tractor driver at the airport, a willingness to challenge a person in 
power, in the name of doing things right together. He persists with his 
questioning even after he has experienced rejection and irritation from 
the higher ranked person on the receiving end of his messages. Socratic 
philosophy is practical at heart, both in the sense that it can address 
concrete questions about how one should act and live, here and now, 
and in the wider sense of being oriented toward the goal of leading a 
richer and better life. It rests on an assumption that an examination of 
personal beliefs, desires, and habits can lead to significant breakthroughs 
of knowledge regarding how to live a good life. You may come to realize 
that your current priorities and ways of living are not consistent with 
what you actually value and see as important, and so have reasons to 
make changes.
We can interpret “Know yourself ” as a recommendation to look 
inwards, to examine one’s own feelings, desires, commitments, prefer-
ences, and habits. Another interpretation of the Socratic motto is that 
the process of attaining self-knowledge requires you to look outwards, 
and take note of your own place and role in a community. Who are you 
among these people? How is your life and your aspirations connected 
to what other people are attempting to do in their lives? This relational 
dimension of being a person can be lost if Socrates’ motto is understood 
solely as an exercise in inward meditation on what matters in one’s own 
life. Self-examination in the Socratic sense can consist in an inward 
and an outward orientation. The former may be the one that springs to 
mind when we read the motto in isolation, but the latter discloses the 
social dependencies of human endeavors, and is essential in attempts to 
understand fallibility at work.
A Socratic examination of life at work can consist of asking questions 
that highlight relational and collaborative aspects: How is what you are 
trying to achieve at work dependent upon your colleagues’ efforts? How 
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is what your colleagues are trying to achieve at work dependent upon 
your efforts? These questions address what Dutton (2003) has called 
high-quality connections at work. Recent research in organizational 
behavior documents the significance of helping and supportive behavior 
at work (Grant, 2014). Organizations differ in how employees perceive 
the threshold for asking for and offering help, and also in the degree to 
which employees and leaders alike hold back due to the apparent social 
cost of such activities (Lee, 2002; Wakefield, Hopkins, & Greenwood, 
2014). To ask for help is to admit personal limitations, vulnerability, 
and dependence on others. The Socratic questions emphasize teamwork 
and collective effort, and can trigger a lowering of the threshold for 
reaching out to others, asking for help and offering it.
The book consists of seven chapters. Each of them addresses aspects 
of fallibility at work through the threefold temporal model of establish-
ing connections between past, present, and future.
Chapter 1 focuses on childhood as preparation for adult life where 
fallibility is likely to be a significant feature. Research suggests that the 
extent to which children are allowed to engage in risky play will affect 
their ability to cope with adversity in adulthood. Protective parents and 
institutions can give priority to the children’s safety, and restrict their 
scope of action in order to reduce the risk of harm. In doing so, the 
adults may also inhibit what has been called the anti-phobic effects of 
risky play, a process of releasing the children from phobias that have a 
significant purpose in early childhood, but will restrict them later in 
life (Sandseter & Kennair, 2011). The chapter explores the connec-
tions between childhood research and the concepts of (i) resilience, (ii) 
growth mindset and (iii) alternative self-understandings where people 
primarily see themselves either as agents or pawns, all of which are rel-
evant in the context of coping with fallibility at work.
Chapter 2 discusses fallibility as a dimension of innovative processes. 
Leaders and organizations tend to assume that failure is always bad, 
and thus restrict experimentation that is required to learn and develop 
(Edmondson, 2011). The main narrative under scrutiny is about the 
decision to stop a large IT-project, despite the resources already invested 
in it. The principle of failing fast, of admitting that a particular idea 
or project is not as good as initially thought, makes theoretical and 
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practical sense, but is difficult to implement. The chapter introduces 
three obstacles to admitting defeat and stopping a project: (i) the sunk-
cost fallacy, (ii) the bystander effect, and (iii) the confirmation fallacy. 
All of these are well-established concepts in explaining human irration-
ality, and here I apply them in the context of fallibility at work.
A nursing home is the setting for the narrative in Chap. 3. It explores 
a positive turnaround in that organization based on a raised level of 
activities involving the employees and residents. Kristine Borvik and 
Helén Norlin became leaders at the nursing home, and set out to 
respond to the old people’s wish to come closer to life and not be iso-
lated in their rooms. In doing so, they shifted emphasis from a proscrip-
tive ethics (avoid harm) to a prescriptive ethics (do good). The chapter 
brings attention to the distinction between active mistakes (doing some-
thing you should not have done) and passive mistakes (not doing some-
thing you should have done), and how the latter appear to be tolerated 
more. It also discusses how perceptions of the extent to which one will 
have to take the burden for bad outcomes of one’s own actions affect the 
readiness to take risks at work.
Chapter 4 investigates developments in aviation regarding falli-
bility, and builds on interviews with pilot Jarle Gimmestad and stud-
ies of relevant research. A barrier model for thinking about fallibility 
dominates the learning processes in this field (Reason, 1990). It distin-
guishes between actions and their outcomes, and how there is a need 
for a barrier system to stop the causal chain of events put in motion by 
a mistake. The obstacles discussed in Chap. 2 can help to highlight the 
weaknesses in the human dimension of a barrier system. Witnesses to 
a mistake may fail to intervene due to (i) sunk-cost bias, (ii) bystander 
effects, and (iii) confirmation fallacies. In addition, the tendency to 
tolerate passive mistakes more than active mistakes, described in the 
nursing home context of the previous chapter, poses a challenge to the 
reliability of the system.
The two main informants for Chap.  5 are experienced doctors, who 
convey narratives about coping with and learning from failure. Doctor 
Stian Westad encountered a situation where a mistake by his team led to 
the death of a baby. With the permission of the parents, he has shared 
the details of that tragic event with the author of this book, and in other 
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public settings. Doctor Bjørn Atle Bjørnbeth has established a biweekly 
complication meeting at the unit he leads, to talk about operations 
and treatments that have not gone as desired or expected. Both doctors 
focus on how failures and mistakes offer unique learning opportunities. 
The barrier system described in Chap. 4 is applicable to dramatic situ-
ations in healthcare, where a doctor or nurse may make a mistake, and 
human intervention can stop the causal chain it sets off toward a bad 
outcome. Trust is an overarching concept for explaining why it makes 
sense to work systematically to learn from failure in healthcare, since it 
is an expression of professionals’ ability, benevolence, and integrity in 
relation to their patients.
A dramatic event in a river in Oslo is the starting point for Chap. 6, 
which addresses helping behavior as an integral dimension of coping 
with fallibility at work. A swimmer is stuck in the stream, but is reluc-
tant to ask people on the shore for help. He behaves similarly to pro-
fessionals who want do demonstrate independence and autonomy by 
performing their tasks without support from colleagues, even when they 
are struggling and unsure about the way forward. Research indicates 
that people tend to perceive requests for help to have a considerable 
social cost (Lee, 2002). Refusals to ask for and offer help at work can 
be systemic, and based on assumptions about what other people would 
be willing to do for you (Hämäläinen & Saarinen, 2007). In order to 
deal adequately with their own fallibility, professionals need to challenge 
such systems, and take the first steps needed to establish and normalize 
acts of helping at work.
The final chapter of the book provides the outline of an ethics of fal-
libility. It contains a normative and a descriptive dimension. The former 
addresses the extent to which honesty is the right response in situations 
where a person has made a mistake. Consequentialism and duty eth-
ics offer conflicting advice to a decision-maker who can choose to own 
up to the mistake or keep it hidden. The latter dimension provides an 
explanation of what I will call moral fallibility, instances where a per-
son acts contrary to his or her own moral convictions. Developments 
in moral psychology provide reasons to explain moral misconduct in 
terms of circumstances rather than character. We can combine the nor-
mative and descriptive dimensions of an ethics of fallibility in a stance 
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on the subject of forgiveness. Considerations of whether a person who 
has made a moral mistake ought to be forgiven (a normative issue) can 
be informed by knowledge about why people make such mistakes (a 
descriptive issue).
The threefold temporal model of thinking of fallibility in terms of 
past, present, and future appears throughout the book. The opening 
chapter emphasizes how experiences in childhood can serve as prepa-
ration for an adult working life involving critical events connected to 
one’s own or colleagues’ fallibility. The closing chapter is the most future 
oriented, since it discusses the extent to which people who have made 
mistakes deserve to start with a blank page and a new chance to do 
good work in the company of colleagues. The chapters in between all 
dwell on preparation, action, and retrospective learning in connection 
with critical quality moments, and conceptual input that can strengthen 
our abilities to cope with fallibility at work.
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We were going to climb a birch, and my best friend started first up the 
tree trunk. I waited on the ground, to see which branches he chose to 
step on, in preparation for my own foray towards the top. Suddenly 
he lost his grip and fell. When he came to a stop, he let out a high 
pitch scream. As I drew closer, I could see that the tip of a branch was 
inside his mouth. He had been pierced right through the cheek by a 
dry branch sticking out from the trunk. In great pain, he managed to 
maneuver himself away from the tree, with blood running from the 
wound in his face.
Most of the narratives in this book are from organizational life and 
collected through interviews, but this one is personal. During my child-
hood in a suburb of Norway’ capital Oslo in the 1960s and early 70s, 
it was normal for children to roam our neighborhoods and explore the 
world from different heights and perspectives. We sought adventure 
and excitement, and the adults tended to ignore our potentially harm-
ful encounters with trees and branches. I can still vividly remember my 
friend’s scream and the sight of the tip of the branch inside his mouth. 
That dramatic incident put both him and me in a state of temporary 
shock, but a few days later, we were making further daring ventures 
towards the treetops. Researchers have explored whether people who 
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have had dramatic falls in childhood tend to be more afraid of heights 
than other adults, and have found no indication that they are. Fallers 
seem to put the falls behind them, and even express less fear of heights 
than those who lack experience of falling (Poulton, Davies, Langley, 
Menzies, & Silva, 1998).
The freedom to climb that I experienced as a child was part of a more 
general freedom to roam and be away from our parents’ gaze for long 
spells. At the age of seven, I could be away from my home for hours, 
without my parents knowing where I was, with whom, what we were 
doing there, and when I would return. Today, seven-year olds in the 
same area do not have nearly the same opportunity to move beyond 
the home or the gaze of adults. If a mother and father today had been 
similarly unaware of their child’s whereabouts, it would most likely 
have been seen as something the local child welfare authorities should 
look into. The restrictive tendency is present in many cultures (Francis 
& Lorenzo, 2006). Evolutionary childhood studies suggest that it 
may inhibit children’s mental and physical development (Sandseter & 
Kennair, 2011).
This chapter explores how the upbringing of children can affect the 
extent to which they are capable of and prepared to deal with risk, 
uncertainty, and fallibility in adulthood. More specifically, it discusses 
how children’s engagement in risky play can prepare them for encoun-
ters with real and probable adversity as adults, and also the critical qual-
ity moments where the next decision they make will crucially impact 
the outcome of processes at work. The aim of the chapter is to consider 
possible links from findings in childhood research to theories about 
people’s capabilities to cope with fallibility in work settings. First, it 
discusses research on beneficial effects of children’s engagement in risky 
play, most notably the anti-phobic effects of such activities (Sandseter 
& Kennair, 2011). Second, it draws parallels to three sets of concepts 
that are relevant with regard to how people prepare for, deal with, and 
rethink their roles in critical events where mistakes and errors occur. 
All of them have roots in stoical philosophy, in that they highlight the 
need to meet adversity with a calm and collected attitude. They are 
(i) resilience understood as the capacity to bounce back from adver-
sity (Goldstein & Brooks, 2005; Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker, 2000; 
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Masten, Best, & Garmezy, 1990), (ii) the distinction between a growth 
mindset and a fixed mindset, where the former sees mishaps as oppor-
tunities for further learning (Dweck, 2017), and (iii) the distinction 
between agent and pawn (Nygård, 2007) as possible ways to understand 
oneself and one’s role in the way situations and events unfold.
1  Benefits of Risky Play
Risk is the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will 
happen. Risk is a situation involving exposure to danger (Oxford living 
dictionaries, 2017). Despite the negative connotations of the concept, 
risk is attractive in many settings. Children climb trees and engage in 
others kinds of risky play to gain immediate excitement and thrill. It 
can be great fun, and often creates ecstatic feelings of mastery and self-
control. Childhood research indicates that children also benefit from 
such activities in long-term and unintentional ways (Cevher-Kalburan 
& Ivrendi, 2016; Greve, Thomsen, & Dehio, 2014; Lavrysen et al., 
2017; Sandseter & Kennair, 2011). Climbing trees and rocky hills pro-
vides the opportunity to develop and enhance different motoric and 
physical skills, and for developing muscle strength, endurance, and 
skeletal quality (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000; Byers & Walker, 1995; 
Pellegrini & Smith, 1998). Play in heights also provides opportuni-
ties to develop competencies to perceive depth, form, shape, size, and 
movement (Rakison, 2005), and general spatial-orientation abilities 
(Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002). These are significant skills and compe-
tencies both for survival in childhood (immediate benefits) and for han-
dling important adaptive tasks in adulthood (deferred benefits).
One of the unintended and deferred benefits of exposure to risky 
scenarios in childhood can be to create a foundation for understanding 
and coping with risk at work. Familiarity with risk can be a foundation 
for becoming constructively involved in innovative processes, for tak-
ing chances in situations where you cannot know whether things will 
turn out well or badly. It can also be a necessary precondition for being 
at ease and functioning well in professions where things might end up 
badly, as in healthcare and aviation. A professional must face critical 
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circumstances at work with a calm attitude, and exposure to dangerous 
situations in childhood may serve as essential preparation for that kind 
of work.
In childhood research, risky play has been defined as:
thrilling and exciting forms of play that involve a risk of physical injury. 
Risky play primarily takes place outdoors, often as challenging and 
adventurous physical activities, children attempting something they have 
never done before, skirting the borderline of the feeling of being out of 
control (often because of height or speed) and overcoming fear. Rather 
than the avoidance inducing emotion of fear, a more thrilling emotion is 
experienced. Most of the time risky play occurs in children’s free play as 
opposed to play organized by adults. (Sandseter & Kennair, 2011, p. 258)
From this theoretical perspective, risky play is a necessary condition for 
learning to cope with potential danger and harm. Evolutionary child-
hood research indicates that children learn to judge risks through expe-
rience with risky situations. Through risky play, they can develop the 
cognitive skills needed to make more accurate judgements about the 
circumstances they face (Plumert, 1995; Plumert & Schwebel, 1997). 
A greater amount of direct experience with a risky situation itself can 
explain why some individuals demonstrate lower, and more realistic, 
risk appraisals in particular situations (DiLillo, Potts, & Himes, 1998). 
Exposure to risky situations appears to strengthen the ability to man-
age the risk (Adams, 2001) and to enhance the development of a more 
sound and reliable sense of the actual risk in the situation (Ball, 2002; 
Plumert, 1995).
Research on childhood indicates that children’s freedom to engage in 
risky and adventurous activities in uncontrolled settings has decreased 
in the past decades (Francis & Lorenzo, 2006). In the USA, children’s 
involvement in outdoor play has decreased dramatically (Clements, 
2004). In Norway, a country with a tradition for a relaxed attitude 
towards risky play, more elaborate restrictions are gradually introduced 
to promote childhood safety (Sandseter & Sando, 2016). In many soci-
eties, the physical and social space for children to play in has shrunk 
considerably. Attitudes to parenthood and protection have changed, 
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leading to more emphasis on safety and keeping children away from 
danger. If parents today had given their child the amount of freedom 
that children had some decades ago, they would most likely come under 
criticism for negligence and bad, irresponsible parenting. Concerned 
neighbors may have found a reason to contact child welfare authorities 
about it. You are not supposed to let your seven-year old out of sight for 
long periods of time, at least not when there are no other adults present 
to take over your role as controller and protector.
When Lenore Skenazy in 2008 gave into her nine-year old son’s 
intense wish to travel home alone from the supermarket on the metro in 
New York, and wrote about it, she caused controversy and was criticized 
for being an irresponsible parent.
For weeks my boy had been begging for me to please leave him some-
where, anywhere, and let him try to figure out how to get home on his 
own. So on that sunny Sunday I gave him a subway map, a MetroCard, a 
$20 bill, and several quarters, just in case he had to make a call.
No, I did not give him a cell phone. Didn’t want to lose it. And no, I 
didn’t trail him, like a mommy private eye. I trusted him to figure out 
that he should take the Lexington Avenue subway down, and the 34th 
Street crosstown bus home. If he couldn’t do that, I trusted him to ask a 
stranger. And then I even trusted that stranger not to think, “Gee, I was 
about to catch my train home, but now I think I’ll abduct this adorable 
child instead.”
Long story short: My son got home, ecstatic with independence. 
(Skenazy, 2008)
The overwhelming response Skenazy received to this initiative—both 
supportive and critical—motivated her to create a free-range kid pro-
ject, devoted to giving parents and others ideas about how to create 
space for children to develop autonomy and self-respect. Similar initia-
tives have taken place in other countries as well, countering a develop-
ment where anxious parents and strict authorities limit children’s space 
to roam, in the name of safety and protection.
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Childhood researchers are concerned about a tendency among 
authorities, professionals, and parents to overprotect children. So-called 
cotton-wool children are kept at arm’s length from anything that might 
hurt them, but these well-meaning measures can severely limit their 
mental and physical development. Risky play can have an important 
and positive anti-phobic effect on children, one they cannot reap from 
other sources (Sandseter & Kennair, 2011). By climbing trees, using 
sharp knives, and going for walks by themselves, children can gradually 
free themselves from phobias about heights, sharp objects, and being 
left behind by one’s group. These are phobias that serve a purpose for 
very small children but it is good for their mental and physical health 
to gradually discard them as they grow older. Overprotection can take 
away the possibility to experience individual growth and development:
The child may not experience that he or she naturally can cope with the 
fear-inducing situations. And despite having matured mentally and physi-
cally enough to master the previously dangerous situations, one may con-
tinue to be anxious. Continued anxiety hijacks the adaptive function of 
fear and causes non-adaptive avoidance of situations that were but no 
longer are dangerous for the individual due to maturation and increased 
skills. (Sandseter & Kennair, 2011, p. 263)
When we restrict the possibility for risky play, we also take away oppor-
tunities to approach adulthood free of the primary anxieties about how 
things might turn out badly. The research suggests that children need 
freedom to explore the world on their own, without adult supervision 
and control, even at the cost of increasing the risk of harm.
Risky play can be placed in six categories (Sandseter, 2007a). They 
are activities connected to great heights, high speed, dangerous tools, 
dangerous elements, rough-and-tumble, and disappearance/getting lost. 
Each of them can have relevance for the development of abilities and 
skills necessary in adulthood and professional settings, and in coping 
with fallibility at work. A common feature in all six categories is that 
there is a real and serious chance that the child can get harmed, and 
that it is a healthy thing to initially fear the source of this danger. It is 
the gradual movement out of this state of fearing, through risky play, 
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that can prepare the individual for an adult life where some of the most 
thrilling and fruitful activities involve risk of harm. Human flourishing, 
the development of capabilities to change and improve aspects of the 
world, depends on a gradual release from phobias that are designed to 
serve us well in early childhood, in order to take chances and only have 
limited possibility to assess whether things will go well or badly.
The evolutionary explanation of risky play is that it helps to release 
children from phobias. It can be helpful to look at the possible anti-
phobic effects within one of the six categories to establish a connec-
tion to risky work in adulthood. Children enjoy walking off alone to 
explore their environment away from the supervision of parents or other 
adults (Sandseter, 2007b). They experience a feeling of being lost and 
left behind by their group when they do so, but still have an urge to 
do it. Separation is both thrilling and scary. It would be safer for them 
to stay with the adults, but even so, they drift off on their own, and 
crave for the particular sense of excitement that comes from being on 
the move alone (Sandseter, 2007a). It seems that the anti-phobic effect 
of play where children can disappear and get lost is that they can gradu-
ally learn not to fear separation. Small children have good reasons to 
fear being left on their own and getting away from their closest, as they 
depend on the adults to feed, shelter, and support them. As they grow 
older, they can become more independent and autonomous, through 
being able to explore their environment on their own, without the 
adults’ gaze following them around. The fear of being left behind by the 
group can be reduced through risky play initiated by the children them-
selves. “When having the opportunity to voluntarily plan and carry out 
a separating from their caretakers by exploring new and unknown areas, 
experiencing the thrill of the risk of being lost, children seem to “inocu-
late” themselves from the anxiety of separation” (Sandseter & Kennair, 
2011, p. 270).
Overprotective parents can do their children a disfavor by sabotaging 
these expeditions into the unknown. With technology at hand, parents 
have ways of keeping track of where their children or teenagers are at 
any moment. One example is the app Bsafe that allows parents to locate 
the whereabouts of their children at any time, as long as they keep their 
mobile phones on. The slogan for this device is “the end of worry” 
8     Ø. Kvalnes
(“Webpage for Bsafe,”), and the rationale is to give concerned parents a 
sense of security and control regarding their children. They do not have 
to worry that their son or daughter will be next headline in the news 
about abducted or lost children. The app also offers a sense of protec-
tion to the children, who know that no matter where they are, their par-
ents have them on the radar, and can come to their rescue, if necessary.
Under such conditions, the children can only gain limited anti-phobic 
effects from roaming the neighborhood and beyond, since they are aware 
that the parents can constantly check where they are, and call them back 
or collect them there at any time. The beneficial inoculation from the 
anxiety of separation is unlikely to take place. Concerned, loving, and 
well-meaning parents can thus block their children’s path towards matu-
rity, and restrict their opportunities to learn to cope with being away 
from their group. As is the pattern with other dimensions of risk, the 
children who are protected in this way may continue to be afraid of the 
circumstances they find themselves in, even when they have reached an 
age where they would normally feel comfortable in them.
In work settings, to suffer from separation anxiety can be a consid-
erable handicap. It is difficult to flourish and do well in an organiza-
tion if you are constantly afraid of being left alone, and nervous about 
not being seen or appreciated by your leaders or colleagues. Individuals 
who have been allowed the thrill of exploring the world on their own 
in childhood, are more likely to be comfortable with situations at work 
where they are expected to enter the unknown territory and report back 
later about what they find there.
Some researchers and commentators that support the initiative to 
give children more freedom and space for play are unhappy with the 
concept of “risky play”. They believe that “risky” has negative connota-
tions, and prefer to talk about the adventurous and challenging play:
If something is deemed ‘risky’, the risks are understood to be excessive. 
Such activity is best avoided. Inviting parents to encourage their children 
to do things that are expressly risky is simply counterintuitive: where chil-
dren are concerned, the instinct to protect is too profound. (Voce, 2016)
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As we attempt to move towards allowing children more freedom to 
explore their world, the emphasis on the word “risk” shows that we still 
haven’t let go of the mindset of the helicopter parent who is more aware 
of danger than adventure, more focused on what could go wrong than 
how to prepare kids to be both independent and safe in challenging 
situations.
So, please, can we stop talking about risk? Instead, let’s talk about adven-
ture, preparation, and trust. (Allsup, 2016)
These misgiving about the risk concept are understandable, but they 
may themselves be examples of an overprotective stance. We can dis-
tinguish between what is an adequate description of the phenomenon 
from a research perspective, where we seek to understand and find 
explanations to a phenomenon, and what sort of description might 
move parents to become less stressed and anxious about what might 
happen to their children if they get more freedom to roam. Critics of 
the concept of risky play may be right in saying that it is unlikely to 
sway overprotective parents into being more relaxed, since they already 
are worried about possible harm and injury to the children. Talk of risky 
play can have the effect of making them even more protective. However, 
when children climb trees, play with sharp knives, and go on solitary 
expeditions in their neighborhood these are in fact risky activities. These 
parents may be more comfortable with the softer language of adventur-
ous and explorative play, but that may be because those concepts align 
well with their own need for control. Their children can explore and 
go on an adventure, but only under the supervising gaze of parents, or 
other qualified and responsible adults. By retaining the risk component 
in the language, we do not hide the fact that things might actually end 
badly. One significant dimension of risky play is that it can prepare chil-
dren for dangerous and harmful circumstances, and also for failures, dis-
appointments, and breakdowns in expectations. As will be argued later 
in the book, the real test of a commitment to allow risky play and risky 
work comes when things do actually end badly. We may theoretically 
accept that exposure to risk is good, in the upbringing of children as 
well as in nursing of elderly people, but be tempted to reconsider when 
a child or old person gets hurt.
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2  Stoical Approaches
Stoicism is a philosophical tradition that has promoted the idea that 
human being can learn to meet hardship and difficulties with calm. It 
emerged in Cyprus around 300 B.C. and was a dominant feature in 
Hellenistic and Roman philosophy to around 300 A.C. The stoics taught 
that the path towards eudaimonia and a good life involved treating others 
with respect and fairness. Their philosophy was very much meant to be 
applied to everyday living. They argued that we should not let ourselves 
be controlled by cravings for pleasure or fear of pain, but use our reason 
to understand the world around us and participate with dignity in social 
life. At the core of this philosophy is the idea that human beings can 
train themselves not to be overwhelmed by strong emotions or pacified 
by previous experiences of failure and despair. Stoicism tells us that we 
can decide to look upon adversity as a source of learning, and shake off 
initial disappointments rather than dwell on our misfortune.
Stoicism has influenced philosophical reflections about what con-
stitutes a good life for centuries. The three contemporary theoretical 
approaches discussed in this section have more or less loose relations to 
stoicism, in that they all explore ways in which children and adults alike 
can raise above adversity and learn from their participation in events 
where things have not gone according to plan. First, resilience addresses 
how individuals cope with adversity and are capable of bouncing back 
from negative experiences. An underlying idea is that the extent to 
which they have had the opportunity to engage in risky play can affect 
their level of resilience. Second, the distinction between a fixed and a 
growth mindset is useful for considering whether a person sees failure 
and lack of success in a particular endeavor as an opportunity for learn-
ing or not (Dweck, 2017). A person with a growth mindset will see the 
letdown as an opportunity to learn and prepare to do better next time, 
seeing his or her own capabilities as something fluid and formable, 
rather than fixed. Third, the distinction between understanding one-
self primarily as an agent or a pawn, as an active initiator or a passive 
receiver of other people’s instructions (Nygård, 2007), can shed light 
on the processes where people have to cope with their own and other 
 people’s fallibility at work.
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Resilience has captured attention both in psychology and in organi-
zational studies, and can shed light on the link between risky play 
and risky work. The concept has roots in the stoic tradition (Morris, 
2004), in its depiction of how inner strength and calm can lead to 
outer achievements. One study indicates that resilience is different 
from stoicism in that it is flexible and action-oriented (Richardson & 
Chew-Graham, 2016), but that interpretation seems to be based on an 
oversight of the practical dimension of stoicism.
In the psychological research, resilience refers to a dynamic pro-
cess encompassing positive adaptation within the context of signifi-
cant adversity (Luthar et al., 2000, p. 543). Implicit within this notion 
are two critical conditions: (1) exposure to significant threat or severe 
adversity; and (2) the achievement of positive adaptation despite major 
assaults on the developmental process (Goldstein & Brooks, 2005; 
Masten et al., 1990). Resilience depicts the capacity to bounce back 
from negative experiences, and not be overwhelmed and pacified by set-
backs. Individuals, groups, and organizations can be more or less resil-
ient in the face of a struggle and imminent or real defeat. Systematic 
knowledge about the effects of risky play and the lack of it in childhood 
gives us reason to believe that building resilience on individual, group, 
and organizational levels depend on a societal acceptance and encour-
agement of risk-taking in childhood.
Resilience is often a factor in sports. One of the most memorable 
matches in the European Championships in football in 2016 provided a 
vivid example. An English national team consisting of star players from 
prestigious clubs like Manchester United, Liverpool, and Arsenal, faced 
an Icelandic team where the players came from much smaller, and lesser 
known, clubs in Sweden, Norway, and Wales. The match started pre-
dictably with an English goal, but the Icelandic team quickly responded 
by scoring two goals, and from there on controlled the game against the 
higher ranked and more famous opponents. Iceland looked more com-
posed and alert, and knocked England out of the competition with a 
2-1 win. On one interpretation, it was a match between a tough and 
resilient team, with a stoic ability to face a storm, and a weak group of 
superstars unprepared for struggle and fight. The English commentator 
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Jamie Carragher called it a generation problem, connected to upbring-
ing and protection against taking misadventure personally:
I call them the Academy Generation because they have come through in 
an era when footballers have never had more time being coached. (…) 
They get ferried to football schools, they work on immaculate pitches, 
play in pristine training gear every day and everything is done to ensure 
all they have to do is focus on football. We think we are making them 
men but actually we are creating babies. Life has been too easy. They 
have been pampered from a young age, had money thrown at them and, 
when things have gone wrong, they have been told it is never their fault. 
(Carragher, 2016)
On Carragher’s interpretation, the English players were not ready for 
the toil of competing with the Icelandic team, because they had never 
become properly accustomed to hardship. Well-meaning parents and 
coaches had protected them against struggle, and thus inadvertently 
made them more or less incapacitated to bounce back and give another 
try. Their Icelandic opponents were individuals who from childhood 
had been used to cycle or walk through icy cold wind and rain to foot-
ball practice, and had learned to look after themselves and take respon-
sibility in stressful circumstances. The English team may have been 
superior in footballing technique and skills, but lacked the resilience 
and toughness to cope with the powerful Icelandic onslaught.
The second set of concepts that can help make sense of how risky 
play can prepare children for risky work is Dweck’s distinction between 
growth mindset and fixed mindset. She describes her passage into the 
topic and the first realization that people differ in their approach to 
hardship in the following manner:
I was obsessed with understanding how people cope with failures, and I 
decided to study it by watching how students grapple with hard prob-
lems. So I brought children one at the time to a room in their school, 
made them comfortable, and then gave them a series of puzzles to solve. 
The first ones were fairly easy, but the next ones were hard. As the stu-
dents grunted, perspired, and toiled, I watched their strategies and 
probed what they were thinking and feeling.
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Confronted with hard puzzles, one ten-year old boy pulled up his chair, 
rubbed his hands together, smacked his lips, and cried out “I love a chal-
lenge!” Another, sweating away on these puzzles, looked up with a pleased 
expression and said with authority, “You know, I was hoping this would be 
informative.” (Dweck, 2017, p. 3)
These are the first encounters Dweck had with people she would later 
describe to have a growth mindset, who think that their capacities to 
solve problems and take on challenges can be cultivated and devel-
oped over time. The children she describes above, found thrill in the 
puzzles that seemed impossible to solve. They are different from peo-
ple who see their intellectual and practical skills to be given, carved in 
stone, who have a fixed mindset. The former see failure as an oppor-
tunity to improve, while the latter see instances where they are unable 
to solve a problem or cope with a challenge as evidence of their own 
shortcomings.
On Dweck’s interpretation, individuals with a fixed mindset believe 
that their intelligence and practical capabilities as simply inborn traits, 
and will tend to avoids situations where they may expose their own 
limitations. They value perceptions of smartness, and will attempt to 
cover up their weaknesses, since they perceive them to unchangeable. 
There is nothing to gain from encountering difficulties at the threshold 
of their given capacities, since they can end in embarrassment, when it 
becomes clear that they are not good enough to cope with challenges of 
that kind.
A person with a fixed mindset may believe that his or her given 
capacities are at an exceptionally high-level, as we will see in Chap. 5, 
in a narrative about high-ranking doctors who are reluctant to sit down 
with colleagues to analyze and discuss patient cases where complications 
have occurred, and outcomes have been worse than expected. On the 
initiative from doctors with a growth mindset, colleagues at a hospital 
unit meet regularly to talk about such cases. Of those who are attend-
ing, some believe that there is learning to be gained from carefully ana-
lyzing the cases on hindsight, and considering what they as professionals 
could and should have done differently, while others tend to explain 
mishaps and unforeseen complications as a result of bad luck, and not 
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something they could have influenced by doing a better job. In terms 
of the temporal structure of past, present, and future, the doctors who 
are willing to scrutinize their contribution at a critical event now, seem 
to increase their chances of doing a high-quality professional service to 
their patients later. Those who are not, demonstrate a fixed mindset that 
can pose a threat to patient safety. This example will be elaborated and 
discussed more fully in Chap. 5.
In her research, Dweck has found that it is possible to foster and 
develop growth mindset through feedback strategies. Praise and encour-
agement for concrete effort and persistence can help children to learn 
and adopt effective strategies for learning. A range of studies document 
that growth mindset makes a positive difference in student and adult 
achievement, both short-term and long-term (Schroder et al., 2017a, 
2017b; Yeager et al., 2016).
The third set of concepts that can illuminate the relation between 
risky play and risky work is the distinction between agent and pawn 
as alternative modes of self-understanding (Nygård, 2007). During 
childhood and upbringing, we build up mental resources to face the 
changing realities of adulthood. One noteworthy dimension of that 
development is the kind of self-understanding we develop and normal-
ize. To what extent do we see ourselves primarily as active and responsi-
ble individuals, with opportunities to influence the directions our lives 
take, and to what extent do we see ourselves mainly as passive recipients 
of input from others? Agents and pawns differ in how they view their 
scope of action and responsibility for taking initiatives in the situations 
they face (Table 1).
Table 1 Self-understanding
Agent Pawn
• My scope of action is large, and in 
considerable degree defined by me
• I take initiatives and do not await 
instructions
• It is my responsibility to find solu-
tions and decide what to do
• My scope of action is small, and 
in considerable degree defined by 
others
• I do not take initiatives, but await 
instructions from others
• It is other people’s responsibility to 
find solutions and decide what to do
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The parenting regimes children grow up under are likely to affect the 
extent to which they come to understand themselves primarily as agents 
or pawns. Those who become used to having the freedom to explore and 
expand their own scope of action are more likely to develop an agent-
understanding, while those who experience stricter adult supervision, 
become used to seeing themselves more as pawns. Similar patterns of self-
understanding and behavior have been studied under the heading of locus 
of control, focusing on the extent to which people perceive that they are in 
charge of the events in their lives (Hou, Doerr, Johnson, & Chen, 2017).
People apparently do not see themselves consistently as either agents 
or pawns, but tend to move between these two poles of self-understand-
ing, using agent-language in describing their activities and roles in one 
setting, and pawn-language in another. Simple and seemingly innocuous 
statements about our own contribution to a state of affairs can reveal our 
current self-understanding. “I did not get time” is a typical pawn-state-
ment, indicating that time is a commodity handed out by others, and 
not something that the person has control over. A parallel agent-state-
ment can be “I did not prioritize it” or “I decided not to spend time on 
it”. Consider a young man who for a long time has been without a job, 
and lived on unemployment benefit. He has developed anger towards 
the employment authorities. “Now they have turned me into a thief”, he 
says. When asked to explain how, and he claims that the unemployment 
support had not arrived on the due date, and he had run out of food. 
His only alternative, as he saw it, had been to go to the local grocery 
store and steal something to eat. In his account of this turn of events, 
there had been no real alternatives to stealing food, and he felt genuinely 
forced by the authorities to become a thief. His scope of action was small 
and tight, and defined by others. He sees himself to be a pawn, and 
not an agent. When pressed to take at least some responsibility for his 
actions in the grocery store, he refuses to do that, and remains in pawn-
mode. When we see ourselves as pawns, we interpret events in the world 
as that which merely happens to us, while in agent-mode, we acknowl-
edge responsibility for our contributions to how things turn out.
Attribution theory sheds further light on how we take responsibility 
or not for events connected to our own decisions and behavior (Weiner, 
1972). It focuses on how we explain outcomes in terms of internal or 
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external factors, or what has been within or outside our own control. 
To take another example from football, one Norwegian coach famously 
claimed after his underdog team had won the cup final that “this was 
world class coaching”, thus placing himself in the center of attention, 
as the agents who had made the right decisions to overcome a higher 
ranked opponent (Rekdal, 2009). The same coach has a tendency, when 
his team loses, to blame external circumstances like the referee or the lack 
commitment from his players, for the outcome. When his team wins, he 
tends to see himself as an agent, while a loss triggers a pawn mentality.
Outcomes in a range of situations depend crucially on whether peo-
ple see themselves as agents or pawns. These self-understandings affect 
decision-making and conduct in critical situations, when something 
out of the ordinary happens. We can think back on the example in the 
introduction, involving the driver of the push-back tractor at the air-
port. His intervention and continued insistence that the dripping from 
the wing should be checked properly before takeoff is typical agent-
behavior. It was not part of his job instruction to be in dialog with the 
people in the cockpit about that issue. He could have made his observa-
tion once, and left the further decision-making to the pilot and co-pilot, 
but instead continued to voice his concern. In doing so, he took respon-
sibility beyond his formal job description. Similar situations occur in 
other workplaces, and outcomes often crucially depend on whether peo-
ple see themselves primarily as agents or pawns. A range of psychologi-
cal factors can influence self-understanding and personal confidence in 
such situations, as will be discussed in the coming chapters. The main 
purpose here has been to highlight the distinction between two polar-
ized ways of seeing one’s own role and responsibilities. It is likely that 
upbringing and parenting influences whether children primarily develop 
agent—or pawn-understandings of themselves, and that risky play can 
be crucial in teaching them to explore actively their own scope of action.
The main line of thinking in this chapter has been that risky play 
during childhood can prepare individuals for active participation in 
risky endeavors at work. When children get the freedom to roam and 
explore their environment below the adults’ radar, they can develop the 
autonomy and confidence they need to engage in risky work when they 
grow older. The anti-phobic effects of risky play can make the children 
more robust and resilient, and prepare them for an adult life where they 
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are likely to encounter significant adversity in organizational settings. 
We can place the preparation for, the experience of, and responses to 
critical events in a threefold temporal frame of what happens before, 
during, and after it takes place (Table 2).
Childhood research indicates that overprotective parents and author-
ities pose an obstacle to healthy developments when they put restric-
tions on the children’s scope of action. The intention may be to put the 
children’s safety first, but one unintended outcome appears to be that 
their mental and physical development suffers. Risky play can crucially 
make the children aware of their own fallibility, and provides them with 
opportunities to learn to cope with their own and other people’s ten-
dencies to make mistakes. When dramatic slips and blunders happen 
at work, they may not be overwhelmed and pacified by it, since they 
are used to such events from childhood. Initiatives to develop free-range 
kids should be encouraged from organizations, since, in the long-term, 
those are the people who are likely to be best prepared for the challenges 
of adult working life, through a growth mindset and through resilience. 
It is also through this kind of upbringing that children can learn to see 
themselves primarily as autonomous and responsible agents, and not as 
pawns that are moved around by forces beyond their own control.
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Inga Bolstad is the director general of the National Archives of Norway. 
In Spring 2016, she made the decision to terminate a complex and 
prestigious development project. Considerable resources had been 
invested to create a common platform for archiving documents for the 
Norwegian public sector. The overall aim of the project had been to 
counter what Bolstad calls digital dementia, the forgetting of vital pub-
lic information regarding taxation, health, education, and other kinds of 
services offered to citizens and organizations in society. Norway needed 
an electronic archive for local and central public administrations, and 
the E-archive Project was supposed to provide it. “The time horizon for 
such a project is, if not eternity, at least a thousand years. Our nation’s 
common memory depends on a well-functioning digital depot. The sta-
bility of our democratic system relies on easy electronic access to docu-
ments from the past, and it is our responsibility to build it” (Bolstad, 
2017). Stakes were thus high to come up with a robust and reliable 
solution, but the first attempt failed.
“We took the decision to terminate the project after a meeting with 
the Digitalization Council, the government appointed unit set up to 
give advice to public organizations about digital projects. The Council 
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provided constructive criticism regarding what we had done so far and 
the plans for the further development of the project. Now we realized 
that it had been wrong to go for one particular alternative from the 
beginning of the project, since it had made us lose sight of other viable 
alternatives. Furthermore, we had primarily focused on our own needs 
and goals, and not taken sufficiently into account those of the people 
who were supposed to use the system on a daily basis. There was also 
a lack of properly defined milestones for the project, where we could 
have taken the temperature on the development and progress. When 
I entered a meeting with twelve people currently working on the pro-
ject, and asked them about its purpose and direction, I got twelve sig-
nificantly different answers. All of this made us understand that the 
E-archive project was about to become a fiasco, and we decided to stop 
it. We had failed, and realized that it was best to take a step back and 
start afresh” (Bolstad, 2017).
The topic of this chapter is the role of failure in innovative processes. 
A range of studies has focused on experimentation and how organiza-
tional structures and incentives should encourage it (Ahuja & Lampert, 
2001; Cannon & Edmondson, 2005; Lee, Edmondson, Thomke, & 
Worline, 2004). With active experimentation comes the risk of failure, 
and leaders in organizations tend to be reluctant to talk about it, because 
they assume that failure is bad. That is often a misguided assumption, 
since failure is an integral part of testing hypotheses about the world, 
and in experimental explorations to develop new products and services 
(Edmondson, 2011). Narratives about failure can also be sources of sig-
nificant organizational learning (Bledow, Carette, Kühnel, & Bister, 
2017; Rami & Gould, 2016; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011).
When a pilot or a surgeon makes a mistake, it can lead to truly bad 
and devastating outcomes, but in other organizational settings, to fail 
can often be a welcome dimension of learning and development. In 
innovation, “failing fast” has become a viable catchword, indicating 
that individuals, groups, and organizations should stop wasting valuable 
time and resources by remaining loyal to one particular idea. The suc-
cessful design company IDEO’s slogan is “Fail often in order to succeed 
sooner,” and other companies are attempting to adopt a similar stance 
in order to reduce the stigma of failure (Edmondson, 2011).
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This chapter explores how learning from failure requires close atten-
tion to the distinction between causes of failure and blame for failure. It 
also identifies and discusses three psychological phenomena that pose a 
challenge to effective learning from failure. All of them have links to the 
communication climate for voicing a concern that the proposed course 
of action may not after all be the best one. First, the sunk-cost-fallacy is 
the tendency we have to follow through on an activity even when it is 
not meeting our expectations, because of the resources we have already 
invested in it. Second, research on the bystander effect indicates that the 
more people who are witness to an event that calls for help or some 
other form of intervention, the less likely it is that anybody will step 
forward and help or intervene. Third, people are vulnerable to the con-
firmation fallacy, in that they have a tendency to notice information that 
is in line with their beliefs and assumptions, and to disregard informa-
tion that gives them reason to reconsider. These three phenomena are 
well documented and known from social psychology, and the aim here 
is to connect them to challenges regarding fallibility at work. The con-
text in the current chapter is that of innovation and the need to fail fast, 
but an understanding of the three psychological phenomena is also rel-
evant in situations where it is urgent to speak up about mistakes because 
they can lead to harm, as in aviation and healthcare, as will be demon-
strated in coming chapters.
1  Innovation and Failure
In the aftermath of the termination of E-archive, Bolstad and her 
organization have received positive responses on the decision, and on 
the willingness to share the narrative of their failure. The Agency for 
Public Management and eGovernment in Norway has an annual con-
ference for dwelling on mistakes in the public sector, called Feiltrinn 
(Misstep). The idea behind it is to create a learning platform for pub-
lic organizations who are dealing with similarly complex projects as 
E-archive, and need to identify and learn from mistakes. In December 
2016, Bolstad took the stage at the conference to talk about the 
mistakes in the E-archive project, and how they had affected her 
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organization. Her narrative of failure was highly relevant for the other 
participants, several of whom worked on other digital projects in the 
public sector, and could easily end up in similar circumstances of having 
to decide whether to stop a project and admit failure, or not.
Bolstad has highlighted the learning aspect of the closing down the 
E-project. “We have failed, but the experience made us stronger. We are 
now an organization where it is acceptable to try, fail, learn, and move 
on. One other notable thing is that have become more professional in 
handling disagreement. That is a prerequisite for open and honest talk 
about our projects” (Bolstad, 2017). The need to create a digital depot 
for the public sector in Norway remains, and the current efforts to do 
so are different from the first in four significant dimensions, in that the 
project is characterized by:
• Stronger user orientation, taking into account the needs and compe-
tencies of the people who are going to use the system.
• Not just one, but multiple alternatives for a solution are under con-
sideration from the start.
• A communication climate where people are encouraged to voice con-
cerns and disagreements early.
• Tolerance for failure in the process of developing the alternatives.
What Bolstad describes as the key elements in the work to counter digi-
tal dementia overlaps with the main tenets of design thinking, where 
principles of design are applied to the way people work. This approach 
focuses on users’ experiences in encounters with technologically com-
plex processes and uses prototypes to explore potential solutions. It is 
built on the assumption that some alternatives need to fail in order for 
others to stand out as the better ones. Design thinking has proved to be 
especially useful in addressing wicked problems (Buchanan, 1992), that 
is, problems with high levels of complexity and ambiguity. A common 
aim for such processes is to make the users’ interaction with the techno-
logical solutions intuitive and pleasurable. That is the task for the team 
currently working in Bolstad’s organization to create a digital archive. At 
the time of the interview, they had seven active conceptual alternatives, 
and will eventually converge on one of them for further development 
2 Failing fast     25
and implementation. One of the alternatives was similar to the original 
and discarded project, but now it was measured up against a range of 
other viable options.
Toleration for failure is a dimension of innovative work, since it is 
rare to get things right the first time (Kolko, 2015), as experienced by 
Bolstad and her team. In some contexts, what counts as getting things 
right is quite clearly defined and well understood, while in others, the 
process may lead to unexpected breakthroughs outside the scope of the 
original project. Here are four examples of what has been labeled acci-
dental innovation (Austin, Devin, & Sullivan, 2012):
3M attempted to create a super-adhesive that could be used in the con-
struction of planes, and instead ended up with a weak adhesive that was 
labelled “a solution without a problem”. Employee Arthur Fry heard 
about the failure, and noticed that pieces of paper with the weak adhe-
sive could be used as bookmarks, since they could be reused and could 
be peeled away without leaving any marks on the pages. Fry applied 
for a grant to develop the idea further, and the failed attempt to make 
super-glue led to the development of the Post-it note. (Brand, 1998; 
Govindarajan & Srinivas, 2013)
The drug Sildenafil Nitrate was originally intended as a treatment for 
angina, but turned out to be ineffective for that purpose. Nurses participat-
ing in the testing of the drug noted that the patients who took the drug got 
penile erections. Their copious notes of side effects from the trails led to 
the discovery of Viagra. A failure to develop a drug to treat chest pains thus 
became a successful drug to treat erection problems. (Cook, 2016)
The Norwegian company Tine tried to develop and manufacture a salami 
sausage made from salmon. It failed, because the customers and market 
did not show any interest in the salmon salami. The failed sausage was 
based on the use of new fermentation technology that made it possible to 
send exceptionally fresh filets of salmon to the market. The raw material 
to be used in the sausage had to be of exceptional quality for the tech-
nology to work. The company got this from a salmon provider that had 
developed a technology to distribute fresh fish to the market immediately 
after the fileting process had taken place. The commercial director real-
ized that it was much easier to sell the raw material (the exceptionally 
fresh salmon filets) than the salami itself. This product was called Salma, 
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a name originally designed for the failed salmon salami sausage, and it 
turned out to become a great commercial success. (Hoholm, 2011)
One late evening at the restaurant Osteria Francescana, a three-Michelin-
star restaurant in Modena, Italy, the sous chef prepared the last dessert dish, 
a lemon tart. On his way out of the kitchen to the guests’ table he dropped 
the plate, half of the tart ended up on the counter, and half remained on 
the plate. The sous chef despaired, but the master chef Massimo Bottura 
saw it as on opportunity to create a new dish. Together they rearranged the 
lemon tart on the plate, and served it as if the destructed tart was accord-
ing to plan, calling the dish “Ooops! I dropped the lemon tart”. It has since 
become a signature dish in the restaurant. (Gelb, 2015)
The first, second, and third examples are of innovation processes that 
accidentally led to the discovery of a different product to that envisaged 
by the initiators. The fourth is not an innovation process as such, but 
rather an accident in the implementation of a creative process. What the 
four examples have in common is that somebody had an eye for possi-
bilities and were able to turn failure into a surprising success.
2  Beyond Blame
After more than two decades of studying failure, Edmondson (2011) 
has noted that executives and managers tend to think about it in the 
wrong way. She believes that the main reason why they struggle to do 
so that they are trapped in a false dichotomy: “How can you respond 
constructively to failures without giving rise to an anything goes atti-
tude? If people aren’t blamed for failures, what will ensure that they try 
as hard as possible to do their best work?” (Edmondson, 2011, p. 50). 
Managers seem to believe that they have to blame and criticize employ-
ees who fail, because otherwise they will become complacent and think 
that it does not really matter whether they do the best they can at work.
In order to disentangle this dichotomy, Edmondson goes on to pro-
vide a spectrum of reasons for failure, ranging from deliberative devia-
tions at one end, to exploratory testing at the other. An act of choosing 
to violate a process or procedure tends to be blameworthy, as when a 
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flight crew skips parts of procedures before takeoff, or a doctor fails 
to wash his or her hands properly before treating a patient. These are 
unwelcome occurrences, and if the manager does not intervene to 
blame the responsible individuals, it may indeed lead to complacency 
and an anything goes attitude.
The situation is very different on the other side of the scale, where 
the aim is to expand knowledge and generate solutions by testing out 
ideas, to see if they are worth pursuing. Here, a failure can be a wel-
come event, something that enables the group or organization to move 
forward with the knowledge that this particular idea did not work. The 
decision to stop e-Archive and start afresh with new ideas can serve 
as an example of such an event. In the beginning, it can be painful to 
accept failure, in light of so many hours and so much energy spent to 
get things right. Gradually that feeling may give way to relief at being 
able to pursue new directions. Any manager who fails to see the differ-
ence between mistakes on opposite sides of the spectrum outlined by 
Edmondson and blames employees when things go wrong during exper-
imentation or hypothesis testing is likely to hamper innovation.
In between the two endpoints of deviance and exploratory testing lie the 
reasons for failure where it is more difficult to attribute degrees of blame. 
The root cause of why things go wrong may be that the agent is inattentive, 
lacks ability, or has been given faulty or incomplete instructions about how 
to act. It can happen in a hospital, when inexperienced doctors or nurses 
get tasks that are at the limits of their current competence. When things go 
wrong, and patients are harmed, it can be difficult to establish whether the 
cause is primarily a personal mistake on the part of the doctor or nurse, or a 
systemic mistake, as when the person should have received better training, 
instruction, and support from seniors. In such cases, the blame may partly 
lie with the executive or managers who have put the person in that posi-
tion and partly with the person him or herself, who should have spoken up 
about competence limitations. One concrete way to respond when facing a 
situation where personal competence is stretched is to ask for help, a topic 
explored further in Chap. 6 . The main reason for failure may also be that 
the task itself is difficult, or that the situation is complex and ambiguous. 
The more the failure can be adequately accounted for by appeal to circum-
stances, the less room remains for reasonable blame.
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Edmondson warns leaders and other decision-makers against enter-
ing a blame game in the aftermath of a bad outcome. Many failures in 
organizations are not truly blameworthy, and when they are mistreated 
as such, it is likely to block learning. Collins (2001) used the term 
“autopsy without blame” to establish a similar thought. In situations 
where things do not go well, the organization can analyze them and 
try to figure out what happened, without attributing blame. Learning 
and development depend on cool heads that keep any tendency towards 
blame and punishment at bay, at least during the analyzing phase. In 
some cases, the result of the inquiry into the causes of the failure may 
be that some people are actually to blame and are not fit to perform the 
kind of task in question. That conclusion, however, should come at the 
end of careful reflection about the probable causes, all through the spec-
trum of reasons for failure Edmondson outlines.
The attitude of performing an autopsy without blame can be crucial 
when interviewing people about their own behavior and that of their 
colleagues in events leading up to an accident. Whether the inter-
viewer focuses on (i) causes or (ii) blame is likely to affect the openness 
of the interviewee. If the latter senses that (ii) is the prime perspective, 
answers tend to become more defensive and weighted, and the likeli-
hood decreases of getting a full and honest account of events at hand. 
In aviation, autopsy without blame has become common practice and 
has contributed to improved safety (Stoop & Kahan, 2005), while in 
healthcare, a blame focus has been documented to inhibit reporting 
of medical failure (Bond, 2008; Waring, 2005). Lessons from aviation 
on dealing with fallibility and blame to strengthen safety have received 
increasing interest in healthcare and medicine. Chapters 4 and 5 in this 
book will explore in further detail alternative approaches to fallibility at 
work in both these sectors of organizational life.
3  Three Obstacles
Learning from failure requires that missteps are detected and brought 
to the surface. In organizational settings, whether that happens or 
not depends on the communication climate, and particularly on the 
extent to which it is normal for employees to speak up when they sense 
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that something is wrong with a project or initiative. The climate and 
the individuals who operate in it are put to the test in critical quality 
moments, situations where the next thing to happen determine whether 
events unfold in a positive or negative manner. Research in social psy-
chology has identified cognitive biases that tend to hamper our abilities 
to act rationally in concrete circumstances. Three of them are particu-
larly relevant in the context of voicing concerns about failures and mis-
takes. First, the sunk-cost fallacy is the tendency we have to remain 
committed to a decision or plan, even when we know that they are not 
living up to expectations. Second, the bystander effect indicates that the 
more people who are witnesses to a failure and can intervene, the less is 
the likelihood that anybody will actually make an intervention. Third, 
the confirmation fallacy makes us stick to initial assumptions and beliefs 
about states of affairs, and overlook information that gives us reason to 
revise them.
In decision-making and economics, a sunk cost is a cost that has 
already been incurred and cannot be recovered (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). From a perspective of rational decision-making, sunk cost 
should not affect current decisions about how to go forward, since 
whatever the decision-maker does from now on will not change the fact 
of that cost. Only prospective costs should be taken into consideration. 
In reality, sunk costs do influence decision-making and can make people 
pursue projects and plans that are not living up to expectations, or are 
not in line with their current priorities (Fischer, Greitemeyer, Pollozek, 
& Frey, 2006; Friedman, Pommerenke, Lukose, Milam, & Huberman, 
2007). The sunk-cost fallacy is sometimes also named as the Concorde 
fallacy, after the escalating and expensive efforts to make a success of 
that supersonic airplane (Arkes & Ayton, 1999).
Research on the sunk-cost fallacy has identified two psychological 
explanations for the bias. One is that information about failure creates 
cognitive dissonance (Gilad, Kaish, & Loeb, 1987; Staw, 1976). We 
want to believe that the initial decision was rational and correct, and 
now face information to the contrary. One way to reduce the mental 
discomfort of cognitive dissonance is to strengthen the belief in the 
decision to go ahead. Self-justification can take the form of continu-
ing to add resources to a project, thus keeping the discomfort at bay, 
and prolonging a bad project. We can agree with the saying that if you 
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have dug yourself into a hole, you should stop digging, but in reality, 
we struggle to live in accordance with that claim. The commitment to 
pour further resources into the project appears to be stronger the more 
personally responsible the decision-maker takes him- or herself to be for 
the initial decision to start (Bazerman, Giuliano, & Appelman, 1984; 
Staw, 1976).
The second explanation for the sunk-cost bias is loss aversion, or mis-
givings about wasting resources (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). When 
a person has bought a non-refundable ticket for a theatre show and 
finds on the evening of the show that another way to spend the even-
ing appears much more attractive, the sunk-cost fallacy can make that 
person decide to go to the theatre show after all, in order not to have 
wasted money on the ticket. Economists will claim that the person has 
the choice between double and single suffering, that is (1) the suffering 
of having paid for the ticket and the suffering of a suboptimal evening 
at the theatre, and (2) the suffering of having paid for the ticket and the 
pleasure of a better evening away from the theatre. Of these options, 
(2) is clearly the more rational, but in real life we can see a tendency to 
choose (1) (Arkes & Blumer, 1985).
Bolstad’s decision to terminate the E-archive project can be seen as 
a successful effort to overcome the sunk-cost fallacy. Considerable 
resources had already been invested in the project, and a decision to 
stop it would reflect badly on those who decided to go ahead with it. 
The first explanation of sunk-cost fallacy indicates that Bolstad and her 
top management team may have been inclined to continue the project, 
to keep the cognitive dissonance of admitting a previous mistake at bay. 
Furthermore, they faced a voice between (1) the suffering of having 
spent time and money on a failed project coupled with the suffering of 
failing to create a well-functioning digital depot and (2) the same suffer-
ing of having used resources on a failed project, coupled with an oppor-
tunity to pursue new initiatives, better designed for the purpose of 
delivering a functional digital archive for the Norwegian public sector.
The bystander effect is another psychological phenomenon that can 
stand in the way of effective communication about actual and immerg-
ing failures. Studies show that the presence of other people in a criti-
cal situation reduces the likelihood that a person will help. The more 
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people who are present as bystanders, the less likely that the person will 
take an initiative to help (Fischer et al., 2011; Latané, 1981; Latané 
& Darley, 1976; Latané & Nida, 1981). It has also been documented 
that people do not have to be physically present in order for bystander 
effects to occur, as it can also affect interactions on the internet (Barron 
& Yechiam, 2002; Blair, Thompson, & Wuensch, 2005). The phenom-
enon is alluded to in explanations of social networking (Chiu & Chang, 
2015) and the effectiveness of loyalty program marketing (Steinhoff & 
Palmatier, 2016). Bystander effects can also occur among small children 
(Plötner, Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2015).
It has not been empirically tested whether bystander effects can 
occur in organizational setting where employees are aware of weak-
nesses or mistakes in projects, but findings in other areas of research 
make it plausible that even in such contexts, the likelihood that any-
body will intervene to help in a project crisis can be affected by the size 
of the group of bystanders. The two main explanations of the bystander 
effect probably transfer over to organizational settings. First, diffu-
sion of responsibility is the tendency we have to attribute individual 
responsibility based on the number of people who are present (Darley 
& Latané, 1968). We tend to see a responsibility to intervene and do 
something as one particular entity, shared evenly and fairly among the 
people who are present. According to this line of thinking, if we are 
100 people present, we each have roughly 1/100 responsibility to do 
something. That is a very tiny piece of responsibility, and each of us can 
move away from the situation without having done anything, without a 
bad conscience. If we are 50 people present, that gives each of us about 
1/50 responsibility to intervene, which is twice as much as in the first 
scenario, but still only a minimal amount of responsibility. The moral 
reasoning behind diffusion of responsibility is flawed (Parfit, 1984). It 
seems reasonable to attribute responsibility more on the basis of what 
each individual is capable of doing, and give less weight to the num-
ber of people present. Despite philosophical arguments to the contrary, 
however, diffusion of responsibility is a common and stable feature in 
human behavior.
The second cause of the bystander effect is the well-documented phe-
nomenon of pluralistic ignorance, the tendency we have to adjust and 
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correct our own judgement of the situation at hand, in light of what 
we take to be other people’s judgements of it (Beu, Buckley, & Harvey, 
2000; Zhu & Westphal, 2011). A person may initially believe that the 
individuals in front of him or her need help. If a crowd of other people 
are behaving as if that is not the case, the person can mistakenly assume 
that (i) he or she is the only one present who believes that those individ-
uals need help and (ii) that the initial belief is false. A bystander effect 
can occur in a real and acute crisis when individuals start to doubt their 
own judgement due to the passivity of the people around them. Initial 
alarm at seeing other people in distress can vanish at the sight of a calm 
crowd.
It is possible to imagine similar processes in organizations, when ini-
tially promising ideas and plans turn out to have significant weaknesses. 
Bystander effects can put the detection of failure in a project on hold. 
First, a large group of people may have access to the relevant informa-
tion, but diffusion of responsibility can set in and make each of them 
believe that they only have a microscopic responsibility for voicing their 
concern, given the considerable size of the group that has the same 
information. Second, pluralistic ignorance can make each of those who 
have doubts about the project adjust their judgement because nobody 
else shows any signs of questioning the quality of the project. These two 
phenomena in tandem can cause a bystander effect, and thus a continu-
ation of projects that should have been identified as failures.
Even though the bystander effect lacks a reasonable foundation, it 
poses a challenge in organizational contexts where it is important to 
detect failure quickly and forcefully. One way to neutralize it can be 
to address individuals one by one and ask them for feedback about the 
particular project. If the project owner asks 100 people simultaneously 
about their beliefs about the current state of the project, face-to-face in 
an auditorium or through digital media, each them are likely to assume 
that they only have 1/100 responsibility to respond. In order to over-
come that effect, the project owner can address one individual at the 
time, and invite a response. That places the task of responding firmly 
in the lap of one individual and preempts diffusion of responsibility. A 
move of this kind is also likely to puncture pluralistic ignorance, since 
the respondent is now invited to express his or her personal beliefs, and 
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not those of the entire group. The move of addressing one respondent 
at the time does not guarantee that the feedback has high quality, but 
at least it appears to be an effective way of neutralizing the bystander 
effect.
The third psychological phenomenon that can affect identification 
of failure is confirmation fallacy. People tend to notice information 
that confirms their current beliefs, and disregard information that pro-
vides them with reasons to reconsider those beliefs (Hart et al., 2009; 
Nickerson, 1998; Shefrin, 2007). Perception psychology has identified 
one particular way that the confirmation fallacy can set in, focusing 
on the assumption that in order to see something, one simply needs to 
direct one’s eyes toward it. Simons and Chabris (1999) have challenged 
that assumption, most notably through their so-called gorilla experi-
ment. In that experiment, an audience watches a short film, where three 
people in white clothes and three people in black clothes walk around 
on a small area, passing basketballs to each other. The task for the audi-
ence is to count the number of times the white team manages to pass 
the ball to each other, while they ignore what the black team is doing. 
After seeing the film, the audience is asked whether they noticed any-
thing else happening in it. Some people claim to have seen a black figure 
walking across the playing field. When watching the film for the second 
time, now without the task of counting passes, everybody can see that a 
person dressed up as a gorilla walks slowly into the frame, stops in the 
middle of it, bangs his or her chest, and walks slowly out again. The 
gorilla is big, and people who do not see it the first time are amazed 
and surprised that they could fail to do so. Kahneman (2010, p. 24) 
has noted how the gorilla experiment illustrates the double nature of 
this blindness: “We can be blind to the obvious, and we are also blind to 
our blindness.” The research label for the phenomenon is inattentional 
blindness (Kreitz, Furley, Memmert, & Simons, 2016; Mack, 2003; 
Simons & Chabris, 1999).
In an organizational context, the people involved can have fixed 
beliefs about the quality of a project or idea and about the competence 
of the people involved in realizing it and overlook information that 
gives them reason to reconsider. The beliefs may be more optimistic 
and positive than the available information gives a foundation for, but 
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also more pessimistic and negative. Looking back on examples from the 
current chapter, the confirmation fallacy can stand in the way of real-
izing that:
• What appears to be a good idea is actually a failure (E-Archive).
• What appears to be a failure is actually a good idea (Post-It/Viagra/
Bottora’s lemon tart).
There can be similar challenges with regard to taking in information 
about the competence and behavior of people who have a particular sta-
tus in their professional environments:
• A person who has the status of being an expert is actually making or 
proposing a mistake.
• A person who has the status of being not that good is actually doing 
or proposing the right thing.
In order to overcome the confirmation fallacy, it can be necessary to 
invite other people to look at the situation and inquire about their per-
ceptions of it. Research and experience provide emphatic evidence of 
how powerful and pervasive the fallacy is, and how dependent we are 
at individual, group, and organizational levels on a communication cli-
mate where people speak up when they notice events and occurrences 
out of the ordinary.
This chapter has focused on the role of failure in innovative processes. 
Failure is an integral part of testing hypotheses and ideas about how 
things work, and in competitive contexts, it can be crucial to be able to 
fail fast. However, the stigma of failure can be present in many organi-
zational contexts, leading to continuation of projects that should have 
been terminated. The National Archives of Norway managed to break 
the stigma and stop the first attempt to develop a comprehensive digital 
depot for the public sector. In the process of doing so, they more or less 
explicitly overcame three psychological obstacles to learning from mis-
takes, in that they were not derailed by (i) the sunk-cost fallacy, (ii) the 
bystander effect, or (iii) the confirmation fallacy. They were also able to 
avoid the kind of blame-game that often characterizes the periods after 
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an organization has experienced failure. The coming chapters will dis-
cuss examples from other organizational settings, where the ambition 
may be different from innovative processes, but the obstacles to detect-
ing failure and voicing concern are similar. Even in those contexts, indi-
viduals can be blind to important aspects of their work, and blind to 
that blindness. They depend upon colleagues or other individuals in 
their proximity to speak up and intervene in critical quality moments, 
the situations where what happens next will determine whether things 
turn out well, nor not.
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“One fine summer day, a local fisher came to the nursing home door 
with buckets full of fresh fish that he had just caught from his boat. He 
wanted to give it to us free of charge. We rejoiced, and thought that 
now we could create a fish barbecue for the residents. They would be 
so happy to get fresh food straight from the sea on their plates. The air 
at the nursing home would be filled with the pleasant smell of grilled 
fish. Then one of us remembered what the law says about food at the 
nursing home. Everything we serve as food to the residents has to come 
from a registered supplier, and the fisher was not on the list. This meant 
that it would be illegal to grill and serve the fresh fish from the sea at 
the home. Still we felt that it would be the right thing to do, as it would 
be such a rich and thrilling experience for the residents” (Norlin & 
Borvik, 2016).
This event took place at Søbakken, a nursing home in the coastal 
town of Helgeroa in Norway. A change in leadership there in 2011 
brought about swift improvement in the work environment and in the 
living conditions for the residents. Søbakken had a bad reputation in 
the local community, both as a place to work and as a place to live. 
That changed rapidly when nurse Kristine Borvik took over as the 
leader of the nursing home, with nurse Helén Norlin as the assistant 
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leader. The development at Søbakken has come under scrutiny in a 
research project, based on data from interviews with employees, resi-
dents, relatives, and other people from the local community (Carlsen & 
Kvalnes, 2015). This chapter builds on further interviews with Borvik 
and Norlin, to unveil details in narratives concerning moral risk and 
fallibility at Søbakken. Their initiatives are studied through the lens of 
a distinction between active and passive mistakes, or between doing 
something you should not have done, and refraining from doing some-
thing you should have done. The activities they generated at the nurs-
ing home increased the likelihood of committing active mistakes, and 
reduced the likelihood of committing passive mistakes.
This chapter addresses three principled questions regarding responsi-
bility and risk at work: (1) To what extent do our moral evaluations of 
past decisions and behavior depend on actual outcomes? The concept 
of moral luck (Nagel, 1979; Williams, 1981) captures the paradoxical 
phenomenon that the way things actually turn out affect verdicts of the 
right or wrongness of what people do, even though we take morality 
to be a dimension of behavior where it is only reasonable to hold peo-
ple responsible for what has been within their control. (2) What kind 
of protection against sanctions should be in place for people who take 
risky decisions at work? Moral hazard occurs in situations where peo-
ple choose high-risk options because they feel insulated against taking 
the burden if things should end badly. A less acknowledged phenom-
enon is what we may call moral paralysis, where people become passive 
because they feel that they will have to take the burden alone if things 
should end badly. Moral hazard can lead to an overload of active mis-
takes, while moral paralysis can encourage passive mistakes. (3) What is 
the role of leaders in cases where either active or passive mistakes from 
employees lead to bad outcomes? The Søbakken activities did not lead 
to serious harm to residents, but might have done so, and that would 
have been at the test of the extent to which their closest local council 
leader would have stood by or distanced herself from the nursing home 
leaders.
The narratives in this chapter are mainly from a nursing home, but 
the discussion points to theoretical and practical implications beyond 
that field of work, with regard to how organizations (1) cope with moral 
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luck, (2) strike a balance between moral hazard and moral paralysis, and 
to how (3) leaders provide support to exposed and vulnerable employees 
in critical situations.
1  Active and Passive Mistakes
Crucial to the positive development at Søbakken was an initiative from 
the new leaders to involve employees and residents in reflections about 
how they wanted life to be there. The nurses started by asking them a 
very fundamental set of questions: What do you want? What is a good 
life for you here? (Carlsen & Kvalnes, 2015) In a reflection note, Borvik 
and Norlin write: “We have experienced that it is smart to dig some 
more when we ask our residents, and not be satisfied with “everything 
is OK, or I don’t know …”. We ask them what they used to do earlier 
in life when they were younger. What did you enjoy during the sum-
mer, when you were younger? If they cannot answer themselves, we ask 
a relative” (Norlin & Borvik, 2015).
The answers from the residents exposed misunderstandings about 
daily routines and preferences, but also a much more fundamental 
desire. The old people who lived at Søbakken wanted to have more con-
tact with life. Currently, they felt separated from meaningful activity, 
stored away from the rest of the community, out of sight, to wither and 
die. Many of the projects and initiatives at Søbakken in the months and 
years to follow attempted to bring the residents closer to the life outside 
the walls of the nursing home, both by inviting people outsiders of all 
ages in, and by taking the residents on trips. Activities like sightseeing 
bus tours, beer brewing, mini-concerts, exercise sessions, bazaars, boat 
trips, public reading sessions, Christmas tree lighting, visits from the 
local school band, and bathing trips to the sea, contributed to bringing 
the residents closer to life. The residents came more in touch with the 
community in which they had grown up and lived earlier (Carlsen & 
Kvalnes, 2015).
Autonomy and social functioning are important to human well-being 
at all stages of life, including old age (Bangerter, Heid, Abbott, & Van 
Haitsma, 2016; Paque, Goossens, Elseviers, Van Bogaert, & Dilles, 2016). 
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Bringing an old person out of his or her isolation at a nursing home and 
in tighter contact with life is in itself a commendable initiative, but will 
sometimes involve a raised risk of personal harm to that person. Moral 
risk is the kind of risk that exposes the decision-maker to moral criticism 
and blame, based on whether things go well or not. If the outcome is fine, 
the instigators are likely to receive praise, while if something goes wrong 
and the old person is harmed in some way, they can become subject to 
criticism and blame, and more formally to legal repercussions. One basic 
challenge for the leaders at Søbakken was that in order to meet the resi-
dents’ desire to come closer to life again, they also on some occasions had 
to increase the risk of harm, and thus expose themselves to moral risk. 
Going on a bus trip to the sea with fragile, old people involves more risk 
that something will go wrong than keeping them in the sofa back at the 
nursing home. One fragile old woman expressed an eager desire to swim 
in the sea, an activity she had loved earlier in life, but there was no way 
of telling in advance how her body would respond when it was brought 
into the rather cold sea water. The trip from the nursing home to the sea 
was also one where small accidents could affect her badly. Movement and 
activity are good in itself, but will be seen in a different light by relatives, 
authorities, and the media if someone ends up with a heart failure, a con-
cussion or a broken hip bone. The woman did get her desire fulfilled, and 
had a wonderful experience in the water, but taking her there was a risky 
endeavor.
We can apply a distinction between active and passive mistakes in 
order to conceptualize the change in moral orientation at Søbakken. 
You make an active mistake if you do something that you should not 
have done, and a passive mistake if you refrain from doing something 
that you should have done. In many work settings, the balance and pri-
ority between active or passive mistakes can make a considerable dif-
ference to practice. In surgery, the doctors can face situations of doubt 
about whether a patient suffers from appendicitis or not, and must 
decide to operate or not. Operating on a person who does not in fact 
have appendicitis will constitute an active mistake, doing something 
one should not have done, while sending a person with appendicitis 
home without surgery will be a passive mistake, refraining from doing 
something one should actually have done. During a year, the team of 
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doctors may face a number of doubt cases, and they are likely to make 
mistakes. They can make a conscious choice about what kind of mis-
take they are prepared to tolerate the most, either operating on someone 
who in fact does not need it, thus creating unnecessary complications 
and exposure to harm to that person, or failing to operate on someone 
who actually needs it, and prolonging the suffering for that person.
In a finance setting, the difference between active and passive mis-
takes can occur with regard to evaluations of which customers should 
and should not get a particular kind of loan. Even here, we can imag-
ine a set of doubtful cases, where it is uncertain whether customers are 
capable of handling the loan for which they have applied. It can be an 
active mistake to provide a loan to someone who will not be able to 
repay it and will have his or her economy put in jeopardy because of it. 
It will be a passive mistake to refuse a loan to someone who would be 
able to handle it well, and may now not be able to pursue a particular 
project, due to a lack of funding. Even in the bank context, a decision 
can be made regarding a higher or lower tolerance for active and passive 
mistakes.
In a nursing home, an active mistake can be to initiate some specific 
activity that leads to harm to one or more residents, while a passive 
mistake can be to refrain from doing something that would have been 
good and beneficial for them. The development at Søbakken involved a 
move towards taking risks that might end up as active mistakes, since 
they might have harmful outcomes. The established routines that the 
residents complained about, being stored away and separated from life, 
seemed designed to avoid active mistakes, with the unacknowledged con-
sequence of making passive mistakes of not giving them sufficient exer-
cise and movement, and distancing them from the local community.
The practice of pacifying residents in a nursing home can be seen as 
a result of omission bias, or the assumption that harmful outcomes of 
actions (active mistakes) are more serious and important to avoid than 
harmful outcomes of omissions (passive mistakes) (Asch et al., 1994; 
Baron & Ritov, 2004; Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 
1991). Omission bias indicates a more or less conscious preference for 
harm caused by omissions over equal or lesser harm caused by acts. 
Omission bias can affect vaccination decisions, in that many people 
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consider the risk of harm from vaccination as more serious than the risk 
from omitting vaccination (Ritov & Baron, 1990). There is a link here 
to attitudes towards risky play, discussed in chapter one. Harms that 
might occur when children climb trees or roam their neighborhood can 
be considered as more serious than the less tangible harms caused by 
shutting them off from those activities. Childhood research tells us that 
passivity in children can have a bad impact on their mental and physical 
development, but for a concerned and anxious parent, that consequence 
can appear to be more acceptable than the harm that can result from 
risky play (Sandseter & Kennair, 2011). Applied to a nursing home 
environment, omission bias can mean that harm caused by initiatives to 
activate residents are seen as more serious than harms from leaving resi-
dents with limited scope of action in their beds or rooms.
Omission bias can be placed in the context of a tendency to formu-
late ethics in proscriptive terms (this is what we should not do), with an 
emphasis on avoiding harm, and not in prescriptive terms (this is what 
we should do), where the aim is to advance positive outcomes (Carnes 
& Janoff-Bulman, 2012). This line of thinking builds on Kant’s distinc-
tion between negative and positive moral duty, between the moral duty 
to do no harm, and the moral duty to do good for others. A proscrip-
tive ethics has low tolerance for active mistakes and a higher tolerance 
for passive mistakes, and vice versa for a prescriptive ethics, The activi-
ties at Søbakken that came as responses to the residents’ wish to come 
closer to life indicate a prescriptive ethics, since the main motivation 
was to make positive differences in the lives of elderly people. Initiatives 
did raise the probability that active mistakes would occur, but lowered 
the probability of passive mistakes. The previous regime at the nursing 
home seems to have advocated a proscriptive ethics, with emphasis on 
safety and avoiding injury, and that appears to be the norm in the nurs-
ing of elderly people in Norway.
The commitment to bring residents closer to life, even at the expense 
of increased risk of harm, raises principled questions about the tolerance 
for active and passive mistakes. The next section returns to the open-
ing narrative of whether to arrange a fish barbecue for the residents at 
Søbakken. The concept of moral luck can be useful in shedding light 
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on the issues that are at stake in that situation, since it emphasizes how 
actual outcomes color the moral judgements we tend to make.
2  The Fish Dilemma
The local fisher had noticed the positive development at Søbakken, and 
wanted to contribute in his own way. That is why he turned up one 
morning with buckets full of fresh fish. The leaders at the nursing home 
wanted to make a barbecue for the residents, but realized that the law 
forbids them to do so. Fish should come frozen or vacuum packed from 
a registered supplier that would guarantee its quality and safety. That 
legal requirement makes sense from the perspective of food safety and 
protecting the residents from harm. Fish can be contaminated or con-
tain hazardous bones, and so pose a threat to the health of those who 
eat it. From a proscriptive standpoint, then, one should not serve fish 
from a local fisher, no matter how tempting that might be. On the 
other hand, from a prescriptive standpoint, one should try to enrich 
people’s lives when there is an opportunity to do so. A barbecue with 
fresh fish would be a thrilling and memorable event for the residents at 
Søbakken, one they would know to appreciate in full.
A decision to break the law and serve the fresh fish could be seen 
as an instance of civil disobedience, a situation where otherwise law-
abiding citizens give priority to moral considerations over legal ones, 
because they think the law is unreasonable. A justification of this kind 
can be interpreted to belong at the sixth stage of moral development, 
identified in Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (Kohlberg, 1973). 
On this stage, decisions are based on the application of universal ethical 
principles that are considered to be above local law and legislation. It 
is a stage where the Golden Rule and related principles like Kant’s cat-
egorical imperative dominate. Interviews with the leaders at Søbakken 
indicate that the principled question they asked themselves in times of 
doubt was whether they would have accepted that their own parents 
were subject to the decisions under consideration. Putting yourself in 
the shoes of those affected by your own decision is a typical ingredi-
ent of principled moral reasoning. In the fish dilemma, the leaders at 
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Søbakken reasoned about whether they would have accepted that the 
nursing home where their own parents stayed, arranged a grill party 
where they illegally served fresh fish from an unregistered supplier.
The fact that someone’s moral reasoning follows the pattern described 
by Kohlberg as belonging to the highest and most mature form of moral 
development is no indication that the decision is correct. Lunatics can 
reason in ways that perfectly follow the procedure drawn up in the max-
ims of Kant’s categorical imperative. We can distinguish between the 
form and content of moral reasoning, and suffice to say here is that con-
sidering to set the law aside and prioritizing one’s own moral convic-
tions has the form of Kohlberg’s sixth stage moral reasoning.
Opposition to the principled line of thinking at Kohlberg’s highest 
stage could come from someone on the fifth stage, where the emphasis 
is placed on social contracts and decisions based on democratic and pro-
fessional procedures (Kohlberg, 1973). The topic was raised in the inter-
view with the pilot Jarle Gimmestad. His general stance is to assume 
that one should do things by the book, since the rules and procedures 
have been designed under more or less ideal conditions, by people who 
are competent and well informed. “When you are in a heated situation, 
with limited access to information and pressure to make a quick deci-
sion, you can assume that the outlined rules have been established by 
calm heads, who have had time to consider the ramifications of the vari-
ous alternatives” (Gimmestad, 2016). Kohlberg ranks the social contract 
reasoning below that of the principled, universal one, but that in itself 
does not suffice to say that a decision based on the latter is better than 
one based on the former.
True to their prescriptive stance, the leaders at Søbakken decided to 
create a barbecue for the residents. In an email, Helén Norlin explained: 
“One of our aims at the nursing home was to create “the good life” for 
the residents, and we could put many of our ideas and projects under that 
motto. “The good life” also has to do with trusting people in the local 
community and their wish to contribute to the wellbeing of those liv-
ing at Søbakken. That included the fisher. We had complete trust in him 
when he said that the fish was fresh from the sea and of the best qual-
ity. Many at the nursing home were personally acquainted with him, and 
knew that he had the best intentions and was reliable” (Norlin, 2016).
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The leaders called in extra volunteers to analyze each piece of fish 
carefully before it was put on a plate and served to a resident, to mini-
mize the risk of harm. The barbecue was a great success, causing jubila-
tion among the residents. The air was filled with the smells of a good 
life by the sea, and nobody got hurt in any way. The leaders avoided 
repercussions for breaking the law and taking the risk.
The author has presented the grill party dilemma to professionals 
and managers in healthcare and in HSE functions on a number 
of occasions, and asked them to take a stand. It has been interest-
ing to observe how the case evokes different moral intuitions about 
whether it is acceptable to go ahead and serve the fish, or not. A 
majority tends to say yes to the grill party, while a vocal minority 
says they would turn down that offer, based on a respect for legis-
lation, and in the name of food safety. One leader from a local 
council, when presented with the case, said he would have taken 
immediate steps to dismiss the leaders at Søbakken, had the inci-
dent happened in his organization. He did not accept the fact that 
the grill party created happiness and joy among the residents and 
employees as evidence that it was morally right and acceptable to 
initiate it. Instead, he was concerned about the lack of respect for 
legislation, and what could follow of further unlawful actions, once 
this one was deemed acceptable.
It is likely that the responses to the grill party would have been dra-
matically different if one or more of the residents had actually got a 
fishbone stuck in the throat or been harmed in some other way. People 
may applaud risk-taking when things go well, but if they go through 
some unfortunate circumstance they do not and somebody is injured, 
the judgement may be less positive, and even critical. The concept of 
moral luck highlights how actual outcomes affect moral evaluations of 
what people do and fail to do (Nagel, 1979; Williams, 1981). It was 
been widely discussed from a range of philosophical and practical per-
spectives (Biss, 2016; Hankins, 2016; Levy, 2016; Statman, 2015; 
Whittington, 2015). Moral luck appears to be an oxymoron, in that we 
are prone to think that the moral quality of what we do cannot depend 
on circumstances beyond our control. In reality, actual outcomes do 
affect our moral judgements, as Nagel notes.
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Whether we succeed or fail in what we try to do nearly always depends to 
some extent on factors beyond our control. This is true of murder, altru-
ism, revolution, the sacrifice of certain interests over others – almost any 
morally important act. What has been done, and what is morally judged, 
is partly determined by external factors. However jewel-like the good will 
may be in its own right, there is a morally significant difference between 
rescuing someone from burning building and dropping him from a 
twelfth-storey window while trying to rescue him. Similarly, there is a 
morally significant difference between reckless driving and manslaugh-
ter. But whether a reckless driver hits a pedestrian depends on the pres-
ence of the pedestrian at the point where he recklessly passes the red light. 
(Nagel, 1979, p. 28)
The jewel-metaphor Nagel alludes to is from Kant’s description of the 
good will, the motivation to act, which the German thinker considered 
as the only proper object of moral judgement, since it has full value in 
and of itself, independently of outcomes. In opposition to that view, 
Nagel draws attention to how external factors affect even the description 
of the act itself, of what a person has done. There is a morally significant 
difference, he argues, between a successful and an unsuccessful rescue 
attempt.
Similarly, we can say that there is a morally significant difference 
between creating a barbecue and a rich sensory experience of a good life 
for an elderly person, and giving him or her a final and painful meal. 
Theoretically, we may be convinced by Kant’s argument regarding the 
good will, but once that moral reasoning exercise is over, fall back to a 
habit of giving moral weight to actual outcomes. There is a considerable 
tension between the general conviction that morality is unaffected by 
luck, and the particular moral judgements that are significantly influ-
enced by how things happen to turn out. If a resident gets a bone in the 
throat and dies during the barbecue, it will affect the moral judgement 
of the decision to break the law and serve the fish.
Food was also at the core of smaller, everyday dilemmas at Søbakken, 
where the motivation to improve the quality of life for the residents came 
up against legal restrictions on what they could eat. One recurring issue 
was that residents would sometimes not be ready to eat at the specified 
times for serving hot food, because they were tired or asleep or indisposed 
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in other ways. The solution could then be to reheat the food 2 or 3 hours 
later, when they were awake and hungry. However, the option to reheat 
food was illegal. From a legal point of view, that food should either be 
eaten in its current state of being cold, or thrown away. The restriction 
against reheating food is based on food safety and a concern for the health 
of the residents, and in many or most instances, it appears to be reason-
able and make sense. At Søbakken, they decided to take a principled 
approach to each separate situation, and sometimes ended up making 
the evaluation that this particular instance of reheating food would not 
pose a health threat, and was morally acceptable. Sometimes they would 
put leftover potatoes in the fridge overnight, and fry and serve them the 
next day, instead of throwing what they saw as perfectly fine food (Norlin 
& Borvik, 2016). Again, the responses to these small instances of civil 
disobedience and priority to personal, principled moral reasoning over 
Norwegian legislation, would have been seen in a completely different 
light if it had happened to cause harm to one or more residents.
3  Moral Hazard and Moral Paralysis
Attitudes towards moral luck from the decision-maker’s perspective 
are likely to depend on the perception of personal cost. To what extent 
will I have to bear a personal burden if things go badly? In the moral 
risk literature, emphasis tends to be on the phenomenon of moral haz-
ard, or on how people who feel protected against negative costs of their 
actions, tend to take higher risk than they otherwise would have done, 
due to the perception that they will not have to bear the burden if things 
go wrong. Moral hazard occurs when an insurance customer takes a 
higher risk with his or her properties, based on the knowledge that if 
things go wrong, the insurance company will pay the cost (Aron-Dine, 
Einav, Finkelstein, & Cullen, 2015; Parsons, 2003; Sealey, Gandar, & 
Mazumdar, 2016). In the classical sense, moral hazard in insurance refers 
to “(t)he possibility that the policyholder, knowing that he is insured, 
will change his behavior in a way that produces undesirable outcomes: 
in particular, he may become more careless” (Parsons, 2003, p. 448). 
More generally, a person insulated from risk, may become careless and 
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engage in more risk taking than he would have done if he had been fully 
exposed to risk. He or she is less careful, since the cost of any mishaps 
for the most part will be taken care of by other parties. Most insurance 
companies are keenly aware of the dangers of moral hazard, and are 
therefore wary of offering conditions where the customers only have to 
take an insignificant part of the burden in case of an accident.
Moral hazard also occurs when banks and other financial institu-
tions engage in reckless transactions and investments, on the assump-
tion that the authorities will save them if the market collapses. In work 
settings, the highest ranked professionals in an organization can engage 
in harassment and other anti-social behavior, expecting that their exper-
tise and status as being irreplaceable experts will protect them against 
sanctions. Under such conditions, the agents do not fear moral luck, 
because they perceive themselves as invulnerable. For this reason, they 
may not hesitate to engage in an activity that may turn out to go horri-
bly wrong. More specifically, moral hazard occurs in health care settings 
where the moral risks in relation to different treatments are measured 
(Antommaria & King, 2016; Brunnquell & Michaelson, 2016).
The distinction between active and passive mistakes is useful in iden-
tifying the behavioral consequences of moral hazard. Human beings 
make mistakes of both kinds, but under a moral hazard regime, it is 
more likely that active mistakes dominate. The decision-maker worries 
less about the personal consequences, and takes more risk than if he or 
she would have had to take the burden of failure. From the decision-
maker’s perspective, moral hazard neutralizes the threat of bad moral 
luck: It may exist, but that is not a worry for a person who experiences 
protection against punishment or other forms of negative consequences 
for having caused bad outcomes.
Another important and somehow neglected phenomenon in 
decision-making and moral risk is on the other side of the perceived 
protection spectrum from moral hazard. A decision-maker who feels 
fully exposed to repercussion in the event of a bad outcome, even 
when the risk he or she have taken appears to have been reasonable, 
will tend to act in an overtly cautious manner, and avoid doing any-
thing that might conceivably end up badly. Fear of bad moral luck 
can lead to what we may call moral paralysis, a passive and cautious 
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pattern of conduct. The decision-maker expects blame and criticism, 
even if the unfortunate unfolding of events has been highly unex-
pected, and strongly influenced by unforeseeable circumstances. If 
things go wrong, they expect to be alone in having to take the moral 
burden, with limited or no support from the organization or network 
to which they belong. With moral paralysis, a decision-maker will 
tend to avoid what could turn out to be active mistakes, and thus end 
up making passive mistakes instead.
In school settings, moral paralysis can lead teachers to keep children 
indoors to avoid responsibility for harmful consequences of risky play in 
the schoolyard. A report from the Association of Teachers and Lecturers 
in the United Kingdom documents widespread bans on traditional chil-
dren’s games in schools, and prohibitions against letting pupils play out-
side in the snow in winter, out of fear that they might slip and hurt 
themselves (ATL, 2011). The report connects a sharp decline in field 
trips outside the schools to the demand for detailed risk assessments of 
the situations that might occur during such trips. It has created a reluc-
tance amongst teachers to take personal responsibility for harm to the 
pupils, no matter how unexpected and improbable. As noted in chap-
ter one, risky play in childhood can have a crucial anti-phobic effect, 
in that it allows children to gain experiences in dealing with dangerous 
situations (Sandseter & Kennair, 2011). Moral paralysis amongst pre-
school and school teachers, then, can have the negative effect of bar-
ring children from engaging in healthy anti-phobic activities. Avoiding 
the active mistake of allowing children be involved in play that actually 
harms them, takes precedence over avoiding the passive mistake of iso-
lating children from potentially important learning experiences.
Moral luck is a worry for a decision-maker operating under moral 
paralysis, because he or she will personally have to bear the burden of 
actual negative outcomes. It calls for cautious decision-making and 
behavior, a risk-averse attitude geared towards not being involved in any 
kind of activity that might conceivably harm anyone, the moral equiva-
lent of strict liability in law.
Moral reasoning and decision-making in organizations need to find a 
path between the polarities of moral hazard and moral paralysis, a golden 
mean between excessive and stifled moral risk-taking among professionals.
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Applied to a nursing home context, we can imagine that the deci-
sion-makers face one hundred situations where they have the oppor-
tunity to enrich the lives of the residents by exposing them to risk of 
harm. Under moral hazard conditions, they do not have personal incen-
tives to be cautious, and can thus end up choosing the risky option 
every time, while under moral paralysis conditions, they will have 
to bear the personal burden in case of an accident, and may therefore 
reject the risky option every time. The middle ground is one where lead-
ers and employees at a nursing home will sometimes take chances and 
involve the residents in activities that are at once enriching and poten-
tially harmful, and at other times say no to these options.
4  Supportive Leadership
The two leaders at Søbakken started a range of activities with the resi-
dents at the nursing home, in order to meet their desire to come closer 
to life, and some of them involved a raised risk of harm. In taking these 
decisions and initiatives, they had the support of their own leader in the 
local council. She was a person they would call in moments of doubt, in 
order to get clearance for going ahead with a risky plan. The narratives 
from Søbakken indicate that the decision-making and activities took 
place in the middle ground between moral hazard and moral paralysis, 
that is, between the extremes of being fully insulated against negative 
consequences of one’s own actions, and of being alone in bearing the 
cost of any unwelcome outcome of one’s decisions. The resolve of the 
local council leader to stand by the leaders at Søbakken in case of an 
accident or misadventure was never put to the test, because such situ-
ations never happened. To some extent, that leader may have had good 
moral luck in the circumstances she faced. Nagel describes this category 
of moral luck as follows:
The things we are called upon to do, the moral tests we face, are impor-
tantly determined by factors beyond our control. It may be true of some-
one that in a dangerous situation he would have behaved in a cowardly 
or heroic fashion, but if the situation never arises, he will never have the 
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chance to distinguish or disgrace himself in this way, and his moral record 
will be different. … (O)ne is morally at the mercy of fate, and it may 
seem irrational on reflection, but our ordinary moral judgements would 
be unrecognizable without it. We judge people for what they actually do 
or fail to do, not just for what they would have done if circumstances had 
been different. (Nagel, 1979, pp. 33–34)
Along this line of thinking, the council leader who supported the pro-
scriptive activities and initiatives at Søbakken may have lived up to her 
word of standing by the decision-makers even in the face of an actual 
misadventure, or not. She never had the chance to distinguish or dis-
grace herself in this manner, and so may either have had bad or good 
circumstantial moral luck in that regard.
Other leaders have had their abilities to stand by their subordinates 
tested and exposed. In 2007, two ambulance workers in Oslo experi-
enced a lack of leadership support in the aftermath of an incident where 
they mistakenly thought a person did not need to be taken to the hospi-
tal (Schjenken, 2008; Østli, 2008, 2009). During a dramatic encounter 
in a crowded park in Oslo, one person had been knocked down, and 
was bleeding from a head wound. The ambulance personnel checked 
him to find out if he would need further treatment at the hospital. They 
thought that he probably was on drugs, and decided to get him to his 
feet and take him to the hospital. Once on his feet, the man started 
to pee on the shoes and trousers of one of the ambulance people, and 
then went over to the ambulance and peed on that as well. Now the 
two professionals reconsidered their initial judgement, and thought the 
wounded man should be handed over to the police, who were also pre-
sent. Surrounded by an angry crowd, the ambulance personnel decided 
to leave the park without the injured man. Later, it turned out that the 
wounded man had serious head injuries, and these most likely caused 
his aggressive behavior. He should have been taken immediately to hos-
pital for treatment, and the delay in treatment probably worsened his 
condition (Østli, 2008).
The wounded man was dark skinned, and on the day after the inci-
dent, Kristin Halvorsen, the Finance Minister of Norway indicated 
that the ambulance personnel was racists. “Could this have happened 
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to a white father of small children? Probably not.” (Magnus, 2007) 
The two ambulance workers received heavy criticism for racism, negli-
gence, and bad professional work. In the beginning, the hospital leader-
ship appeared to stand by them, but as the media storm increased in 
intensity, they decided to suspend the two, and start internal investiga-
tions. The top leaders at the hospital expressed concern for the repu-
tation of the organization, and saw it fit to distance themselves from 
the two employees. The two ambulance workers were forbidden by their 
employer to make statements in the media about the incident, while the 
critical voices could be heard everywhere (Østli, 2008).
During the suspension, one of the ambulance workers quit his job, 
while the other decided to go public with his version of the story. He 
was a vastly experienced ambulance driver, with more than 100.000 
previous assignments during 17 years, without negative remarks. Before 
the dramatic event in the park, he had just washed the ambulance 
clean of blood and urine from a previous incident, and he and his col-
league had further assignments on the same day, after the park incident 
(Schjenken, 2008). Little did they know that their professional lives 
would be ruined because of a serious mistake in the park. The second 
ambulance worker also initially quit his job at the hospital, and later 
won a High Court case against one of the newspapers that labeled him a 
racist (Johansen, 2014).
Apparently, the ambulance personnel did not receive proper leader-
ship support in the aftermath of the incident (Østli, 2008, 2009). They 
made a serious passive mistake, in not taking the injured man to the 
hospital, and had to take the total burden of the negative outcome on 
their own shoulders. The driver who has been most public about his 
experiences has talked openly about mental problems and thoughts of 
suicide. The top leadership at the hospital made it clear that they did 
not want to see him back in activities where he would have direct con-
tact with patients, the kind of work he had excelled in previously (Østli, 
2008). They questioned his ability to do the kind of work he found the 
most meaningful, helping and making a positive difference to other 
people. The hospital did have a psychological service for employees, 
but did not actively offer it in this case. It is very likely that the per-
sonal outcomes for the employees would have been vastly different if 
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the leaders had stood up for them and offered support in the aftermath 
of the dramatic park incident (Østli, 2008).
Social workers are another group of professionals who face constant 
risks to their moral integrity, in that they have to make decisions that 
can negatively affect the lives of others. They, too, are vulnerable to 
bad moral luck (Hollis & Howe, 1987). A child may be at possible risk 
from parents, and the social workers must decide whether to remove the 
child from its home. The distinction between active and passive mis-
takes is relevant here. During one year, the social workers may remove 
children that would actually have been remained unharmed by par-
ents, an active mistake, and also decide not to remove children, who 
as it happens turns out to be harmed by parents, a passive mistake. The 
former kind of mistake cannot easily be documented, in the way the 
latter can. Ambulance workers encounter a similar challenge in bal-
ancing between intervention and help, and deciding that the persons 
in pain will manage well without professional assistance. Mistakes will 
occur in these circumstances. They are moral minefields, and the profes-
sionals who work under this kind of pressure to their morality deserve 
leadership support, even at the risk of weakened reputation. A leader, 
who prioritizes short-term reputational gain over long-term support 
for employees under pressure, is likely to lose internal credibility in the 
organization.
This chapter has explored the concept of moral risk, and the 
distinction between active and passive mistakes, primarily by using exam-
ples from the nursing home context of Søbakken. It has focused on three 
questions that have both theoretical and practical aspects: (1) To what 
extent do our moral evaluations of past decisions and behavior depend 
on actual outcomes? The concept of moral luck captures a paradoxi-
cal dimension of moral reasoning. On the one hand, we tend to assume 
that people should only be held responsible for aspects of their decision-
making and conduct that are within their control. On the other hand, 
it seems to make a morally relevant difference whether we succeed or 
fail in our endeavors to help or support other people. We have seen that 
omission bias is the tendency to judge harm caused by action to be more 
serious than the similar harm that comes about through omission or inac-
tion. The Søbakken activities enriched the residents’ lives in multiple 
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ways, but also in some cases increased the likelihood of harm. The leaders 
at the nursing home generated a shift from a proscriptive ethics, accen-
tuating the negative duty of not hurting others, to a prescriptive ethics, 
answering to the positive duty of creating wellbeing and a good life. That 
move made it relevant to pose the question of (2) what kind of protection 
against sanctions should be in place for people who take risky decisions 
at work. The suggestion in this chapter has been that there is a need to 
find a middle ground between moral hazard, where people feel insulated 
against taking the burden if things should end badly, and moral paralysis, 
where people become passive because they feel that they will have to take 
the burden alone if things should end badly. Moral hazard can lead to 
an overload of active mistakes, while moral paralysis can encourage pas-
sive mistakes. Leaders are the prime initiators of practices to handle moral 
risk. Thus, the latter part of the chapter has addressed (3) what the role of 
leaders is in cases where either active or passive mistakes from employees 
lead to bad outcomes. These are the situations where the leaders’ ability to 
stand by their subordinates comes to the test, and where some fail, while 
others truly excel.
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“After takeoff from Kristiansand on our way to Oslo, we experienced a 
brake pressure leak that caused some shaking in the plane. We tried the 
standard procedures to neutralize it, with no effect. Then we tested other 
options, and found that the shaking stopped when we put on the brakes. 
The co-pilot and I agreed that of course we would release the brakes 
before landing. Now we had found an unconventional solution to an 
immediate problem, and would switch back to the normal non-deploy-
ment of the brakes when preparing for landing. Usually, when there is 
something out of the ordinary that we need to remember, we create a 
reminder, by taping a piece of paper to the window in the cockpit, or 
something odd like that. This time we did not do that, since we thought 
it was unnecessary. Checking that the brakes were off would turn up not 
only once, but twice in the checklist procedures before landing, so to our 
minds, there was no risk at all that we would forget to release the brakes. 
The flight continued, and we did the first check. I answered automati-
cally that brakes are off, without actually thinking and taking them off. 
Then later, for the second time, we did a checklist procedure, and again I 
answered as I always do, that brakes are off. The result was that we landed 
with the brakes on, and it was a very rough and unpleasant experience for 
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the passengers and the staff onboard. The tires exploded, and the plane 
came to a halt across the runway, and not parallel to it, as it should have. 
Nobody got seriously injured, but it was a shocking experience for every-
body, not easy to shake off and forget” (Gimmestad, 2016).
Jarle Gimmestad is an experienced former pilot, who now works as 
a safety consultant in industry, healthcare, and travel. His own story 
about landing with the brakes on serves as evidence that pilots, like the 
rest of us, are prone to make mistakes. He also uses it as an invitation to 
participants in seminars about safety to open up about their own pro-
fessional fallacies and mistakes, lowering the threshold to do so. Once 
the former pilot has admitted a mistake, it is easier for others to do the 
same. The conversation can begin about human errors and the ways in 
which to deal with them.
The introduction to this book included another Gimmestad narra-
tive, about the driver of the pushback tractor who made the pilot aware 
of dripping from the wing, and who persisted with his feedback, even 
after the pilot had signaled a stop to the conversation. It illustrates 
the strong emphasis on teamwork in aviation. Even the lowest ranked 
employee has a responsibility to intervene in a situation where he or she 
senses that something is wrong. It is also the responsibility of the high-
est ranked employee to take such interventions seriously.
The main sources of data for the current chapter are extensive inter-
views with Gimmestad about safety in aviation. We first met in 2009, 
when I was writing a book in Norwegian about fallibility at work 
(Kvalnes, 2010), and have remained in contact since then. The rela-
tion has gone beyond that of being researcher and informant, in that we 
have taught seminars and given conference presentations together, com-
bining theoretical and practical, experience-based input about fallibility 
at work. The interview method has been one where we talk extensively 
about narratives and cases, I write them down, get feedback from him 
about the content, and rewrite the text accordingly. The primary theo-
retical input in this chapter is a barrier model to structure thinking and 
activity connected to safety (Reason, 1990). It has applicability beyond 
aviation and safety. Organizations can use it to (a) create awareness, (b) 
implement analysis and (c) prepare for action in settings where errors 
can lead to unwelcome outcomes.
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1  Inattentional Blindness
Safety in aviation has improved in recent decades because of a shared 
realization that pilots are fallible beings. There has been a shift in atti-
tude, from seeing pilots as extraordinary, infallible individuals who 
could be trusted to bring the plane safely to its destination, to under-
standing air travel as depending on teamwork, where all the individuals 
involved depend on feedback and support from others. The realization 
that each individual is fallible and depends upon others to intervene 
when he or she appears to make a mistake has caused a breakthrough 
in safety practices (Helmreich & Davies, 2004; Stoop & Kahan, 2005). 
The development has been noted in healthcare, where the aviation 
approach has inspired similar practices of coping with fallibility (Kao & 
Thomas, 2008; Pronovost, et al., 2009; Aviram, Benyamini, Lewenhoff, 
& Wilf-Miron, 2003). Strategies for learning from mistakes in health-
care is explored further in the next chapter.
Personal narratives about mistakes are a rich source for learning 
(Bister, Bledow, Carette, & Kühnel, 2017; Gould & Rami, 2016). Jarle 
Gimmestad shares a range of stories from his own time in the cockpit 
with his audiences. A story about the aftermath of the brake incident 
and how it was handled in his organization, generate further learning 
points. Two aspects stand out, one regarding knowledge, and another 
regarding perception. First, his bosses were pondering what to do with 
Gimmestad after the event, and ended up sending him on a three-days 
course in how brakes function, thus indicating that what he had been 
lacking on that dramatic day was basic brake knowledge. They reduced 
the problem to something concrete and tangible that could be fixed by 
introducing the pilot to new knowledge. From a philosophical perspec-
tive, this can be seen as a contemporary version of Socrates’ idea that 
for a person to do the good, it is enough that he knows the good. As an 
explanation of Gimmestad’s mistake, it seems rather weak and uncon-
vincing. It is unlikely that he forgot to put off the brakes because he did 
not know about the functioning of the brakes, and would have acted 
differently if that knowledge had been in his possession at the time of 
the event. Sending Gimmestad on that course appears to originate from 
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a misunderstanding of the causes of his conduct, a simplistic and tech-
nical response to a complex set of challenges connected to fallibility and 
the interaction between human beings and technology.
Second, the words most emphasized by Gimmestad’s main boss in 
the conversation after the event were that he trusted that there would be 
no repetition of that particular kind of mistake. “I am sure that you will 
never again land with the brakes on in your pilot career.” He has turned 
out to be right about that, but on hindsight, Gimmestad believes that 
his boss’ words made him exaggerate his attention to the brakes, at the 
expense of other and equally important aspects of the situation before, 
during, and after a flight (Gimmestad, 2016).
When a person is encouraged to focus on one particular aspect of a 
complex situation, it can lead a blindness to other significant aspects, as 
documented in studies in perception psychology (Mack, 2003; Chabris 
& Simons, 1999). When you tell a pilot or a professional in other set-
tings that they are not likely to that particular mistake again, it can cre-
ate a strong motivation to make your words come true. That in itself 
can trigger aspect blindness since it draws the professional’s attention to 
one particular aspect of the situation, much as in the gorilla experiment 
(Chabris & Simons, 1999), mentioned in Chap. 2. Gimmestad says 
that the period after the dramatic landing was one where he was par-
ticularly attentive to the brakes, and made himself vulnerable to over-
look other important matters in the cockpit. That might have been the 
time in his career when the safety of flying with him was at its lowest.
Inattentional blindness is a phenomenon that poses a threat to safety, 
and to the success of other collaborative processes. One by one, indi-
viduals have a limited ability to perceive what goes on around them, and 
depend upon colleagues to intervene when they are blind to significant 
aspects of what goes on in their work environment. As noted earlier, the 
experience of being blind to something that is right in front of their eyes 
comes as a considerable surprise to participants in experimental studies. 
It can generate a realization that we are dependent to a high degree of 
input from other people’s perspectives in order to get a rich and ade-
quate understanding of what goes on in our work environment. The 
next section focuses on a model central to systematic efforts in aviation 
to counter the pervasive threat of inattentional blindness. It is a model 
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that can be adopted in other organizational settings to create awareness 
and readiness for action in situations where people make mistakes.
2  A Barrier Model
Over the years, reflection on practice has strengthened safety in avia-
tion. A combination of practical and academic contributions have 
highlighted the need for precise and direct communication, and a devel-
opment from a heroic and individualistic approach, to a more collec-
tive one, where teamwork is essential. Theoretical contributions from 
Reason (1990) have been central to this development, first through the 
establishment of a vocabulary to distinguish between different kinds of 
error, and second through his so-called Swiss Cheese Model for dealing 
adequately with error (Reason, 1990). Both of these conceptual sources 
have relevance beyond aviation, as they can be useful in analyses of fal-
libility and error outside the safety domain.
Reason distinguishes between execution errors and planning errors. 
With the former, the plan is fine, but the execution faulty, while with 
the latter things go wrong from the start, since the plan is inadequate 
for the task ahead. Furthermore, he separates between two kinds of 
execution errors, and calls them slips and lapses. Slips are actions not 
carried out as intended or planned, as when a person struggles with 
digits on a phone when dialing in a frequency. There can be “Freudian 
slips” when a person intends to say one thing, but inadvertently ends up 
saying something revealing about his or her real attitudes or thoughts. 
The idea is good, but not the execution. Lapses are missed actions 
and omissions, as when somebody has failed to do something due to 
lapses of memory or attention, or because they have forgotten some-
thing. Gimmestad’s landing with the brakes on is an example of a lapse 
(Reason, 1990).
A student presented another example of a lapse to me at a seminar at 
the Norwegian Police University College. The agent was a police officer 
who was an expert at rapidly disarming people who point a gun at him. 
He had built up this expertise through thousands of repetitions in training. 
The police officer had asked colleagues and friends countless times to 
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point a gun at him, and he wrestled it off them with amazing speed, 
repeatedly. When he encountered a real and dangerous situation, com-
ing face to face with a gunman in a supermarket, things went well in 
the beginning. He used his impressive skill to quickly take the weapon 
out of the hands of the gunman, thus removing his ability to cause seri-
ous harm. Then, the policeman proceeded to hand the weapon back 
to the gunman, reinstating him in a position to cause harm. That was 
the movement automated though all the repetitions with colleagues 
and friends. He had grabbed the weapon, handed it back, grabbed the 
weapon, handed it back again, repeatedly. The police officer was saved 
through the intervention of a colleague, who was able to disarm the per-
plexed gunman a second time. A lesson from this example is that it mat-
ters how you frame the training situation, since every movement can 
become automated, even unwelcome ones like handing a weapon back 
to the person who initially has it in his or her hands.
Slips and lapses, then, are execution errors. In Reason’s vocabulary, 
they differ from mistakes, which are a type of error brought about by 
a faulty plan or intention. You make a planning error or mistake when 
you do something believing that it is the appropriate and correct thing 
to do, when in fact it is not. As discussed in the previous chapter, we 
can distinguish between active and passive mistakes, where an active 
mistake is to do something you should in fact not have done, while a 
passive mistake is to refrain from doing something you should in fact 
have done.
A common feature of slips, lapses, and mistakes is that they can 
start a chain of events that lead to some sort of accident or unfortu-
nate outcome. Reason argues that systematic analyses of accidents need 
to take into account why the error has occurred. It is easy to start the 
blame game and point the finger at the person who has slipped, lapsed, 
or made a mistake, but a thorough understanding of the event at hand 
needs to clarify the systemic aspects. To what extent have the persons 
who erred received proper support, training, and guidance? To what 
extent can long working hours or other potentially stressful factors have 
contributed to the error? Questions like these are geared towards detect-
ing the root causes of the event, and to keep at bay the understandable 
instinct to find a scapegoat.
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Reason’s (1990) Swiss Cheese Model contains three main elements: 
Error, barriers, and accidents. The main idea is that an error sets in 
motion a chain of events that leads to an accident, unless there are bar-
riers in place to stop it. Gimmestad started landing procedures with 
the brakes on, and although that lapse did not result in casualties, the 
resulting landing constitutes an accident. It could have been avoided if 
there had been barriers in place to stop the causal chain. Reason distin-
guishes between three kinds of barrier elements: Technology, procedures 
and rules, and human intervention. At the time when Gimmestad made 
the landing with brakes on, there was no technology in place to pre-
vent it from happening. There were procedures to make him and the co-
pilot consider the brake issue, but that did not suffice to stop the chain 
of events either. Finally, the human element could have consisted in an 
intervention from the co-pilot, who could have challenged Gimmestad 
and been more alert to the brake issue. Today, technological improve-
ment is in place, making it impossible to replicate the mistake of land-
ing with the brakes on. That came about as an acknowledgement that 
these are the kinds of errors humans are likely to make, and that cannot 
be eliminated through training or exercises in awareness.
When a pilot makes a mistake, and the barriers are not sufficiently 
strong to halt the fatal causal chain it sets in motion, the bad outcome 
normally occurs quite rapidly, in a matter of seconds or minutes. In 
other settings, the time from the mistake to the unwanted result can be 
much longer. On September 8, 1989, Partnair Flight 394 crashed off 
the coast of Hirtshals in Denmark, and all the fifty five people on board 
died. The main cause of the crash was a mistake made three years ear-
lier, when cheap, counterfeit aircraft parts where used instead of original 
ones, to fix the tail of the aircraft. These parts where not of the required 
quality, and gradually wore out, leading to a collapse of the tail. The 
mistake of using low-quality parts set in motion a causal chain of events 
that ended in the fatal accident three years later (Report on the Convair 
340 aircraft accident, 1993). Inspections of the aircraft could have func-
tioned as barrier elements to stop it, but in this case, there were neither 
technological, procedural, nor human factors in place to avoid the crash 
from happening.
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I have applied Reason’s model in offshore engineering settings, 
and asked experienced professionals to provide examples from their 
own work environment, where a mistake can lead to an accident or 
unwanted event. One engineer said that if he made a mistake on the 
drawing board today, and nobody, including himself noticed, it could 
set off a chain of events leading to a bad outcome in about three years, 
at the bottom of the ocean, where some components in a complex 
structure would not fit together or not function properly. Even in 
that kind of work environment, there is a need for efficient barriers to 
stop the mistake from causing a negative outcome. Technology, pro-
cedures, or human intervention can serve to identify the mistake and 
break off the series of events that otherwise will lead to an unwelcome 
result. Three years provides more time for a barrier to work, but it 
might be that the crucial time to detect the mistake and stop it from 
causing trouble is quite short. If nobody notices anything or takes 
action in the beginning, there may be no further quality checks of the 
drawings. The production phase sets in with an undetected mistake 
on board.
In the engineering context, I inquired about whether people who 
detect mistakes and intervene receive applause in their work environ-
ment. One way to strengthen the barrier system can be to celebrate 
the instances where a person voices a concern and steps out of passiv-
ity. Depending on the size and importance of the project and the sav-
ings brought about through the intervention, the active person can 
receive minor or major hero treatment. The response from the engineer-
ing group was that the heroes in their work environment are not those 
who speak up in critical quality moments, but rather those who step 
in once an unwelcome event has occurred, at the bottom of the ocean 
or elsewhere. These are the people who do damage limitation, and are 
experts at fixing things that are already broken. Things look bleak, but 
then these exceptional professionals turn up to minimize the negativity. 
Reflections on this issue brought about a shared realization that even 
the people who speak up earlier, to stop the unwelcome events to hap-
pen in the first place, deserve positive attention in the organization.
The distinction between active and passive mistakes can also help 
explain reluctance to take an initiative and voice a concern. When you 
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speak up, chances are that you are raising a false alarm, and that consti-
tutes an active mistake, doing something that it turns out you should 
not have done. To keep quiet in such situations might turn out to be 
wrong but only constitutes a passive mistake, to refrain from doing 
something you should have done. You may get away with it more easily 
than an active mistake. In organizations with a more or less acknowl-
edged preference for passive mistakes over active mistakes, chances are 
that people opt to say nothing. Efforts to make it normal and appreci-
ated to voice a concern need to build a tolerance for active mistakes in 
what people perceive to be critical quality moments.
Reason came up with the name Swiss Cheese Model to draw atten-
tion to a potential weakness in the barrier mentality he proposed. When 
people start to think about safety and prevention in barrier terms, they 
may end up judging the strength of the barrier system in terms of the 
number of layers it consists in. The more layers, the better. If you have a 
procedure consisting of safety checks at three different times, it appears 
to create better safety than if you only have one safety check in place. 
This way of thinking can create a false sense of safety, according to 
Reason. He proposes that we should compare each layer in the barrier 
with a slice of Swiss cheese. What they have in common is a propensity 
to have large and small holes in them. If we are unlucky, the holes in 
the barriers are placed next to each other in a way that allows the nega-
tive chain of events to travel straight through. We may be content with 
the high number of layers, but an experience that a negative outcome 
occurs after all, because we have underestimated the size and position-
ing of the holes in each layer.
One of my students in a leadership and safety class gave the following 
example of how a higher number of barrier layers can cause less rather 
than more safety. She worked in a hospital unit where they sometimes 
treated dangerous patients, who needed to be checked for weapons and 
other dangerous objects when they entered and left the premises. It had 
been the responsibility of the police to check the patients when they 
went in or out of the hospital. In order to make sure that they came and 
left unarmed, a second round of checking, conducted by hospital staff, 
was introduced. The intention was to make the system twice as safe, 
but in reality, the new system led to lenient controls both by the police 
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and by hospital staff, since both groups had in mind that another group 
would also check the patient for dangerous objects. The introduction of 
the second barrier level created a bigger hole in the existing one, and it 
also came with a hole itself.
The barrier model can also be useful in analyzing creative processes. 
As discussed in Chap. 2, effective development of new products and ser-
vices depend on producing intelligent failures as quickly as possible. To 
persist with a proposal that really is not that good, is a mistake that will 
lead to a big or small disaster later, unless there are barrier elements in 
place that cut off the causal chain of events. It takes courage to speak 
out against a proposal and claim that it should be scrapped.
We can redescribe in barrier terms the three psychological phenom-
ena mentioned as obstacles to detecting and speaking out about mis-
takes. (1) Sunk cost fallacy can create a weakness in the barrier, if the 
people who are supposed to intervene and take action when they spot 
an error, have invested heavily in the development of the idea from 
which the error generates. In order to intervene and stop the chain of 
events, they have to admit flaws in their own previous thinking and 
priorities. That makes them unreliable as contributors to the barrier 
system. Furthermore, awareness of (2) the bystander effect can coun-
ter an unwarranted trust in the barrier system based on numbers. We 
may think that we can strengthen the human dimension of the barrier 
system, and the likelihood that someone will intervene in critical sit-
uations, by increasing the number of people who are in a position to 
follow the processes and speak their minds. Research on the bystander 
effect indicate otherwise. The more people who are included as wit-
nesses to the processes and invited to intervene, the less likely it is that 
one or some of them will actually do so, due to diffusion of responsibil-
ity and doubts about one’s own personal judgement. Finally, (3) accord-
ing to research on the confirmation trap, we tend to favor evidence that 
supports our existing beliefs, and overlook information that gives us 
reasons to reconsider. The human, interventionist elements in a robust 
barrier system depend on people who are able to detect discrepancies 
and unexpected turns of events. One such element can be that an expe-
rienced professional, who usually does exceptionally good work, has an 
off-day and is about to put people at risk because of a misjudgement of 
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a situation or a lapse in concentration. Knowledge and awareness about 
these three psychological phenomena, then, are important in designing 
an organizational climate where people take action when they spot what 
they perceive to be a mistake.
3  Beyond Hint and Hope
Human intervention is often the most challenging kind of barrier ele-
ment to put in place. Technology and procedure plans are more con-
crete and tangible. Creating a work environment where it is normal to 
voice your concerns is not so straightforward. The essence of the human 
element in barriers is that people need to speak up when they witness 
something out of the ordinary, events that startle, surprise, or frighten 
them. It seems that aviation has managed to make it normal to do so, 
thus creating a safety culture that other professional disciplines can take 
inspiration and learn from.
Speaking up when you sense that somebody has made an error or is 
about to do so, can be particularly hard for a junior person towards a 
senior person in an organization. A newly employed person may be less 
prone to the aspect blindness mentioned earlier, and may see things that 
the veterans in the workplace are unaware of, but also be unsure about 
whether it is a good and welcome thing to speak up. A way of com-
munication that has been detected in aviation and in healthcare in such 
circumstances is what has been called hint and hope. A person, who 
perceives that something is wrong, but is afraid of the consequences 
of intervening in the situation, may decide to give a hint about his or 
her observation, and hope that it will be sufficient to generate a positive 
response. Investigations into accidents in aviation and healthcare have 
documented a range of hint and hope responses. A nurse sees that the 
anesthetics doctor is preparing to set a syringe in what she perceives to 
be the patient’s wrong shoulder. They are supposed to perform surgery 
on the left shoulder, and not the right one that the doctor is now get-
ting ready to treat. The nurse is not completely confident in her judge-
ment, and thus decides to hint rather than say out straight that they are 
now focusing on the wrong shoulder. Then things happen very quickly, 
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the doctors in charge do not understand the hint, and they cut open the 
wrong shoulder. In the investigation that takes place after the event, the 
nurse claims that she tried to tell the doctors about the emerging mis-
take, while they say that she did try to say something to them, but the 
message was unclear.
It is understandable that people turn to hint and hope instead of 
addressing an issue in more direct manner. The motivation for vague 
and indirect communication can protect both the sender and the 
receiver from unpleasantness.
A lot us are taught that it is not polite to confront another person by 
directly stating a problem, opinion, or disagreement. Hinting and hop-
ing is a communication strategy that courteous people are tempted to use 
to avoid confrontation, to preserve someone else’s sense of dignity or sta-
tus, or to protect themselves from criticism and rejection. People hint and 
hope every day. (Gordon, Mendenhall, & O’Connor, 2012, p. 59)
When hint and hope works, it is an elegant form of communication, 
where you succeed in correcting a person’s behavior in other people’s 
presence, without anybody else noticing it. On other occasions, the 
hinting is a feeble and weak barrier that cannot stop a mistake from 
creating a horrible outcome. The Tenerife disaster on March 27, 1977, 
where two Boing 747 airplanes from Pan American and KLM crashed 
on the runway, killing 583 people, one of the pilots took off before hav-
ing received clearance to do so. A recording of the conversation inside 
the KLM plane reveals that the flight engineer hints that the other 
plan may be in their way. “Is he not clear, that Pan American?” (Weick, 
1990). The warning signal he provides to the pilot is not strong enough, 
so he proceeds to take the plane onto its fatal journey. Here is an exam-
ple hint and hope as part of a weak barrier system. The pilot makes a 
mistake, and it starts a causal chain that ends with disaster, since no bar-
riers are in place to prevent it from happening. A steadfast and persis-
tent flight engineer or co-pilot could have made a difference, but none 
of them dared to confront their senior, who was one of KLM’s high-
est ranked and most respected pilots. The pilot had recently provided 
the first officer with a qualification check to work in a Boing 747, and 
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that might have contributed to make the threshold for confronting 
him higher than normal. In his analysis of the accident, Weick (1990, 
p. 574) comments: “Perhaps influenced by his great prestige making it 
difficult to imagine an error of this magnitude on the part of such an 
expert pilot, both the co-pilot and the flight engineer made no further 
objections.”
I witnessed an interesting example of hint and hope during a seminar 
for leaders in a Norwegian city council. Before the seminar, the admin-
istrative leader told me that he wanted to say a few words of truth to 
the fifty or so participants. He said to me that he was disappointed with 
the collaboration between them. Individually, they were thinking solely 
about their own units, and not about what would be best for the city 
council as a whole. There was little solidarity among them. Now he had 
the opportunity to confront them and demand improvement.
The leader then took the podium and told the leaders a story about 
gees, about how they fly together and support each other. Whenever 
one goose struggles to keep the tempo during flight, two other gees will 
connect to it and help it to gain speed. Whenever the leader goose is 
exhausted from flying in the front, another goose will take over, and 
allow the leader to rest. The audience smiled politely at the story, and 
that was it. Afterward, I talked to the administrative leader, who was 
very pleased with himself. “Now I really gave them something to think 
about.” he said, indicating that he thought he had been sharp and direct 
in pointing out a lack of collaboration amongst the leaders. From my 
perspective, he had failed in addressing the issue properly. I doubt that 
any of the leaders noted a critical or challenging note in the story about 
the geese. It was another example of hint and hope, of fruitless com-
munication based on a wish not to hurt or anger anybody. The inci-
dent can also be analyzed in the terms from Reason’s barrier model. The 
administrative leader perceived that the city council leaders were on the 
wrong path with regard to collaboration and solidarity, and attempted 
to stop a chain of events ultimately leading to the suboptimal use of 
public resources, and worse service for the citizens. It was most likely 
an unsuccessful attempt, since he used hint and hope, rather than direct 
communication.
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In aviation, there has been a quest to move beyond hint and hope, 
to more direct and unambiguous ways of communication. The Tenerife 
disaster was a turning point, generating activities to improve feed-
back quality amongst employees, under the heading of Crew Resource 
Management (CRM). Gordon, Mendenhall, & O’Connor (2012, 
p. 59) convey how CRM encourages crew to focus on what is right 
rather than who is right, and thus draws attention to the matters of fact 
rather than on opposing views and rivalry amongst colleagues about 
who has the most appropriate understanding of the situation. Personal 
prestige can stand in the way of clarification of the situation at hand, 
since it makes people hold on to their own beliefs, even beyond the 
point where they have obtained strong reasons to revise them. CRM 
is all about challenging each other in respectful manners, with a con-
structive intention. The person who is expressing a concern should be 
specific about the content, and timely, not hesitating to speak up at 
the moment when something appears to be wrong. CRM encourages 
crew to seek information, ask questions and push for clarification of 
situations that appear ambiguous to them. In order to be effective, the 
human dimension of a barrier system depends on a wholehearted com-
mitment to these principles of direct and unambiguous speech.
Flight engineer Morten Theiste conveys an experience where a pilot 
he was working with needed a reminder about his commitment to 
CRM (Theiste, 2017). This pilot had trouble with the autopilot in the 
aircraft on the second last leg of the day. The device had disconnected 
several times. Even though the crew could reconnect it, the autopilot 
continued to disconnect. The pilot was looking forward to a short turn-
around in Oslo before his last leg to home base in Copenhagen but he 
had to report the autopilot problem to technical staff in Oslo. He con-
sidered it to be a minor issue, and thought that he could easily fly the 
aircraft manually home and have the Copenhagen technical staff to look 
at the autopilot during night stop.
“I was called out to meet this crew to check up the matter at the gate 
after landing. The aircraft had been emptied and was ready for board-
ing when I came to the gate. The captain explained the problem to me. 
I said that I needed to go back to the hangar to check the technical 
manuals about the specific logic behind the autopilot disconnect during 
the described circumstances. Sometimes an autopilot disconnect may 
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indicate that something more is wrong than just the autopilot itself. 
When I explained this to the captain, he went totally mad, shouting at 
me, calling me different ugly names and said he needed the turnaround 
to be fast so that he could return home to his family. He did not need 
the autopilot to fly back to Copenhagen. The captain verbally abused 
me and made me almost speechless. After a while, I simply asked 
him:—Are you angry with me?” (Theiste, 2017).
This simple question got the pilot to see the situation more clearly, 
much like the pilot in the situation with the persistent driver of the 
pushback tractor in the introduction to this book. “I saw in his face 
that he suddenly was reminded of the CRM training he had been 
through on how to communicate to each other in the aviation industry. 
He then realized that he had been acting in an unprofessional manner 
and that it was a great thing that I took the safety of the passengers seri-
ously and did not immediately release the aircraft” (Theiste, 2017).
An hour later, the aircraft was ready for takeoff, after a thorough 
investigation of the technical issue with the autopilot. The two pro-
fessionals at the core of the episode had experienced a critical quality 
moment, a situation where the flight engineer could have succumbed 
to the pilot’s strong wishes to ignore the technical problem and proceed 
immediately to takeoff. Verbal abuse from a senior person can easily 
lead to such a decision from a junior person. It is the kind of behav-
ior that can weaken the will to speak up, and thus can pose a threat to 
the robustness of a barrier system. In this particular situation, the flight 
engineer stood his ground, and his reminder to the pilot about the com-
mon platform for communicating about safety was enough to diffuse 
the tension and get the professionals back on track together.
4  Teamwork
One further narrative about barriers and safety illustrates how Reason’s 
model is relevant beyond aviation. It concerns pilot Gimmestad’s expe-
rience when he went through laser eye surgery. The narrative also high-
lights the nuances between teamwork and individual expert effort. One 
surgeon and two nurses were in the operating room with him, and he 
was awake during the entire two-hour operation. One thing started 
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to worry him as the operation proceeded, and that was the lack of 
talk around him. The operating room was quiet, with no conversation 
going on between the three people who were working on his eye. “I 
have learned the people who work together on complex tasks, should 
talk with each other, to ensure that things were done in the right man-
ner. In a cockpit, silence is a sign of potential danger. It can mean that 
something out of the ordinary is going on, and the persons involved are 
confused or uncertain about what to do.” (Gimmestad, 2016) When lis-
tening to conversations recorded in cockpits before plane crashes, one 
striking feature is that the people involved gradually speak less and less 
to each other. With this knowledge in his mind, Gimmestad found the 
silence in the operating room disconcerting, and wondered why the sur-
geon and the two nurses were not speaking to each other.
The operation on Gimmestad’s eye went well, so the silence turned 
out to be a false alarm. Nevertheless, the pilot was curious about the 
lack of talk, and asked the surgeon about it afterward, explaining that a 
crucial feature of safety in his own profession was the conversations in 
the crew. “Who is your co-pilot during an operation?” he asked the sur-
geon. The response was that the surgeon did not have a person to talk 
to like that, and did not perceive that he needed one either. It appeared 
that the surgeon considered himself to be so skillful with his tools that 
he did not need people around who could correct or challenge him in 
critical situations. Gimmestad wondered why the nurses could not be 
involved as conversation partners during an operation, to ensure that 
things were done in the right order and that mishaps would be spot-
ted and addressed. The surgeon dismissed that idea, claiming that 
the nurses were not on his level of expertise and experience. The pilot 
retorted that at least some nurses are experienced, and have participated 
in many complex operations, gaining knowledge about procedures and 
possible complications. “That may be true, but they will never be on my 
level,” answered the surgeon (Gimmestad, 2016).
No matter how brilliant the surgeon is in his work, it seems unlikely 
that he will go through his professional life without making errors 
that can have dramatic negative effects on patients. With the attitude 
he expressed in the conversation with Gimmestad, it appears that the 
barrier system to detect and confront his wrong moves is weak or even 
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nonexistent. A slip, lapse, or mistake from this surgeon is likely to 
start a causal chain of events that will not stop until a patient has been 
injured. He seems to perceive himself as an infallible individual, who 
may need others for assistance and help to keep processes flowing, but 
not to critically evaluate his decisions and behavior as they happen.
I have discussed this story with experienced healthcare staff, who 
are critical of the surgeon’s apparently dismissive attitude towards the 
nurses’ possible role as dialogue partners during the operation, and 
towards the need for collaboration and feedback from colleagues. 
However, they say that one reason for the quiet that concerned 
Gimmestad can be that the surgeon performed a high precision oper-
ation, requiring intense personal concentration to be able to things 
exactly right. During such a process, talk may be counterproductive. 
Those moments of deep concentration do not take up the full two-
hours process, so can only account for some of the silence the patient 
encountered.
It has become safer to travel by airplane after a shift from an individ-
ualistic to a more team-oriented approach, where it has become normal 
to challenge the decisions of the pilot, who we no longer consider to see 
as an infallible superman. Practitioners in healthcare and other parts of 
organizational life can learn from this development towards non-heroic 
professionalism. From time to time, stories of heroism still occur in avi-
ation, none more dramatic than when captain Chesley B. Sullenberger 
on January 15, 2009, landed US Airline Flight 1549 on the Hudson 
River, after the plane had hit a flock of geese and lost power in both 
engines. In interviews, Sullenberger has reiterated that the successful 
landing and subsequent evacuation of the 155 people on board was a 
team effort, involving the entire crew. Nevertheless, he is the one who 
gets public attention and hero treatment. One particular detail in the 
transcript from the cockpit voice recorder indicates that Sullenberger’s 
collaborate mentality is real. His final remark to the co-pilot as they are 
approaching the water and getting ready for impact is “Got any ideas?” 
Here is an open invitation to the co-pilot to contribute, and not hold 
back any suggestions he might have about how to proceed from here. 
Those three words seem to express personal vulnerability, a realization 
that they are a team who are in this situation together, and need to 
76     Ø. Kvalnes
draw on their collective resources to get out of it, irrespective of rank 
and position. Now is the moment to speak up. The co-pilot answers 
“Actually not”, right before impact (Brazy, 2009).
This chapter has presented narratives from aviation, and inter-
preted them in the light of theoretical approaches to fallibility at work. 
Research indicates that safety in aviation has improved, and three guid-
ing insights appear to be at the core of this development:
1. All pilots are fallible, including the most skillful and experienced 
among them.
2. Professionals can be blind to important aspects of their work envi-
ronment, and they are often blind to this kind of aspect blindness.
3. Safety in aviation depends primarily on teamwork, and not on sepa-
rate, individual efforts.
Implementation of these insights can happen with the aid of Reason’s 
Swiss Cheese Model. It offers concrete conceptual tools for handling 
human fallibility. Organizations can use it (a) to create awareness about 
the importance of voicing intervention, (b) to analyze and critically 
assess current ability to deal with error, and (c) to get people to take 
action and voice a concern when they perceive that somebody has made 
a mistake. The model originated in aviation, but it can be useful in any 
setting where it is important to identify mistakes and stop them from 
causing bad outcomes. Barriers can be technological, as when an alarm 
goes off when somebody has forgotten to do things properly. They 
can also be procedural, in that people are trained to follow a particu-
lar checklist and are thus able to detect the deviations from normal and 
correct procedures. Human intervention is the third type of barrier, and 
often the most fragile one, since it requires that people develop habits 
of speaking up, even when they are deeply uncomfortable about doing 
so. Hint and hope may be the least confrontational and most courte-
ous strategy, but also one that is likely to fail. In professional settings, 
we can witness activities that unbeknownst to the agents seem destined 
to cause havoc, and need to engage in the matter without hesitation, 
in order to avoid the bad outcome. Doing that takes courage, and may 
require considerable training and preparation. In organizations, the 
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barrier system will form a part of the culture, of the way things are nor-
mally done there. It is a particularly pressing responsibility for leaders to 
be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the current barrier system, 
and to take steps to strengthen and improve it.
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“It was total paralysis, and every birth doctor’s worst nightmare, to find 
that your own mistake caused the death of a baby. It is a horrible trag-
edy for the parents, but also a nightmare for the staff at the hospital. I 
remember when the father looked me in the eyes and asked me why we 
did not perform a caesarean birth. My reply was that I had made a mis-
take, and not read the journal properly. If we had followed the original 
plan, the baby would most probably have lived” (Westad, 2016).
Stian Westad is the head doctor of the women’s clinic at Lillehammer 
Hospital in Norway. Some years ago, he experienced how a mistake on 
the part of him and his team caused the death of a baby. The pregnant 
woman was expecting her first child. The time of expected conception 
was coming close, and the woman was anxious, because her stomach 
was so big. She went to the hospital, and the ultrasound showed that 
she was expecting a big child. In the journal, the doctor wrote that if 
the birth had not started by itself within one week, they would proceed 
to perform a caesarean birth. When the woman returned to the hospital 
some time later, a new ultrasound was taken, and this time the conclu-
sion was that the child was not so big after all. That turned out to be 
a fatally mistaken change of view. When the birth started, the doctor 
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decided for a vaginal rather than a caesarean birth. The baby was stuck 
during the birth, suffered severe brain damage, and died four weeks 
later.
“The baby would have survived if we had stayed with the original 
plan, and kept the promise to the parents of performing a caesarean if 
the birth did not start normally. I feel that we owe it to the parents and 
the child who died to not hide this away, but speak openly about it, 
so that we can use it constructively and improve. I told the parents 
instantly that we, the hospital staff, had made a mistake and that they 
had done things exactly right” (Westad, 2016). The doctor remained in 
contact with the parents, and when the woman became pregnant again, 
they chose to have the same doctor and the same midwife to follow them 
up. The hospital crew’s openness about their mistake created trust, and 
this time the process ended as expected, with the birth of a healthy baby.
In the aftermath of the mistake, Westad received support from col-
leagues, and together they critically scrutinized procedures to strengthen 
them, to minimize the risk of making the same mistake again. He hopes 
that his openness will make others come forward and talk about their 
mistakes. “When we have made a mistake, we have a unique opportu-
nity to improve. If we ignore the mistakes we have made, we are at risk 
of repeating them, and that would be unforgivable” (Westad, 2016).
This chapter discusses examples from healthcare, both to illustrate 
further the relevance of the concepts from previous chapters, and to 
introduce the concept of trust into the discussion about fallibility. 
Hospital staff face situations where it is important that they voice a con-
cern, and intervene to stop chains of events that may lead to unnec-
essary injury or death. Hospitals and other organizations in the health 
sector need to create a barrier system where people do not hesitate to 
voice their concerns, a communication climate where it is normal and 
appreciated to intervene when you sense that something is wrong.
The guiding ideas of this chapter are that openness about mistakes (i) 
can serve a foundation for trust within a professional unit, (ii) is neces-
sary for further learning and improvement of professional services, and 
(iii) can strengthen public trust in the service providers. Trust will be 
understood as a function of ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer, 
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Trust 
5 Fallibility and Trust in Healthcare     81
can be one of the pathways for building high-quality connections at work 
(Dutton, 2003; Dutton & Heaphy, 2003). The examples in the current 
chapter illustrate how open talk about failures and mistakes can serve to 
build, maintain, and even repair trust, and also how a climate for such 
exchanges needs to be characterized by psychological safety (Carmeli, 
Brueller, & Dutton, 2009; Edmondson, 1999). What is at stake is also 
organizational trust (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 1996). Hospitals and 
other health organizations need to display a willingness and ability to 
learn from failure in order to be deemed trustworthy by the public. The 
main data for this chapter comes from interviews with two experienced 
doctors. Both exemplify a growth mindset (Dweck, 2017) in that they see 
situations where things go wrong as an opportunity to learn and improve 
their professional work, individually and in teams.
1  Immediate Acknowledgement
Doctor Westad explains that his motivation for being open about his 
mistake in not initiating a caesarean birth was the thought that there 
is good health in doing the right thing immediately. He quickly erased 
any tendency on the parents’ side to think that they should have done 
things differently, that the death of their baby had even the slightest to 
do with any miscalculations from their side. In the light of other dra-
matic incidents where mistakes lead to bad outcomes, this immediacy 
seems important. If you hesitate and do not admit a mistake at the 
beginning, it might become more difficult later, since you then have to 
explain two things, both the mistake itself, and the fact that you did not 
speak up about it on the first occasion where that was possible.
Failure to admit mistakes early can create long and painful pro-
cesses of denying and attributing blame. One dramatic example is the 
Hillsborough disaster in Sheffield on April 15, 1989, where 96 support-
ers were crushed to death at a football match (Scraton, 1999, 2016). It 
was not until April 2016 that an inquest returned a verdict that the sup-
porters died due to grossly negligent failures by police and ambulance 
services to fulfill their duty of care to the supporters (Scraton, 2016). 
For twenty-seven years, the professionals had denied any mistakes, and 
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had instead explained the tragedy as a result of reckless behavior from 
the supporters themselves. Families and friends endured the extra pain 
of these speculations and accusations. Doing the right thing immedi-
ately, as exemplified by doctor Westad’s response to his own mistake, 
would have made an immensely positive difference to a great number 
of people, over a long period of time. It may not have been necessary to 
take full and unconditional responsibility, but admitting a considerable 
part of the blame for the tragic events would no doubt have made a sig-
nificant positive difference for many people.
It is worthwhile to dwell on the idea that there is good health to 
doing the right thing immediately after a mistake. It is a move that 
punctures any tendency towards a blame game, the kind of process we 
have seen after the Hillsborough tragedy. In hospital settings, a blame 
game often develops in the aftermath of shocking and publicly exposed 
mistakes. From time to time, in different cultures and settings, an 
operating team forgets a scissor inside a patient’s stomach. When the 
patient returns to the hospital in great pain, and professionals detect 
the mistake, the game of attributing personal blame can begin. The 
head surgeon may blame the nurse in charge of counting the number 
of instruments. She should have noted the missing instrument, and 
stopped the process of sewing the operation wound. The doctor himself 
can deny responsibility for the unfortunate turn of events. A surgeon is 
normally so preoccupied with the complex and difficult operation tasks 
that it is impossible for him or her to keep track of all the instruments 
that are in use. It is common that not only one, but two nurses have 
it as their main responsibility to count the instruments and speak up 
when one or more go missing. Nevertheless, when things do go wrong, 
the surgeon can decide to take responsibility on behalf of the team, 
and not point a blaming finger at one or two colleagues. A heated and 
public blame game can create an impression of an unprofessional and 
divided workplace, characterized by unhealthy individual strife rather 
than a team-oriented organization where colleagues shared the responsi-
bility in the face of misadventure. Dutton (2003, p. 97) has noted how 
public chastising of people for poor performances is sometimes seen as a 
necessary way of being tough, but is also likely to be a “trust killer”, cor-
roding professional relationships at work.
5 Fallibility and Trust in Healthcare     83
We can attempt to generalize from Westad’s behavior to a princi-
ple for professionals to follow in situations similar to the one he faced, 
highlighting the quality of immediacy in the response.
Principle of immediate acknowledgement: When you realize that your 
decision or behavior has caused harm, admit it and take responsibility 
immediately.
In the critical aftermath of a bad outcome, victims can be particularly 
susceptible to blaming themselves, no matter how irrational that may 
seem. When the professional meets them very early with an acknowl-
edgement of responsibility, that causal attribution is much less likely 
to happen. One important dimension of the current example is that 
Westad could immediately grasp the facts of the situation, including his 
team’s role in bringing about the terrible outcome. In other situations, 
doctors, nurses, and other healthcare workers may be under pressure to 
acknowledge that they have made a fatal mistake, but may need more 
time to evaluate the circumstances and their own contribution to the 
outcome. The pressure to admit a mistake may also be present in situ-
ations where a reasonable interpretation of the facts does not warrant 
such an act. Angry and frustrated patients or relatives may understand-
ably push for it, even in cases where the healthcare workers have actu-
ally done excellent work, to no avail. Those kinds of cases, and how they 
differ from the ones where the connection between a failure and a bad 
outcome can be established quickly will be discussed further in the next 
section.
Doctor Westad stayed in close contact with the parents after the 
death of their baby, and when the couple expected another baby, they 
decided to keep the same team of professionals that had helped them 
the first time. That trust appears to have been built on the foundation 
of the immediacy of the acknowledgement. Trust can be explained in 
terms of three factors that need to be in place in relation between the 
trustor and the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995; Schoorman et al., 1996). 
The trustor must perceive that the trustee has the necessary ability, 
benevolence, and integrity to be trustworthy. This understanding of the 
phenomenon overlaps with Dutton’s, who also highlights benevolence 
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and integrity, but uses the more general term of dependability (honesty 
and reliability) instead of ability (Dutton, 2003, p. 81). The former def-
inition will be used here, since the concept of ability brings forth the 
non-moral dimension of trust. The trustor must perceive the trustee to 
have a set of skills and competencies that enables him or her to per-
form specific tasks. Benevolence is present when the trustor perceives 
the trustee to be a person who cares about his or her well-being, and 
gives priority to the trustor’s interest over his or her egocentric inter-
est. The trustor sees integrity in the trustee when it seems that the trus-
tee believes in and adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds 
acceptable. All three factors must be in place for trust to happen. The 
absence of any one of them creates an imbalance. It does not help to 
have ability, if the trustor doubts your benevolence or integrity, and nei-
ther of those two factors, together or alone, will suffice as a foundation 
for trust without being tied to a proper ability.
A fatal mistake at a hospital can create a deep crisis in the trustworthi-
ness the patient (trustor) sees in the professionals (trustees). All the three 
factors can come under serious doubt, and the trust collapses if one or 
more of them gives way. It may appear that the doctor or the midwife 
did not have the necessary abilities to do the job well. Their benevolence 
can also be questioned. Are they more concerned about themselves than 
they are about the patient? A mistake with a terrible outcome can also 
make the patient doubt the integrity of the professionals, and question 
whether they are really adhering to the right set of principles.
Immediate acknowledgement of a mistake can keep trust alive, or 
at least create conditions from which to rebuild it. Being open about 
a mistake is a particularly strong expression of benevolence, in that the 
professional places the interest of the parents ahead of his own self-
interest. Westad could have remained vague about the causes of the 
baby’s death, and even suggested some kind of fatal involvement or lack 
of proper care from the parents. That would have protected his own 
narrowly construed professional reputation, and placed more of the 
burden on the mother and father, who would have lacked the medical 
expertise to challenge that account. Westad instead chose to prioritize 
the parents’ wellbeing. In doing so, he practiced the benevolence at the 
core of professional ethics of any kind, as outlined by Nanda (2002), 
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who sees the relation between professional and client or patient as one 
governed by a more or less explicit pledge from the professional: “Trust 
me; although my self-interest may dictate other actions, I undertake 
to serve in your best interest.” There can be conflicts of interest, and 
those situations are distinct from ethical dilemmas, where there are 
strong ethical reasons to do both A and B, and no matter what you do, 
something will be wrong. In conflicts of interest, there are strong ethi-
cal reasons to prioritize the client or patient, but the professional might 
be tempted to set his or her self-interest first. That temptation can be 
particularly strong due to the fact that there is usually a considerable 
knowledge gap between the provider and receiver of a professional ser-
vice. The patient has seldom any way of knowing whether the doctor is 
doing the right thing, or not.
The parents whose baby died decided to use doctor Westad and his 
team when the next pregnancy occurred. That is a particularly powerful 
expression of trust. Mayer et al. (1995, pp. 712–714) understand trust 
as a willingness to be vulnerable. You are willing to trust someone, and 
assume that they have the required ability, benevolence, and integrity to 
do the work. That assumption may turn out to be false, and you lose, 
particularly if you engage in actual, trusting actions. Mayer et al. (1995, 
p. 724) distinguish between trust and trusting activities, and only the 
latter are truly risky. You can have a willingness to be vulnerable without 
ever becoming engaged in any risky activity, because the occasion never 
arises. The parents in question did both, in that the willingness was in 
place, and led to the concrete trusting action of staying with the pro-
fessional team whose mistake had caused their first baby’s death. They 
must have had a strong belief along all three dimensions of trust in doc-
tor Westad and his team, despite the tragic outcome of the first preg-
nancy. It seems that a crucial building block for that trust was Westad’s 
immediate acknowledgement of responsibility. The parents could go 
through a grief process without being tormented by thoughts about per-
sonal responsibility, and about how they could have done things differ-
ently to save the baby.
Admitting the mistake generated trust between doctor Westad and 
the parents. It is also likely that this act of honesty also contributed to 
a trusting environment at the doctor’s unit, and so to a strengthening 
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of professional connections. When the leader steps forward and talks 
openly about what he did wrong, it lowers the threshold for others to 
do the same, and also signals the presence of ability, benevolence, and 
integrity at the top of the professional unit.
2  Barriers in Healthcare
Mistakes in medicine and healthcare is a considerable source of harm 
to patients even in countries where the professionals are well educated 
and trained. One study indicates that medical error is the third most 
common cause of death in the US (Makary & Daniel, 2016). In the 
previous chapter, we saw how a safety culture in aviation rests on the 
assumption that human beings are fallible. Even the most experienced 
professionals are prone to fail, and that creates a need for a system to 
detect their mistakes before they lead to harmful outcomes. Human 
intervention is a crucial element in any barrier system, as it can stop the 
causal chain of events set in motion by a professional’s mistake.
Doctor Westad was asked about what he thought could make a 
doctor hesitate about telling others about his or her mistake at work. 
One aspect he drew attention to was that of social cost. “A doctor may 
think that colleagues will see him as a loser if he admits to a mistake” 
(Westad, 2016). There is a parallel here to the perceived social cost of 
asking a colleague for help. That, too, is an initiative people tend to per-
ceive to be socially costly. You risk losing face at work if you ask for help 
and are open about the limitations to your own competence. Brooks, 
Gino, and Schweitzer (2015) have studied the assumption that people 
who ask for help are considered to be less competent than those who 
try to manage on their own, and their data suggest the opposite. When 
work tasks are complex, the person who asks help for is seen as more 
competent than the one who do not. The relation between fallibility 
and asking for help at work will be explored further in Chap. 6.
Another aspect Westad drew attention to is that many young doctors 
are on temporary work contracts. They may want to be perceived as reli-
able and infallible professionals, in order to get a permanent job at the 
hospital. That ambition may also cause them to hold back when they 
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are witness to mistakes and mishaps in the making in the hospital. They 
may decide to keep silent, out of a wish of not becoming an unpopular 
figure among the senior, permanently employed doctors, who will have 
a say in whether they get a contract renewal or even permanent employ-
ment. They do not perceive speaking up as a good career move.
Doctor Bjørn Atle Bjørnbeth is an experienced gastro surgeon at 
Oslo University Hospital. We have discussed communication climate 
and fallibility at work on a number of occasion in the past fifteen years. 
His experiences in sharing narratives about mistakes are the focal point 
of the next section. Even he identifies these career considerations as a 
major obstacle to openness about mistakes in a hospital, both to report-
ing about one’s own and those of colleagues (Bjørnbeth, 2017). From 
a leadership perspective, it is possible to neutralize both of these rea-
sons for holding back when witnessing something out of the ordinary, 
by inviting people to voice their concerns, and by rewarding those who 
actually do.
Westad and Bjørnbeth are both concerned about how social cost and 
threat to career development can weaken the barrier system at a hos-
pital. As noted in Chap. 4, Reason’s model starts from the assumption 
that people are fallible, and that each mistake they do start a causal 
chain of events that leads to a bad outcome, unless there is a barrier 
in place to bring that chain of events to an earlier stop. Human inter-
vention is one possible barrier element, and the more people experi-
ence that the voicing of a concern will be valued and appreciated in the 
organization, the more likely it is that the will actually do so.
In order to investigate the two experienced doctors’ thoughts about 
how young doctors may be reluctant to speak up about mistakes, I 
interviewed doctor student Arne (not his real name) about his experi-
ences when being exposed to hospital work for the first time. One of 
the episodes he shared exemplifies an attempt to voice a concern and 
function as the human element in a barrier system:
I was present when a doctor was doing a Nasopharynx test, where the 
aim is to get a microbiological sample from a specific location 6 to 8 cen-
timeters into the nose cavity. The sample can tell us what kind of airway 
infection the patient has, and will determine what kind of treatment to 
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pursue. The instrument is a brush, similar to a q-tip, but thinner and 
longer. I noticed that the doctor only inserted the instrument a few mil-
limeters into the nostrils, and took samples there, where the microbiolog-
ical flora is different. At school, we had learned that this is a mistake. Not 
only will the test be useless, but also the result can potentially mislead 
the doctor into making faulty decisions about treatment. I let the doctor 
know after the patient had left the room. (Arne, 2016)
The doctor had made a mistake, and the student took an initiative to 
stop the causal chain of events it put in motion. As such, the student 
behaved in an exemplary manner. The doctor, however, did not see 
things that way:
In response, he got mad at me, and said that I was supposed to learn from 
him, and not the other way around. Anyway, I hope he took in what I 
said and corrected his understanding of the test for later, because what he 
did was completely wrong, a bit like making a blood analysis of a urine 
sample. (Arne, 2016)
Without claiming that the situation above is typical, it is at least a stark 
example of the concrete circumstances where the communication cli-
mate between seniors and juniors in a work environment is put to the 
test. Arne’s own interpretation was that the more experienced doctor 
found it socially difficult to be confronted with a mistake by a junior. 
Here was an opportunity to strengthen the climate for making such 
interventions, by thanking the junior for the effort, in line with what 
the pilot did in his meeting with the driver of the pushback tractor, in 
the example from the introduction of this book. That opportunity was 
not taken, but at least we can share the hope expressed by the student 
that the doctor actually absorbed the information and silently revised 
his understanding of how to perform the test.
Conveying feedback in a constructive way is often easier said than 
done, particularly for a junior in relation to a senior. It can be a chal-
lenge in a range of professional setting, also beyond healthcare. In 
an interview, finance student Mina Randjelovic explained a strat-
egy she used towards a senior colleague during a work assignment in 
a company. The two were supposed to have an expert—apprentice 
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relationship, much as in the case of the senior doctor and the doctor 
student mentioned above. From time to time, the senior would make 
a mistake in preparing a particular business document, and the junior 
would catch it. “In those situations, I said to him that what he just did 
was really interesting, and I asked him to explain why he had done it. 
That way he had to rethink his behavior, and was able to detect and cor-
rect the mistake himself ” (Randjelovic, 2017). She cleverly spared her 
colleague of the potential humiliation of being corrected by someone 
less experienced and knowledgeable than he was. Its strategy has a trace 
of hint and hope to it, and can fail if the recipient is inattentive and 
slow in his pedagogical effort. A plan B may be needed if the senior is 
unable to detect his own mistake even after revisiting the faulty reasons 
for his decision.
The three psychological phenomena highlighted in Chap. 2 can also 
pose a threat to the robustness of the barrier system in a hospital set-
ting. First, a doctor or nurse can be susceptible to the sunk-cost fallacy, 
in that he or she has invested professional pride or other currency in 
one particular way of doing things. The idea of failure may cause cog-
nitive dissonance, a pain that can be held at bay by continuing in the 
same direction, even with a vague idea that something is not quite right. 
A turnaround can also require the professional to admit that resources 
have been wasted, something he or she may be reluctant to do.
Second, there may be a bystander effect, in that many employees are 
present when the mistake happens, and they have a pacifying effect on 
each other, a diffusion of responsibility. Each of twenty in a group of 
doctors and nurses will tend to think that they only have one twentieth 
of a responsibility to intervene. Furthermore, pluralistic ignorance can 
occur. Each of the twenty may watch out for a response from the other 
nineteen, and if those remain passive, each will be prone to think that 
everything is fine, since none of the others take steps to intervene. Each 
individual can doubt his or her own initial thought that something is 
about to go wrong, given that there is no sign of a response from any of 
the others.
Third, the confirmation fallacy may cause professionals in a hospital to 
overlook and fail to spot obvious missteps from a colleague. The doctors 
and nurses who have the status of being the best and most experienced 
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are particularly vulnerable to being allowed to continue on erroneous 
paths, since their colleagues may interpret whatever they do in the best 
possible light. They are, after all, the experts in their field. One patient 
story can serve to convey this situation. A woman was admitted to hos-
pital with a broken ankle, from a skiing accident. The doctor in charge 
told her that it was an uncomplicated break, and it would even be fine 
to walk with the plastered foot on the next day. When the woman tried 
to do so on the following afternoon, it did not go well. It hurt to put the 
broken foot down on the floor, and the plaster did not seem to give suf-
ficient support for standing or walking. The woman decided to go back 
to the hospital to explain the problem. One doctor and two nurses lis-
tened to her, and inspected the plastered foot. They agreed that it did 
not look right, and that the plaster should be removed and replaced by a 
new one. Before they proceeded to do so, the doctor asked who had put 
on the original plaster, and the patient answered doctor A. That changed 
the whole interpretation. “Doctor A is the best orthopedist in the Nordic 
countries. If he has put on the plaster, then it is supposed to be that way.” 
The decision to change plaster was revoked immediately, in the light of 
who had produced the initial one.
Some weeks after this event, the woman returned to the hospital to 
have the plaster removed. The doctor in charge assumed that she had 
already been to take an x-ray to confirm that the break had healed prop-
erly. The patient explained that she had been told that this was such 
an uncomplicated break that no x-ray was needed. “That is very odd. 
We are always supposed to check that the break has healed before we 
remove plaster. Whoever said otherwise?” he asked. Again, the patient 
said that it was doctor A. For the second time, this answer made any 
misgivings from the professional disappear. “If doctor A says so, it is 
correct. He is the best orthopedist in the Nordic countries.”
This patient twice experienced that professionals put preliminary 
evaluations of her situations aside because the doctor in charge was 
renowned for being the best in his field. Special rules applied to him, or 
he could allow himself to break the rules that ordinary medical work-
ers must follow. The patient’s ankle has healed properly, so the medi-
cal treatment she got appears to have been right. However, we can have 
some doubts about the barrier system at the unit where doctor A works. 
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It appears that everything he does is interpreted in the best possible way, 
since he is the best orthopedist in the Nordic countries. He is probably 
an excellent doctor, but the barrier system around him may be weak, in 
that colleagues commit the confirmation fallacy, assuming that every-
thing he does is correct.
The pilot Jarle Gimmestad has talked of a similar vulnerability among 
the highest ranked pilots. Juniors and less experienced co-pilots hesitate 
to intervene when they sense that the seniors are about to make a mis-
take, often out of reverence to experience, but also for similar reasons as 
the junior doctors on temporary contracts. It may not be a wise career 
move to challenge a person who has the power to influence your pro-
fessional prospects. A senior who is aware of this possible weakness in 
the barrier system can counter it by encouraging the junior to intervene 
when he or she notices something out of the ordinary in what the more 
experienced person is doing (Gimmestad, 2016).
3  Sharing Mistakes
One thing that surprised doctor Westad when he started to talk openly 
about his mistake was how unique and uncommon this kind of shar-
ing appeared to be. The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision got his 
and the parents’ permission to use it in their annual report, and that 
led to media interest and invitations for the doctor to give presentations 
to healthcare workers about the processes before and after the mistake. 
This attention indicates that it is quite unusual to speak openly about 
one’s mistakes in the health sector in Norway, and that there is room for 
more learning from them among doctors, nurses, and other healthcare 
workers.
Interviews with doctor Bjørn Atle Bjørnbeth have focused on his 
experiences with fallibility at work, and the links between being open 
about one’s mistakes and learning to become a better professional. His 
initial response to doctor Westad’s act of immediate acknowledgement 
is that it was a very commendable thing to do, but also that many sit-
uations where things go wrong in connection with an operation are 
very complex. It may not be clear-cut that the negative outcome is a 
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result of faulty professional work. An immediate acknowledgement of 
responsibility may be what the patient or the relatives are want to hear, 
but the rationale for giving one may not be present. “Prior to an opera-
tion, I try to be open about risk to the patients. Sometimes it is difficult 
to make a precise diagnosis, and we have to proceed without reliable 
knowledge about what is actually the matter with the patient. The 
uncertainty means that things might go wrong. Sometimes we operate 
people for an illness where it is common that about 30% experience 
more or less serious complications after the operation, and may have to 
be re-operated. Patients who end up in that category may respond with 
anger, and expect me to acknowledge a mistake. It would be wrong of 
me to do that, since we cannot establish whether the current problem is 
a result of a professional mistake in diagnosing or operating the patient, 
or not. Absorbing and acknowledging information about risk is difficult 
for patients and relatives, particularly in the light of a bad outcome” 
(Bjørnbeth, 2017).
Doctor Bjørnbeth has focused on the learning potential of sharing 
experiences about unexpected complications and mistakes. One epi-
sode from his early career set him on the path to understanding the 
importance of transparency about fallibility. He was on duty at a hos-
pital when a young girl entered as a patient, with symptoms indicating 
a broken arm. When studying the x-ray of the arm, doctor Bjørnbeth 
could not see any break. In order to be on the safe side, he knocked on 
the door of his leader, the chief doctor of his unit, and showed him the 
x-ray. The senior doctor studied the picture carefully, and came to the 
same verdict as young doctor Bjørnbeth. The girl had not broken her 
arm, and could return home without treatment.
Later on the same day, another doctor came to the unit, and looked 
at the x-ray of the girl’s arm. After careful scrutiny, he spotted a break 
that was difficult to detect, and had escaped both doctor Bjørnbeth and 
the chief doctor’s gaze. The girl was sent for again, and this time got the 
proper treatment in the form of plaster.
The next day, doctor Bjørnbeth took the x-ray back to the chief doc-
tor’s office, and said that the two of them had missed the break in the 
girl’s arm yesterday. The chief doctor asked to see the picture again, and 
once more studied it carefully. Then he exclaimed. “Yes, of course there 
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is a break in this arm, but this is not the same picture that you showed 
me yesterday. I would not have failed to spot something so obvious.”
Doctor Bjørnbeth’s trust in his leader diminished after this exchange. 
It was not primarily the belief in the chief doctor’s professional abili-
ties that disappeared, but more the perception of his benevolence and 
integrity. This man appeared to prioritized self-interest over the interest 
of his younger subordinate, and seemed to adhere to dubious principles 
regarding leadership support. From a moral luck perspective, we may 
say that he was unfortunate to encounter circumstances that revealed a 
weakness of character, a lack of substantial leadership capabilities.
Early in his career, doctor Bjørnbeth became convinced that talk 
about professional mistakes and failures could be a source of deep and 
profound learning, making it safer to be a patient at a hospital. In tan-
dem with another young doctor, he initiated a new point on the agenda 
of the weekly unit meeting: Where have we had unexpected compli-
cations this week? In which cases have we failed to diagnose and treat 
patients faultlessly? The idea was to bring up examples where there 
would be room for strengthening common and individual work pro-
cedures and methods. Both doctors exemplified a growth mindset, an 
assumption that it is possible to strengthen professional capabilities 
by dwelling on unforeseen complications and failures (Dweck, 2017). 
In the beginning, the two initiators took turns in explaining to their 
colleagues how they had failed in giving perfect treatment to patients, 
and how they thought things could be done better. “The more expe-
rienced doctors listened in, shook their heads in more or less real dis-
belief at what we, the young colleagues told them. They indicated that 
such events would never have occurred on their watch. The veterans 
remained silent about their own mistakes. When their patients had 
complications after an operation, these doctors would explain that in 
terms of bad luck. They tended to be surprised whenever things went 
wrong, having expected that their superior professional efforts would 
lead to a good outcome” (Bjørnbeth, 2017). These veterans appear to 
have had a fixed mindset (Dweck, 2017), considering their own capa-
bilities to be fully developed and set in stone. After a while, doctor 
Bjørnbeth and his equally open colleague decided to terminate this 
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point on the meeting agenda, since nobody else stepped forward to 
share examples of situations where they had failed to be perfect doctors.
Concepts from attribution theory (Harvey, Madison, Martinko, 
Crook, & Crook, 2014; Heider, 1958) are useful for making sense 
of the responses from the doctors who denied fallibility and appealed 
to bad luck in order to explain bad outcomes. People tend to have 
an innate interest in understanding the causes of their own and oth-
ers’ successes and failures. An agent’s self-attributions can be internal, 
pointing to individual efforts and skills, or external, pointing to factors 
beyond the agent’s control. As mentioned in Chap. 1, a football coach 
can explain his team’s success in a cup final to be a result of “world 
class coaching”, and thus engage in internal attribution, and a loss in 
a crucial game as down to bad refereeing or injuries to his own players, 
applying an external attribution strategy. Learning from failure depends 
on a realistic balance between internal and external attribution. That 
appeared to be absent in the case of the veteran doctors who refused 
to participate in a talk about failures. When you say that bad luck was 
the sole explanation for a negative outcome, you also indicate that you 
have nothing to learn from carefully studying the case at hand, inviting 
colleagues to evaluate your work, and to consider whether you could 
have done things differently. In the case of a successful outcome, the 
tendency to engage in internal attribution, explaining it primarily to be 
a result of individual expertise and effort can also hamper learning, in 
that fortunate dimensions of the situation are ignored. The shift in self-
understanding in the light of success and failure can also be interpreted 
as a move from understanding oneself as an agent, to understanding 
oneself as a mere pawn (Nygård, 2007).
Attribution error happens when a person over- or underestimates 
his or her own contribution to a particular outcome (Ross, Amabile, 
& Steinmetz, 1977). Doctor Westad’s immediate acknowledgement 
of responsibility appears to have been motivated by a wish to prevent 
the parents from committing the attribution error of taking part of the 
blame for the baby’s death.
A relevant development in research on attribution has been to move 
beyond the distinction between internal and external, to include rela-
tional attribution in explanations of outcomes (Eberly, Holley, Johnson, 
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& Mitchell, 2011). The success or failure of interpersonal interac-
tions in organizations often depends on the quality of the teamwork, 
a dimension not properly captured in the traditional dualistic model of 
attribution theory. Dialogue between colleagues about recent failures 
can serve to utilize and strengthen the relational dimension at work.
In recent years, doctor Bjørnbeth has been the leader of a large unit 
at the Oslo University Hospital. When he took over responsibility as 
leader, work environment surveys indicated weaknesses in the commu-
nication climate. Regular exchanges of harsh words created a climate 
where people dreaded to go to work. Fallibility was at the core of the 
troubles, in that some doctors found it difficult to accept that even 
they could make mistakes, and might depend upon colleagues to inter-
vene. Based on a series of one-on-one employee conversations, doctor 
Bjørnbeth gradually identified the challenges and set new standards for 
communication at the unit. A stronger team mentality emerged, where 
it was considered normal to voice a concern and engage in constructive 
criticism. The individuals who had contributed negatively to the work 
environment through harsh language were able to engage more respect-
fully in conversations with colleagues (Bjørnbeth, 2017).
One fixed agenda feature at the unit currently led by doctor 
Bjørnbeth is a meeting where they go through complications and unex-
pected developments from the past week. It is a version of the same 
kind of meeting his colleague and he tried and failed to establish years 
earlier. “At a recent meeting, we discussed a case where the operation 
itself had gone well, but there had been more blood than expected. I 
had cut a hole in a blood vessel, and had failed to anticipate the amount 
of blood that would come out of it, creating a more stressful situation 
than foreseen. We could have avoided that with a more careful look at 
the x-ray. We learned that for operations of that kind, we need to look 
more closely at the size of the closest blood vessels” (Bjørnbeth, 2017).
Sharing mistakes and talking openly about them require the pres-
ence of high-quality relationships between colleagues, and thus a sense 
of psychological safety (Carmeli et al., 2009; Edmondson, 1999). When 
colleagues sit down to talk about their experiences of not getting things 
right, they expose themselves to criticism and even humiliation. It is only 
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in a work environment perceived to be psychologically safe that partici-
pants are likely to talk openly about tasks they have struggled with.
Dutton (2003) has noted how we can build trust in a work envi-
ronment by being open about weaknesses: “Disclosing something of 
ourselves—especially information that makes us vulnerable in some 
way—is an especially powerful way to convey and generate trust.” 
Doctors and nurses who speak openly to one another about mistakes 
assume that nobody will use the information they share against them at 
a later stage, and so take a risk. The assumption may be false, and a col-
league may betray the trust by exposing the information in some other 
setting. One reason why it can be difficult to create trust in a work 
environment is that people are not ready to make themselves vulner-
able. Instead, they adopt a wait-and-see attitude or a “show me” stance 
(Dutton, 2003, p. 82). You go first, and then I might join you after-
ward. In the previous, unsuccessful attempt to create a practice of shar-
ing mistakes, nobody was willing to follow in the footsteps of Bjørnbeth 
and his colleague. In Bjørnbeth’s current workplace, on the other hand, 
a system of trust appears to be in place, creating what Dutton sees as 
the potential for gradual strengthening of that attitude: “When we take 
the first step in building trust, we become crafters of connecting pos-
sibilities. Rather than passively waiting to see whether someone can 
be trusted, we actively start the virtuous cycle in which trust builds on 
itself ” (Dutton, 2003, p. 82). Here we have a procedure for countering 
a tendency to hold back, of taking an initiative to break with the atti-
tude of not being open about one’s own mistakes because you do not 
expect others to be equally open.
The main examples and input in this chapter have been from health-
care, where there is a potential to create trust and learn to become bet-
ter professionals by being open about mistakes and failures. Doctor 
Westad’s open acknowledgement of his mistake created an opportunity 
for him and his colleagues to learn and to improve their professional 
work with pregnant women. Other doctors, nurses, and midwives in the 
same line of work can also take note of what went wrong in that par-
ticular case, and adjust their own efforts accordingly. It is also striking 
how the idea that there is much health in immediate acknowledgement 
of a mistake, is relevant in other contexts where the things go wrong 
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and victims may start to question their own decision-making and con-
duct. Dutton has identified trust as one of the pathways to high-qual-
ity connections at work, and doctor Westad’s conduct appears to have 
generated trust both in relation to patients and among colleagues. Input 
from doctor Bjørnbeth indicates that there are also more complex cases, 
where a doctor needs to withstand pressure to take full responsibility for 
a bad outcome. His experience also points in the direction of sharing 
mistakes and analyzing them together as a powerful way of improving 
one’s professional work. The concepts of internal, external, and relational 
attribution can also be useful in sorting out the causes of good and bad 
outcomes of interpersonal interactions at work. The next chapter will 
investigate the more specific topic of normalizing acts of seeking and 
offering help as a fruitful way to cope with fallibility at work.
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The river Akerselva runs through Oslo, from north to south, forming a 
boundary between the east and the west parts of the city. On hot sum-
mer days, the river is a popular place to cool down with a bath or go 
for a swim. People of all ages can normally enter the river and enjoy 
the water, but sometimes the current is too strong, and the city council 
advises people to stay on the shore. There are always a few people who 
nevertheless decide to enter the river. They are usually strong, athletic 
types, who are able to look after themselves, and have the muscles and 
energy to go in and out of the strong current.
A few years ago, there was a noteworthy incident at one of the most 
popular bathing spots along the river. It was one of those days with a 
strong current, where most people lay on the shore instead of stepping 
into the river. A young man was standing in the middle of the river, at 
the top of a small waterfall. It is usually a comfortable place to stand, 
facing away from the waterfall, with water gliding at and past you at 
breast height, but on this day, the stream was faster and more forceful 
than usual.
From time to time, the man would move towards the shore, and then 
walk backwards to the spot by the waterfall again. He kept standing 
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there, and people were starting to leave the bathing place for the day. 
Now it started to look odd that the young man was still standing out 
in the river, with water rushing at and past him. Somebody shouted out 
to him: Do you need help? He responded very quickly with a muted 
confirmation. Yes, he really needed help. This young, athletic man was 
stuck in the river with its strong current, and had been so for some 
time. The moves he had made towards the shore were actually failed 
attempts to get out of the river. Now he was cold and lacked energy to 
move. A group of people had to hold hands and make a line out into 
the river, to drag him out of the water.
This chapter explores how initiatives to seek, offer, and provide 
help is a central ingredient in coping with fallibility at work. First, it 
revisits two of the psychological phenomena discussed in earlier chap-
ters—the bystander effect and the confirmation fallacy—to consider 
how they can contribute to an understanding why people are hesitant 
to seek and offer help. Second, it focuses on the perception of social 
cost as an explanation of why people might refrain from seeking help in 
critical situations at work. The starting point for that discussion is two 
examples from healthcare, one real and one fictitious, in which inexpe-
rienced professionals attempt to do things on their own, without help 
or support from colleagues. Third, it considers how systems of holding 
back can make people mute and passive in situations where they either 
need or are in a position to offer help. One person can withhold help to 
another, thinking that the other would probably not have gone out of 
his or her way to help if the roles had been reversed. When both have 
this assumption about the other, a system of holding back is in place, 
and it inhibits helping behavior.
Helping behavior among colleagues increase the likelihood that work 
units and organizations succeed (Grant, 2014; Grant & Patil, 2012; 
Kahn & Katz, 1966). Research on helping at work frames it as “proso-
cial, promotive and cooperative behaviors intended to benefit others” 
(Grant & Patil, 2012, p. 547). It includes assisting colleagues with work-
related operations (Anderson & Williams, 1996), supporting colleagues 
who face personal problems (Kahn, 1998), and expressing compassion 
and care towards colleagues. Helping behaviors are fundamental building 
blocks of organizing, the process through which individual employees 
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coordinate their efforts to achieve collective goals (Grant & Patil, 2012; 
Weick, 1979). They belong to the altruism dimension of what is called 
organizational citizen behavior, “individual behavior that is discretion-
ary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and 
in the aggregate promotes the efficient and effective functioning of the 
organization” (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006). The contribu-
tion of the current chapter is to tie helping behavior to the specific chal-
lenge of coping with fallibility at work.
1  Beyond the Crowd
The young man who could not get out of the waterfall by himself only 
got help when the crowd at the shore had diminished to only a handful 
of people. He had not been in constant need of help from the moment 
he stepped into the river. His capacity to handle the situation on his 
own gradually deteriorated with each effort to get out of the river by 
himself. Even if his condition got gradually worse, it seems likely that 
he to some degree was a victim of the bystander effect. When many 
people were present, none took any initiative to ask about his condi-
tion. As people started to go home from the bathing spot, diffusion of 
responsibility most likely decreased, as there were fewer and fewer peo-
ple present who could share the responsibility of taking an initiative 
between them. Furthermore, the reasons for doubting one’s own judge-
ment that here was a human being in distress weakened when the num-
ber of other bystanders went down, and so the foundation for collective 
ignorance gradually diminished.
In previous chapters, the bystander effect has been used as an element 
in efforts to explain why people hesitate to intervene when they sense 
that a colleague is about to make or already has made a mistake. It can 
happen during an innovation process, where everybody can agree upon 
the importance of being able to fail fast, but still are mute about a grow-
ing concern that this might not be a good project plan or idea after all. 
It can also happen when safety is at stake, and many people know about 
a possible weakness in a procedure, of either a systemic or a personal 
kind. Research on the bystander effect makes it plausible that the higher 
104     Ø. Kvalnes
number of people who know about the weakness, the less likely it is that 
anybody will take a step forward and identify it.
When it comes to bystander effects that inhibit helping behavior, it is 
really the home turf for knowledge about this phenomenon. As we have 
seen, it is well documented that the likelihood of receiving help in a 
critical situation tends to increase when the number of bystanders goes 
down (Darley & Latané, 1968; Fischer, et al., 2011; Darley & Latané, 
1976). In organizational settings, there can be situations that are paral-
lel to the one experienced by the young man stuck in the stream. Many 
can be witness to a colleague who is struggling at work, and each can 
interpret what they see in the light of the behavior of his or her fellow 
bystanders. With a high number of bystanders often comes an illusion 
of being only minimally responsible for taking an initiative to help, and 
a sense that the situation might not be as serious as initially thought, 
since everybody else is behaving as if everything is fine.
In the current context, it is noteworthy that the bystander effect appar-
ently can be reversed by means of cues that raise public self-awareness in 
public settings. With the introduction of nametags and cameras, partici-
pants in bystander experiments have been more helpful when other peo-
ple are present than when they are alone, indicating that they are guided 
by concerns about the impression they make on others (van Bommel, 
van Prooijen, Elffers, & van Lange, 2012, 2014). Reputation concerns 
and impression management lead to helping behavior. An unmonitored 
crowd offers anonymity and an opportunity to remain passive without 
fear of making a bad impression. In an organizational setting, this indi-
cates that nametags and other ways of making bystanders identifiable can 
enhance the probability that somebody will take helping initiatives even 
when they are one of many. The presence of cameras is ethically problem-
atic due to privacy issues, but the knowledge that the introduction of rep-
utational concerns can reverse the bystander effect is nevertheless useful 
for efforts to raise help levels in response to fallibility at work. A person 
in need of help can also neutralize the bystander effect by pointing to one 
person in the crowd and ask him or her for assistance, instead of appeal-
ing in the general direction of all those present. That move can effectively 
puncture both diffusion of responsibility and collective ignorance, since it 
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places one person in the spotlight and makes it clear that there is indeed a 
need for help.
Even the concept of confirmation fallacy can offer some explanation 
of both why a person in distress remains silent about his or her need 
for help, and why witnesses remain passive. Going back to the example 
from the river, the man stuck in the stream may have had an image of 
himself as a strong, muscular, mobile, and independent swimmer, who 
would never need help to get onto the shore after a dip in the river. 
The initial belief that he was capable to manage on his own may have 
remained with him, even after it was becoming obvious that it was false. 
Bystanders who took one look at him out in the river would also get a 
first impression of seeing an athletic person who appeared truly capable 
of taking care of himself. That assumption could survive the emergence 
of stark evidence to the contrary. In work settings, confirmation fallacy 
can also lead to initiatives to help colleagues who seem to need it, but in 
fact do not. The two alternatives to be conscious of, then, is that:
• A colleague who appears to be sufficiently competent and in control 
may actually be in trouble and need help.
• A colleague who appears to be in trouble and need help may actually 
be sufficiently competent and in control.
Research on confirmation fallacy suggests that we are slow to register 
changes in people’s personal capabilities. Once we have supplied others 
with individual labels about what kind of people they are, we tend to 
be blind to obvious signs of negative or positive developments. It takes 
initiative to clarify whether first impressions are correct, and a colleague 
actually needs help, or not. That is what happened in the river episode, 
when a person on the shore finally took an initiative to inquire whether 
the man out in the strong current whether he needed help.
The most striking aspect of the incident in the river is the fact that 
the man in trouble did not ask for help himself, and had to be saved by 
another person’s intervention. An appeal to a possible fixed self-image of 
being an independent and capable person cannot really function as the 
sole explanation. In the next section, attention turns to theories about 
how perceptions of social cost can inhibit people from seeking help. The 
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act of asking others for help at work can be experienced as an admit-
tance of defeat, of not being properly qualified for the job. Research on 
the real and apparent social costs of seeking help can clarify the extent 
to which a person is likely to be seen as less competent if he or she takes 
the step to ask for assistance at work.
2  Perceived Social Costs of Seeking Help
Reluctance to seek help in professional settings can create unacceptable 
risk and negative outcomes at work, since the solitary efforts of people 
who want to manage on their own can be inadequate in dealing with 
complex challenges. In the following, the point is illustrated through 
two narratives involving newcomers in healthcare who want to impress 
colleagues by demonstrating an ability to fix a problem without sup-
port from seniors. The first stems from an interview with doctor stu-
dent Arne (not his real name), while the second is a fictitious account 
of what can happen when an inexperienced doctor attempts to be inde-
pendent and autonomous in dealing with patient complications.
I had a summer job at a mental hospital, and was eager to do a good job and 
impress the staff there. I thought it would give me exciting and relevant expe-
rience, a chance to get good references, and maybe weekend jobs for later in 
my studies. Looking back, I got a bit overexcited in some situations. I was 
very active and engaged in meetings with patients who were suffering from 
psychosis, and tried to talk and reason with them, when what they really 
needed was rest. My behavior was quite intuitive, and I could have asked col-
leagues for help, and whether I was doing the right thing. (Arne, 2016)
This doctor student shows the same hesitancy as the man in the water-
fall to admit to himself that he cannot deal with the situation alone, and 
needs help. Both appear to have a need to demonstrate independence 
and individual strength.
In one situation, I tried to convince a manic patient to reveal where she 
had hidden an ointment. Patients were not allowed to have medicine in 
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their room, and this patient refused to hand over this ointment. A doctor 
and a nurse were present, and I got a chance to show them my capabili-
ties. What I realized later, was that if the patient would not immediately 
reveal the hiding place, she was too ill to be a patient at this unit. I should 
have calmly asked for the ointment, and if she refused, that would mean 
she should have a transfer to another hospital. The patient was quarrel-
some, but not violent. I employed all of my skills of conviction, and we 
had a fierce exchange of words about the hiding place for the ointment. 
In the end, I won through and the patient handed over the medicine. I 
asked for feedback from the colleagues who had been present. The nurse 
claimed that I had been too active in the situation, and should have sim-
ply asked for the ointment, and left the room if the patient refused. The 
doctor said that I have handled the situation quite well. Later I heard that 
the nurse that gone to the unit leader and complained about my behavior, 
saying that I was not competent enough to be left alone with patients. 
I went into this job too eager to make a positive impression and should 
have been more ready to seek help from colleagues and become involved 
in the teamwork of the place. (Arne, 2016)
When an organization hires students and other inexperienced people, 
there is a need to clarify expectations and ground rules. What are the 
normal ways of interacting in this place? How do you balance collabora-
tion and individual work? When is it acceptable to ask for assistance, 
and who are available to help? It is not uncommon for a young per-
son to enter an organization with the mindset exemplified by the doctor 
student above, eager to impress colleagues and demonstrate compe-
tence, autonomy, and independence. If an organization wants to keep 
such solo initiatives at bay, it needs to communicate it in advance, 
and be clear about what is the normal and expected ways of working 
together.
In healthcare, transparency about the expected balance between indi-
vidual and collective efforts is particularly important. Newcomers can 
have an understandable need to show colleagues that they are trustwor-
thy and competent, but may end up causing harm in the process. We can 
imagine the following scenario: A young doctor is present one afternoon 
when a child patient arrives at the unit. This girl is scheduled for an opera-
tion the next day. When the doctor on duty is about to leave the unit for 
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the evening, he asks the young doctor if there is anything he should know 
about before he goes home. The young doctor now has the opportunity to 
describe the condition of the child patient, but decides not to do so. He 
wants to cope with the situation on his own, without support from sen-
ior colleagues. During the night, a complication occurs with the patient, 
and the young doctor can again choose to consult a senior doctor, but 
decides not to do so, thinking that he can and should handle the situation 
by himself. The patient is sleeping, and the young doctor believes that 
the complication can be dealt with when she wakes up in the morning. 
The patient dies, and would most likely have survived if she had received 
proper, routine treatment during the night.
When a hospital faces a situation of this kind, it is a test of its ability 
to perform an autopsy without blame (Collins, 2001), or a calm and 
clearheaded analysis of the chain of events where the main attention is 
on causes, rather than blame. It appears that the young doctor has made 
passive mistakes in (i) not consulting the senior doctor before he went 
off duty, and (ii) not calling for help when the complication happened 
during the night. From one perspective, these are personal mistakes for 
which he is accountable, while from another perspective, they are sys-
temic mistakes. A verdict depends on whether the hospital has clarified 
expectations about doing things together rather than one by one. Both 
the real and fictitious examples of junior doctors who want to impress 
have a past, present, and future dimension, with corresponding ques-
tions (Table 1).
It may be that the principle of seeking help when you are in doubt 
or at the limits of your own capabilities seems so obvious that it should 
Table 1 Time frame for help seeking
Before Critical quality moment After
Did the organization 
properly clarify for the 
junior the normality 
and expectation of 
seeking help?
Should the junior be able 
to understand that he 
should seek help?
Should senior person-
nel be more active in 
inquiring about the 
situation?
Will the student and 
the organization learn 
and improve practices 
of help seeking from 
the event? What are 
the consequences for 
individuals and the 
organization?
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not be necessary to say it. However, patient safety in hospitals hinges on 
a deep, shared an understanding of this principle, and in meetings with 
inexperienced professionals, it seems reasonable to err on the side of 
over-communication rather than risk that they do not grasp the impor-
tance of seeking help when in doubt. Also, in the aftermath of critical 
event, it is possible to look at present routines and practices in order to 
consider improvements.
A person that refrains from seeking help from colleagues or others, 
even when he or she clearly needs it, is likely to perceive that the act of 
asking for assistance has some kind of social cost that they are unwill-
ing to pay. Lee (1999, 2002) has proposed that there are three specific 
categories of social cost associates with seeking help. First, by asking 
for help one acknowledges incompetence and one’s own inability to 
solve problems and find solutions by oneself. Second, a person seeking 
help acknowledges inferiority to other people in terms of knowledge, 
skills, and resources. Third, help seekers acknowledge their depend-
ence on other people, and admit that they cannot complete a particu-
lar task along, but only through the efforts and contributions of others 
(Lee, 2002, p. 18). All of these categories of social cost have links to 
self-esteem. Admitting more or less publicly that you are not sufficiently 
competent, inferior, and dependent upon other people’s contributions 
can disrupt a person’s feeling of self-efficacy and being able to take care 
of him or herself. What will other people think of me, now that they 
have seem how dependent I am of help? These social costs can serve to 
explain the tendency to refrain from seeking help.
The doctor student’s reluctance to seek help can be understood in the 
light of these theoretical propositions. He most likely wanted to avoid 
social costs in all three dimensions. First, he did not want to acknowl-
edge incompetence, but instead had the ambition to make a good 
impression on colleagues and leaders at the mental hospital. Second, 
being a student he was already in some sense inferior to the other peo-
ple in the workplace, and would not want to have the perceived gap 
in knowledge, skills, and resources widened even further by asking for 
help. Third, he acknowledges that he came into the organization with 
a plan to be perceived as an independent and autonomous person, 
someone who would deserve excellent references and offers of further 
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assignments in the hospital. Asking for help would be detrimental to 
this plan. Only after feedback from the leader at the unit did he real-
ize that the normal and expected behavior from newcomers was to seek 
assistance and be open about one’s own shortcomings. Opportunities 
for further work at the hospital would have been greater if he had 
actively sought help from more experienced and competent colleagues.
In the fictitious case of the doctor who refrained from asking more 
experienced colleagues for help, we can imagine a similar set of reasons 
why he might have wanted to sort out complications with the patient 
on his own. He, too, is in a position where he wants to make a good 
impression and demonstrate that he can cope with complex cases on his 
own. All three dimensions of social cost are relevant to understand why 
someone in his position may avoid seeking help, even when the life of a 
child patient is at stake.
Gender differences can affect the threshold for seeking help. In a 
study conducted at a hospital, Lee (2002) followed the introduction 
of a new medication-ordering system, introduced in place of a system 
based on hand-written paper forms, and looked at how often people 
sought help from various sources when they encountered problems 
with the new system. She found that women were significantly more 
likely than men to seek help in such situations. That even held when 
comparing male and female doctors. Lee interprets these findings to 
mean that being competent, superior, and independent may be more 
important to male self-esteem than to female self-esteem. Gilligan 
(1982) proposed that women are socialized to value relational closeness 
and interdependence, while men to a stronger degree value independ-
ence and being able to look after oneself. There appears to be a gender 
difference when it comes to help seeking, and it can be important to 
acknowledge that, regardless of whether we consider that the causes are 
biological or social.
Another interesting finding in Lee’s study is that tasks central to an 
organization’s core competence, the ones that directly influence the 
organization’s strategic advantage and competitiveness, are precisely the 
tasks for which the organizational members perceive the social cost of 
seeking help to be the highest. It appears to be harder and more socially 
costly, then, to seek help to perform tasks that people in the organization 
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are supposed to be particularly good at. Lee (2002, p. 31) claims that 
acceptance of fallibility can be a key to improve the situation:
This suggests that managers should pay particular attention to increasing 
help seeking in the organization’s area of core competence, for example 
by decreasing social costs through increasing interdependence between 
employees, by encouraging employees to try risky experiments that may 
fail, or by establishing norms that making mistakes is acceptable.
At hospitals, one can thus attempt to decrease the social cost of seeking 
help, by encouraging a teamwork mentality. The doctor student inter-
viewed about his summer job experience at a mental hospital indicated 
that he was slow to understand the team dimension, and only gradu-
ally understood that it was normal to seek help from other team mem-
bers. In other organizations, the issue can be to find ways to introduce 
risky activities, much in the same manner as described in chapter three 
regarding Søbakken nursing home. What constitutes a reasonable toler-
ance for risk and harm will always depend on the local circumstances, 
but a common feature is likely to be that one finds a balance between 
active and passive mistakes, or between prescriptive and proscriptive 
dimensions of morality.
Another finding from research in this field is that the social cost of 
seeking help is lower than common perceptions take it to be (Brooks, 
Gino, & Schweitzer, 2015). The act of contacting another person to 
ask for help might even have a social gain rather than a cost. The study 
focused on the specific help seeking activity that consists in asking oth-
ers for advice. Conventional wisdom and lay beliefs (as documented in 
two pilot studies for the main study) tend to be that asking for advice 
decreases perceptions of competence, but the results of the study indi-
cate to the contrary that people tend to interpret acts of seeking advice 
as signs of high competence. The effect depends on the perceived com-
plexity of the task: “When the task is difficult, asking for advice causes 
advice seekers to appear more competent than when they do when the 
task is not difficult; when the task is easy, asking for advice confers no 
benefit” (Brooks, et al., 2015, p. 547). It also makes a positive difference 
that the request for an advice is directed to the person who is going to 
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assess the competence of the advice seeker. The dominant assumption 
appears to be that smart people ask for advice.
Perceptions of social cost can explain why people hesitate to seek help 
even in critical situations where their own capabilities are stretched. As 
we have seen in this section, emerging research provides us with rea-
sons to reconsider establishes assumptions about the effect of help seek-
ing on the perception of competence. Seeking help appears to have the 
potential to enhance social status, rather than diminish it. Knowledge 
in this field has the potential to change the way people think about fal-
libility and interdependence of work efforts, with a shift in focus from 
individualism towards teamwork and collective capabilities. It is likely 
to take conscious and systematic effort to establish a more team-ori-
ented approach that acknowledges the limitations of what even the best-
trained professionals can do on their own. Organizations can still expect 
that exceptionally gifted newcomers, with top results from top schools, 
will want to demonstrate their independence by managing on their own 
and not seeking help. Their leaders have an important task in commu-
nicating that it is perfectly normal and even required to ask for help and 
involve other team members in situations where they experience doubt 
and uncertainty.
3  Systems of Holding Back
When a person faces difficulties at work, help can be just around the 
corner, in the shape of a competent and experienced colleague who 
knows how to handle situations of this kind. All it takes is to get up 
from the chair and walk over to the colleague to ask for help. As we 
have seen in the previous sections, people tend to hesitate to do so in 
many contexts, and research on the psychological phenomena of the 
bystander effect and confirmation fallacy, as well as on the perceived 
social costs of seeking help provide input to understand and over-
come the tendency to refrain from taking such initiatives. This section 
will consider another theoretical approach that also has the potential 
to explain the phenomena of not seeking or offering help. One thing 
is that the person who needs help at work remains at his or her desk 
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instead of seeking help. Another is that the competent colleague may 
sense that a minor intervention can make a huge positive difference to 
the less experienced colleague, but still not make a move to offer or pro-
vide it. The ground cause for passivity in both cases may be what has 
been called systems of holding back (Hämäläinen & Saarinen, 2007).
A system of holding back is in place in a dyadic setting when person 
A and person B are both thinking along the lines of “I will not contrib-
ute to an improvement in this relation, because the other person is not 
willing to contribute”. Both A and B would appreciate and benefit from 
an improvement, but each of them mistakenly assumes that the other 
person is not interested or would not make an effort. The result is that 
nothing happens. There is no movement in the direction of changing 
the relation for the better, since none of the people involved is willing 
to take the first step. The situation resembles that discussed in the pre-
vious chapter, the wait-and-see attitude (Dutton, 2003) that can pre-
vent colleagues from speaking openly about failures and mistakes. The 
shared assumption there can be that “I will not be vulnerable and talk 
about my mistakes, because he/she is not going to be vulnerable and 
talk about his/her mistakes”. In professional settings, there can actually 
be a mismatch in people’s readiness to be open about failure, as doc-
tor Bjørnbeth experienced with his first, failed attempt to establish 
a routine of talking about mistakes. He met genuine resistance to the 
initiative to establish a climate for sharing professional experiences of 
not getting things right (Bjørnbeth, 2017). In other setting, there can 
be systems of holding back, where the people involved actually have a 
common wish to overcome muteness about failure, but each mistakenly 
assumes that they are alone in wishing for it.
The researchers who have identified systems of holding back as a fea-
ture of human behavior believe that it takes systematic effort to over-
come it. In a work environment where people are holding back, the 
negative spirals can grow stronger:
The concept (of holding back) refers to mutually aggregating spirals 
which lead people to hold back contributions they could make because 
others hold back contributions they could make. We believe such systems 
are fundamental to human interaction – indeed, our conviction is that 
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human interaction has a tendency to slide into systems of holding back 
unless conscious effort is launched to counter this tendency. A negative 
dance of holding back will prevail unless it is countered time and again. 
(Hämäläinen & Saarinen, 2007, p. 26)
Efforts to disrupt systems of holding back can be Socratic in nature, 
and consist in raising questions about current practices. The Socratic 
motto “know yourself ” can be interpreted as a reminder of the fact that 
we are relational beings. Knowing yourself is in this sense to become 
aware of the social systems you are a part of, and the extent to which 
you rely on contributions from others, and others rely on contributions 
from you. When you discern and contest systems of holding back, it 
can push individuals and groups in the direction of more constructive 
collaboration.
The philosopher David Hume has provided a vivid example of how 
two people can suffer from not overcoming initial reluctance to assist 
each other. One farmer notices that his neighbor needs help with his 
crop today, but refrains from helping because he does not expect the 
neighbor to assist him later when his crop is ripe:
Your corn is ripe to-day; mine will be so to-morrow.’Tis profitable for us 
both, that I shou’d labour with you to-day, and that you shou’d aid me 
to-morrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for 
me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; and should 
I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation of a return, I 
know I shou’d be disappointed, and that I shou’d in vain depend upon 
your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone: You treat me 
in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our har-
vests for want of mutual confidence and security. (Hume, 1975/1737,  
pp. 519–520)
One striking feature if this narrative is that each farmer appears to know 
about the other that there would be no return of services. Their assump-
tions about each other may actually be well justified and true, and so 
constitute knowledge. When there is a negative dance of holding back, 
there is at least movement, and the assumptions it is based on can be 
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challenged. Hume’s farmers appear to have stopped dancing, and ended 
up in a toxic deadlock.
In a system of holding back, the situation is initially one where 
farmer A thinks that “I will not offer to help him get the corn into 
the barn today, because he is not willing to help me tomorrow” and 
farmer B thinks that “I will not seek help from him to get the corn 
into the barn today, because he will not trust me to help him tomor-
row”. Assumptions about what other people are willing to do may be 
false. The more cemented relation that Hume describes may be what 
lies ahead if the system of holding back continues without opposi-
tion. Initially, false assumptions about a lack of willingness to help may 
gradually become true, as the relation deteriorates. We can distinguish 
between fluid systems of holding back, where it might not take much 
effort to expose false assumptions about the other’s lack of readiness to 
help, and a fixed system of holding back, where it has actually become 
true that the two individuals are not willing to seek or provide help 
to each other. It is possible to imagine how Hume’s farmers have been 
neighbors for a long time, and that there was potential for seeking, ask-
ing for, and providing help at the early stage. Thirty or so years later, the 
lack of initiative from any of them to cancel out the system of holding 
back has created a standstill where both are losers.
Time is also a feature in many instances of coping adequately with 
fallibility at work. If colleague A has spotted that B colleague has mis-
understood a routine or adopted a bad habit, the longer A waits to tell 
B, the more awkward the situation is likely to become. We can imag-
ine that B has misunderstood a particular written form they are using 
at work, and fills it in wrongly every time. A or other colleagues have 
adopted a habit of fixing the mistakes B makes, but nobody has taken 
an initiative to show him how the form is supposed to be filled in. If 
A picks a moment two years after these practices have been established 
to explain to B how it is really done, there are two things he or she will 
have to convey to B: (i) You have misunderstood the form, and filled 
it in wrongly, and (ii) I have known for 2 years without interfering 
and telling you. The thought of how awkward it will be to explain (ii) 
can contribute to more holding back from A and other colleagues in 
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relation to B. The system of holding back can develop from being fluid 
to being fixed, unless somebody steps forward to turn things around.
The concept of holding back can serve to explain a range of instances 
where colleagues struggle to cope with fallibility. As illustrated with 
examples from aviation and healthcare, there can be critical situations 
where a mistake will lead to a negative outcome, unless somebody steps 
forward and intervenes to stop the chain of events that has been set in 
motion. People may hold back contributions they could make, based on 
assumptions about the extent to which the potential benefactor would 
have contributed if the roles had been reversed:
• I am not going to make him aware of his mistake, because he would 
not have made me aware of my mistake.
• I am not going to assist him in this critical phase of the project, 
because he would not have done the same for me.
• I am going to let him suffer through this on his own, because he 
would have let me suffer through a similar event on my own.
A common challenge in overcoming these systemic stalemates is to 
move from a passive mode to an active mode. As noted in chapter five, 
it is useful to distinguish between active and passive mistakes, between 
the mistake of doing something you actually should not have done, and 
the mistake of refraining from doing something you actually should 
have done. An active mistake is often salient by nature and tends to 
bring unwanted attention to the decision-maker, while a passive mistake 
can take place unnoticed, outside the spotlight. This asymmetry means 
that it is easier to get away with a passive mistake, compared to an active 
one. It can also strengthen systems of holding back, since passivity 
towards a habit of not supporting colleagues does not have the kind of 
obvious and tangible consequences that an active mistake can have.
The topic of this chapter has been how helping behavior can counter 
the challenges that occur due to human fallibility. In organizations where 
it is normal to seek, offer, and provide help to colleagues, the imper-
fect nature of professional capabilities is less likely to lead to bad out-
comes than in organizations where people are more restrictive in those 
areas. The first example under scrutiny was one from a non-professional 
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setting, where an athletic person stuck in a river stream refrained from 
asking for help. Similar situations can occur in organizations, when a 
person who apparently is competent and in charge of the situation, may 
actually need help, but be reluctant to ask for it. Three kinds of explana-
tions of why people are reluctant to both seek and offer help have been 
discussed. First, bystander effects and confirmation fallacies can lead to 
passivity, in that both the person in trouble and the people watching 
may mistakenly think that this person is capable of managing on his or 
her own. Second, research on the perceived social cost of seeking help 
explains why the threshold for doing so can be high. It also exposes the 
perception to be dubious, in that studies show that help-seekers are often 
seen as more competent than those who try to do things independently 
and on their own. Third, systems of holding back can stand in the way of 
people seeking and offering help, in that people assume the other would 
not seek or offer help under reversed circumstances. There can be fluid 
systems of holding back, which can be challenged and exposed to be 
based on false assumptions about the other’s willingness to make a posi-
tive difference, and fixed systems that have been allowed to develop over 
time and are harder to overcome. Conscious efforts to counter and chal-
lenge systems of holding back now appear to be central to any attempt to 
lay the foundation for adequate coping with fallibility at work.
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Teacher A has a particular responsibility at her school for a group of 
pupils, aged fifteen, who are struggling either socially or with the school 
subjects, or both. One afternoon she has scheduled individual meetings 
with the parents of these pupils. In front of her now is the mother of 
Max, a pupil that has recently made considerable progress at school, 
both in the subjects where he has had difficulties, and in the social 
relations with other pupils. Max has become more integrated with the 
rest of his class and has stopped bullying other pupils. Teacher A expects 
him to continue on this positive path, and has great belief in him, based 
on his recent development in the classroom. When teacher A conveys 
the concrete steps forward that Max has made, and the expectations she 
has for him, the mother gets visibly proud of what she hears about her 
own son. She is probably not used to hearing positive things about his 
behavior. The meeting ends and the two women shake hands. Max’s 
mother starts to walk down the corridor. It is at this moment teacher A 
realizes that she has made a serious mistake. The woman walking away 
from her is not Max’s mother, but rather the mother of another pupil in 
her group, Alex. The papers about both pupils were on her desk when 
the mother turned up for the meeting, and she grabbed the wrong set 
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of papers. In teacher A’s mind, the person she greeted at the door was 
Max’s mother, but now she has to admit to herself that it was not. Alex 
is a pupil steeped in trouble at school, a bully who is far behind the rest 
of the class in most subjects. The words teacher A has used to describe 
Max’s progress in no way fits with the development Alex has had.
What should teacher A do now? She can either pursue the mother 
to acknowledge the mistake, or not. The previous chapter launched the 
principle of immediate acknowledgement: When you realize that your 
decision or behavior has caused harm, admit it and take responsibility 
immediately. The principle is not directly applicable in teacher A’s situ-
ation. Her mistake has not yet caused harm, and may not do so later 
either. Immediate acknowledgment is nevertheless a viable option, and 
may be the right and proper thing to do. It depends in part on the 
foreseeable outcomes of telling and not telling. Alex’s mother is on her 
way home, where she will probably tell her son that teacher A has high 
expectations for him. That may actually give him a positive and energiz-
ing experience, the opposite of harm. Even so, teacher A has to consider 
the ethical dimensions of the situation and to what extent she owes it to 
Alex and her mother, and to the school, to be open about the mistake 
she has made.
This chapter explores the normative and descriptive dimensions 
of an ethics of fallibility. The normative dimension is discussed from 
teacher A’s mistaken identity case, in light of alternative justifications for 
acknowledging the mistake and not. The normative traditions of con-
sequentialism and duty ethics provide conflicting advice about what 
teacher A and people in similar situations ought to do. Moral risk and 
the balance between prescriptive (do good) and proscriptive (avoid 
harm) considerations are at the heart of a normative ethics of fallibil-
ity, as noted in the chapter about events at Søbakken nursing home. 
This chapter outlines some theoretical resources available to formulate 
a normative platform for coping with fallibility, both with regard to 
what from a moral point of view should happen ahead of critical events 
where people are likely to make mistakes, in the midst of such events, 
and in their aftermath.
The descriptive dimension of an ethics of fallibility addresses alterna-
tive explanations to why people become involved in moral misbehavior, 
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and often continue to be so once they have habituated a certain behav-
ioral pattern. In an organizational context, it is particularly relevant to 
explore a phenomenon we can call moral fallibility, the instances where 
people act contrary to their moral convictions and values, first hesitantly 
and with some distress, later out of habit. One kind of explanation 
builds of virtue ethics, and sees moral wrongdoing at work as an indi-
cation of character defects and weakness of will, while another kind of 
explanation points to circumstantial influences on decision-making and 
behavior. Both belong under the heading of descriptive ethics, where 
the aim is to explain rather than to justify what people do. The main 
example under discussion will be from a turnaround process in Norsk 
Gjenvinning, a Norwegian waste management company, where work 
has been done to address instances of moral misbehavior. Material for 
the discussion will come from a Harvard Business School Case Study of 
the company (Serafeim & Gombos, 2015) and from an interview with 
the CEO Erik Osmundsen (2017).
The ethics of fallibility proposed here takes into account both nor-
mative and descriptive dimensions of human behavior. In the final sec-
tion of the chapter, the two are combined in a stance on forgiveness. 
Considerations of whether a person who has made a moral mistake 
ought to be forgiven (a normative issue) can be informed by knowledge 
about why people make such mistakes (a descriptive issue).
1  The Good and the Right
Alex’s mother is disappearing down the corridor and teacher A needs to 
decide whether to go after her to admit her mistake, or not. She can also 
postpone the decision about disclosure until tomorrow, or later.
If teacher A thinks solely in terms of self-interest in this situation, 
it is likely that she will keep the knowledge about the mistaken iden-
tity to herself. She is the only person in the world who knows about 
the mistake, and it is hard to see how anybody else will ever find out if 
she remains silent. The mistake will reflect badly on her professionalism, 
and she may come on the receiving end of repercussions or reprimands 
from her leader. Colleagues will most likely think badly of her. From a 
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self-interest perspective, then, it appears that the best thing is to keep 
the knowledge about the mistake to herself.
From a perspective of professional ethics, teacher A should prioritize 
the pupil’s interest over her own. As noted in the previous chapter, con-
flicts of interest are at the core of ethics in profession (Nanda, 2002). 
The professional more or less explicitly says to the client, patient, or 
pupil: “Trust me; although my self-interest may dictate other actions, 
I undertake to serve in your best interest.” In teacher A’s case, then, the 
professionally right thing to do in the aftermath of a mistake is to ask 
what would be in the pupil’s best interest. Is it in Alex’s best interest that 
he and his mother gets to know that the positive words about progress 
were actually about another pupil, and not about him? Is it in his best 
interest to get the truth, or to remain under the illusion that his teacher 
has seen progress in his development, and thinks he will continue to 
take social and subject related strides forward?
The discussion of moral risk in chapter three is also relevant with 
regard to the situation teacher A faces, and in the more general context 
of establishing a normative ethics of fallibility. Teacher A may wonder 
whether her leader and her colleagues will stand by her if she admits 
to the mistake, or whether she will be isolated and must defend her-
self alone. She has committed an active mistake, in doing something she 
should not have done. Keeping quiet about it might be viewed as a pas-
sive mistake, not being open about a mistake she should admit to the 
affected persons. There is also an element of balancing between a pro-
scriptive (do no harm) and a prescriptive (do good) stance towards the 
pupil and his mother, but interpretations of facts and research indicat-
ing the probable effects of the alternatives can differ, and so also the per-
ceptions of which of them are likely to be the more hurtful or beneficial.
The two main traditions in normative ethics are consequential-
ism and duty ethics. They offer different input to the situation teacher 
A faces, and what she should do. One way to describe the difference 
between them is to say that consequentialism gives priority to outcome 
(the good) over the quality of the conduct (the right), while duty eth-
ics does the opposite, claiming that conduct (the right) is more impor-
tant than the outcome (the good) (Kvalnes, 2015). Utilitarianism 
is the most common version of the former theory, and builds on the 
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moral philosophies of John Stuart Mill (2002/1859/1863) and Jeremy 
Bentham (1970/1789). It claims that the decision-maker should always 
seek to maximize the overall sum of utility for all those affected by the 
choice at hand, and thus base the decision on a kind of cost-benefit 
analysis on behalf of all stakeholders. Duty ethics, based on Immanuel 
Kant’s moral philosophy, holds that there are moral values that should 
never be sacrificed in the name of a good outcome. Human dignity, 
fairness, honesty, and respect, should always have priority over consid-
erations about common utility, according to this line of thinking (Kant, 
1998/1785).
Teacher A can seek advice from these two ethical traditions. Duty 
ethics will claim that she should choose the honest and truthful 
option and be open about the mistake towards Alex and his mother. 
Considerations about whether their lives will be better or worse depend-
ing on the disclosure or not are irrelevant from this theoretical perspec-
tive. In the here and now, we should be open with each other and not 
hide the truth, no matter what might happen next, because that is in 
line with core values of human dignity. Consequentialism, on the other 
hand, will claim that teacher A should consider the probable outcomes 
of her alternatives. Will it be harmful to Alex and his mother to con-
tinue their lives under the illusion that teacher A has seen great progress 
in his behavior at school, and is optimistic about his future, or will it 
be more harmful to them to have the truth about the mistake revealed? 
Answers to these kinds of questions will determine the consequentialist 
advice to teacher A.
At the moment in time when teacher A has to make her decision, 
there is no concrete way of knowing or predicting future outcomes for 
Alex and her mother. However, studies of the so-called Pygmalion effect 
indicate that teacher expectations about performances from pupils can 
become self-fulfilling. In one study, teachers at an elementary school 
were told that some pupils could be expected to be “intellectual bloom-
ers” in a particular school year. Tests at the end of that year showed 
that the pupils identified in that manner actually had enhanced per-
formances, compared to other pupils, even though they from the out-
set were singled out randomly. Positive expectations from the teachers, 
then, appeared to have a concrete, positive effect on how the students 
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performed (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). The effect has been docu-
mented in a later study (Boser, Wilhelm, & Hanna, 2014; Chadha 
& Narula, 2016), and also beyond the classroom. Pygmalion effects 
also occur in organizations, when leaders and colleagues express high 
expectations to their coworkers (Chandrashekar, 2016; Eden, 1990; 
Livingston, 2003).
With knowledge about the Pygmalion effect in mind, teacher A 
could choose to remain silent about the mistake, in the hope that Alex 
would respond positively to news about the high expectations from 
his teacher. Her mistake could then transform into a positive push for 
Alex. From a duty ethics perspective, this line of thinking misrepresents 
morality, in that it fails to give weight to non-negotiable moral values of 
honesty and truthfulness.
We can imagine a continuation of the story about teacher A, where 
she decides not to tell Alex’s mother about the mistake. The mother 
goes home to her son, and tells him about the glowing positive appraisal 
from the teacher. In line with research on the Pygmalion effect, we 
can assume that what occurs next is a positive upturn in Alex’s life at 
school. He starts to take schoolwork more seriously, and makes con-
siderable progress both in the subjects where he has struggled previ-
ously and socially among the other pupils. Exposure to the teacher’s 
positive regard and high expectations gives him a strong motivation to 
strengthen his efforts at school.
Such a positive outcome for Alex would not suffice to convince a 
duty ethics representative that teacher A was right in keeping the mis-
take to herself. From this theoretical perspective, moral luck (Nagel, 
1979; Williams, 1981) can at most function as a label for the mistaken 
judgements people sometimes make, when they allow actual outcomes 
to overshadow the principled dimensions of a decision. According to 
duty ethics, we should always act in accordance with a maxim or rule 
of conduct that we can, to be universally applicable to these kinds of 
situations. Teacher A, then, should have asked herself whether she could 
will that every other person facing a similar situation applied the maxim 
of keeping quiet about the kind of mistake she has made. This Kantian 
line of thinking is similar to the one found in the Golden Rule, to treat 
others the way you want to be treated yourself. If teacher A had been 
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the mother who had been mistaken for another, would she have wanted 
the teacher to reveal the mistake, or would she have accepted to be kept 
in the dark about it? Duty ethics in the Kantian tradition assumes that 
any consistent and rational person will end up prioritizing honesty over 
potentially positive outcomes in such situations.
In support of teacher A’s decision, it can be noted that it was more 
than wishful thinking to assume that Alex could benefit from high 
expectations and praise, since research on the Pygmalion effect indi-
cates that to be an expected outcome. She may even apply the Kantian 
maxim or the Golden Rule and conclude that she would accept simi-
lar treatment if she had been in the mother’s position. During autumn 
2016, the case was presented to special advisors in pedagogy, people 
who work closely with professionals like teacher A, They were asked 
to give an intuitive response to it. Around half the participants indi-
cated that the right thing to do would be to explain the mistake to the 
mother, while the other half believed that teacher A should withhold 
that information. The case was used in three seminars with around one 
hundred professional participants each time, and there was an even split 
between a duty ethics answer and a consequentialist answer in all of 
them.
A normative ethics of fallibility can address a range of issues were 
people have made or are about to make mistakes. Questions of moral 
responsibility and right conduct can be raised at different moments in 
time about what one ought to do (Table 1).
The temporal structure can also illustrate the priorities within the two 
normative traditions. Consequentialism will seek information about 
likely outcomes in order to determine what the right thing to do is, and 
so is future oriented. Duty ethics, on the other hand, is primarily ori-
ented towards the present, and on how moral values like human dig-
nity, honesty, autonomy, and respect dictates what a person ought to do 
under the given circumstances, here and now. It can also to some extent 
be oriented towards the past, in taking into account what the decision-
maker owe to the people affected by his or her conduct, based on previ-
ous promises and commitments. Even without a scholarly introduction 
to the two traditions, people tend to have strong intuitions about right 
and wrong, belonging to these theoretical categories. However, people 
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Woften do not remain consistent duty ethicists or consequentialists, 
but rather alternate between them when figuring out what the mor-
ally proper response to a situation would be. Only theorists in this area 
appear to be faithful to one particular ethical tradition over time. The 
rest of us tend to alternate, and be drawn towards outcomes one day 
and towards honesty and respect the next day, shopping around among 
ethical theories.
2  Moral Fallibility
“At some of our locations, we suspected hazardous waste was mixed 
with non-hazardous waste. We interviewed some employees about 
this practice, and they appeared not to see anything morally problem-
atic with it, since competitors were also doing it, and it was a common 
thing to do. Our company also profited from it. Some said that they 
were only following orders from their bosses” (Osmundsen, 2017).
One aspect of an ethics of fallibility is what we ought to do in the 
face of possible and real failure and error, another aspect is what it is 
that makes us prone to commit moral mistakes. The quote above is 
from an interview with Erik Osmundsen, CEO of Norsk Gjenvinning 
(NG), Norway’s largest waste management company whose own-
ers and top management took the initiative to scrutinize and clean up 
the company’s behavior with the aim to make it more sustainable. In 
that process, they came across examples of moral misbehavior among 
employees, and needed to find countermeasures to it (Serafeim & 
Gombos, 2015).
NG has around 25% of the Norwegian waste management indus-
try’s revenue. In 2012, the company handled about 1.8 million tons of 
waste, and had 40.000 customers. Since the introduction of new own-
ers in 2011, the company has gone through a dramatic turnaround, 
where the aim has been both to become more cost-efficient, and to 
clean up activities and make them more sustainable. The new CEO 
Erik Osmundsen introduced a compliance program to systematize this 
effort. Nationally, NG has taken the industry lead in a development 
to see waste as a resource for recycling, rather than a problem to get 
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rid of, and to make the industry itself more transparent. The company 
has activities all over the country, and had for a long time been struc-
tured in a way that made it difficult for upper management to evaluate 
local activities. Internal investigations exposed local practices of corrup-
tion. NG employees paid cash for hauls of mixed metal received at their 
waste drop-off sites, often not reporting the transactions properly. There 
were reports of thefts of metals from local industry sites, a practice that 
was incentivized by the industry wide practice of paying cash for metals 
at the sites (Serafeim & Gombos, 2015).
The most serious instance of morally questionable behavior detected 
in NG was the treatment and disposal of hazardous waste:
At times, hazardous chemicals would be unwittingly mixed in with the 
non-hazardous waste supply. In other cases, NG employees would incor-
rectly code hazardous products for export. (Non-hazardous waste costs to 
ship were exceptionally lower than hazardous waste costs.) In the most 
egregious cases, some customers were unwilling to pay a higher price for 
the proper treatment of waste even after it was discovered that their waste 
included hazardous materials. Because their contract was already signed, 
the customers would refuse to pay the additional fees. This led some 
managers to ignore the issue and continue business as usual. (Serafeim & 
Gombos, 2015, p. 8)
One of the most difficult tasks for Osmundsen and upper manage-
ment was to challenge and change the local practices regarding the 
treatment of hazardous waste. What they found during interviews with 
NG employees who had partaken in the practice was that they did not 
consider it to be morally problematic. On a personal level, it did not 
necessarily benefit them financially to let industry dump hazardous 
materials among the non-hazardous waste. It had become a habit to do 
so, and a standard justification was that everybody else was doing it. 
Changing the practice also appeared to make little sense to the employ-
ees, since the company was making a lot of money that way (Serafeim 
& Gombos, 2015, p. 9).
When studying this case from a vantage point outside the waste man-
agement industry, it is striking that the employees involved apparently 
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did not see the questionable aspects of the practices. We can interpret 
this as another example of inattentional blindness, discussed in chapter 
two, illustrated with the gorilla experiment (Simons & Chabris, 1999). 
Even here, the individuals involved seem to be blind to important 
aspects of what they are doing, and blind to that blindness.
Moral fallibility is the name we can use for the phenomenon of act-
ing contrary to one’s moral convictions and beliefs. An individual may 
believe that adultery, tax avoidance, and nepotism somehow is morally 
wrong, but still engage in those activities, due to the weakness of will or 
some other explanation. Moral fallibility in organizations occurs when 
leaders or other employees make decisions and act in manners that 
appear to contradict what they generally take to be morally acceptable 
and right. A financial advisor may believe that he or she should put the 
clients’ interest first, but still try to sell dubious products to them, to 
bolster personal bonuses. An athlete may consider doping to be mor-
ally wrong, but nevertheless take up an offer to use illegal substances 
to enhance performance. A waste management employee may be con-
cerned about sustainability, and be a proponent of safe treatment of 
waste, but still let industry clients dump hazardous waste among the 
safe and recyclable waste.
If there are real cases that fit these descriptions, they illustrate that 
people can actually go against their moral convictions, and be mor-
ally fallible. However, one widespread assumption in the field of moral 
psychology is that when we come up against alternatives that conflict 
with our moral beliefs, we will dismiss them unless we manage to con-
vince ourselves that those alternatives are morally acceptable, after all 
(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). The main idea 
is that “people do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct 
until they have justified to themselves the rightness of their actions” 
(Bandura et al., 1996, p. 365). When facing an option to act against 
our moral convictions, then, we will either dismiss the option or revise 
those convictions to be able to proceed with the option, without 
conflict.
Rawls has described how individuals and groups seek “reflective equi-
librium”, a situation where there is coherence among our beliefs (Rawls, 
1971). In that state of affairs, the beliefs we have about particular cases 
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are consistent with our more general beliefs about right and wrong, and 
they provide mutual support to each other. Whenever there is a con-
flict with particular beliefs about what we ought to do and more prin-
cipled beliefs, we tend to seek coherence by working back and forth to 
revise the beliefs, either the general ones or the ones about the particular 
case, until they are in equilibrium. Once we face an option do some-
thing that goes against our current principled beliefs, and are tempted 
or ordered to choose it, we can engage in a reflective activity to create 
coherence. Something has to give way, and that can either be the alter-
native of acting in that manner, or the general belief that it is wrong to 
do so.
Moral psychology offers conceptual tools to describe and analyze the 
tensions that can occur in such situations, and how we tend to deal with 
them. On one interpretation, what we have called moral fallibility never 
occurs, since we have the tendency to seek reflective equilibrium, and 
will revise either our particular or general moral beliefs, before we either 
dismiss the option or go ahead to act in a way that initially appeared 
to be wrong. According to this view, the financial advisor, the athlete, 
and the waste management employee mentioned above do not really 
act against their moral convictions or beliefs, since their actions indicate 
that they have managed to justify to themselves the rightness of those 
choices. They have been able to reshape their moral beliefs in manners 
that remove the initial conflicts.
Bandura et al., in the quote above, do acknowledge that people might 
act against their moral convictions, even though they do not “ordinar-
ily” do so. It is reasonable to assume that some rest of the initial moral 
belief that it is wrong to prioritize self-interest over client interest, to 
use doping to enhance athletic performance, and to let clients dump 
hazardous waste in unsafe areas, remains, even after a process of con-
vincing oneself that it is not. If so, the phenomenon of organizational 
moral fallibility is real and worthy of theoretical and practical attention. 
It can be important to understand the processes through which ordinary 
employees become involved in moral misbehavior, and act contrary to 
what they initially have taken to be morally acceptable and right.
Traditional virtue ethics would explain both inabilities to see morally 
problematic aspects of one’s own practices, and the actual partaking in 
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them, in terms of character defects and weaknesses. A person of firm 
and strong character would not become involved in such activities, 
and would not fail to see the immoral aspect of assisting industry in 
getting rid of hazardous waste in unsustainable ways. Recent empiri-
cal studies in social and moral psychology provide reasons to be skep-
tical of this character explanation, pointing instead to circumstance as 
a more reliable predictor of moral misbehavior (Ariely, 2012; Doris, 
2002). Any person appears to be vulnerable to being blind to significant 
moral aspects of the practices he or she engages in. Once you come into 
a habit of doing things in a certain way, morally questionable aspects 
gradually become invisible. The idea that a person of firm character 
could never experience a development of this kind can create a false 
sense of strength and immunity among those who believe that they are 
in possession of stable dispositions always to do the right thing.
Theoretical contributions to moral psychology offer a vocabulary to 
give a more detailed account of the processes that can lead individuals 
and groups to adopt morally questionable practices. The next section 
will highlight how the concept of moral neutralization, developed by 
criminologists Sykes and Matza (1957) can be used to explain how deci-
sion-makers end up deviating from what they initially take to be mor-
ally acceptable behavior. This theoretical framework makes it possible to 
identify and categorize attempts to justify deviations from shared moral 
convictions and beliefs, and as such, it can be useful in organizational 
settings where the aim is to halt such developments and strengthen the 
barrier against moral misbehavior at work.
3  Moral Neutralization
The theory of neutralization challenges the dominant assumption that 
juvenile delinquents typically belong to a sub-culture whose members 
adhere to a set of moral values contradicting those held in regard by 
respectable, law-abiding citizens. Sykes and Matza (1957) described the 
young criminals as individuals who shared the moral convictions of the 
rest of society, but had been able to justify to themselves that they could 
not be blamed for those instances where they had broken the law. They 
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introduced neutralization as the term for the justification processes that 
“precede deviant behavior and make deviant behavior possible” (Sykes 
and Matza, p. 666). Their theoretical framework has been adapted in 
different settings, to explain tax evasion (Thurman, John, & Riggs, 
1984), normalization of corruption (Anand & Ashforth, 2003), insur-
ance customer dishonesty (Brinkmann, 2005), software piracy (Bhal 
& Leekha, 2008; Siponen, Vance, & Willison, 2012), consumption of 
counterfeit luxury goods (Bian, Wang, Smith, & Yannopoulou, 2016), 
misconduct in marketing (Vitell & Grove, 1987), and unethical behav-
ior intended to benefit one’s own organization (Umphress, Bingham, & 
Mitchell, 2010). All of these studies focus to some extent on moral fal-
libility, and attempt to explain it as an outcome of a process of moral 
neutralization.
A person or group who engages in moral neutralization, first experi-
ences some form of moral dissonance (Kelman & Baron, 1974; Kvalnes, 
2015), a conflict between an option to act in a particular manner, and 
his/her/their moral convictions. In music, dissonance is the simultane-
ous emission of two or more sounds that are disharmonious. It is usu-
ally painful to the ear. The more general term of cognitive dissonance 
applies to the discomfort of holding conflicting cognitions. It was first 
used to describe the cognitive struggles of a UFO cult who believed in 
the impending apocalypse and faced a reality where that did not occur 
(Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956). The concept of moral disso-
nance describes a situation where somebody faces a situation where the 
person has the option to act against his or her moral convictions, and is 
tempted or ordered to do so. The situation can also be described as one 
where there is a lack of reflective equilibrium, and something has to give 
way to restore harmony among the person’s beliefs.
A decision-maker has three main alternatives in overcoming moral 
dissonance. It is possible either (i) to dismiss the option and stay loyal 
to his or her existing moral beliefs, (ii) to revise and change the moral 
beliefs so that the described option no longer conflicts with them, or 
(iii) to reinterpret the situation to be different from the initial view that 
created the dissonance. The latter process can be categorized as moral 
neutralization.
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Sykes and Matza identified five techniques of neutralization. The 
first is denial of responsibility, where the decision-maker sees himself as 
a victim of forces beyond his control, “helplessly propelled into new 
situations” and “more acted upon than acting” (Sykes and Matza, p. 
667). The distinction between agent and pawn (Nygård, 2007), dis-
cussed in chapter one, is also relevant here. The decision-maker can 
deny responsibility by staging him—or herself as a pawn rather than as 
an agent. The second technique is denial of injury, where the decision-
maker raises doubt about whether anybody will actually be hurt by 
his or her conduct. Delinquents may claim that the rich people they 
rob can afford it. Leaders can defend acts of lying as a reference per-
son for an employee who is not functioning well in their own organiza-
tion, claiming that the other organization is better equipped to motivate 
this person to do good work (Kvalnes, 2014). The third technique is 
that of denial of victim, where the argument can be that the part who 
might suffer due to this deviance from ordinary moral considerations, 
deserve it. It is a form of “rightful retaliation or punishment” (Sykes 
and Matza, p. 668). In a study of honesty in reference situations, lead-
ers justified lying with claims to the effect that the other organization 
would have done the same to them, and probably already have, and 
so do not deserve moral protection against similar treatment (Kvalnes, 
2014). Fourth, condemnation of condemners consists in pointing the fin-
ger at those who might criticize the act under consideration, and raising 
doubt about their motivation. From the perspective of the delinquent, 
“by attacking others, the wrongfulness of his own behavior is more eas-
ily repressed or lost to view” (Sykes and Matza, p. 668). Finally, the 
fifth technique of neutralization is appeal to higher loyalties, in which 
the decision-maker claims that other moral considerations or beliefs 
are more important than the one about to be sacrificed. In business, it 
can take the form of an appeal to the survival of the company. We had 
to cheat the customer a little bit, in order to save the workplace from 
bankruptcy.
The framework of moral neutralization has also been used to analyze 
the conduct of bankers and financial advisors ahead of the financial cri-
sis in Iceland (Kvalnes & Nordal, 2017). Some of these decision-makers 
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have gone to jail for misbehavior against their customers and the finan-
cial markets, taking risks that initially led to the collapse of all national 
banks, and to huge personal and collective financial losses. All five neu-
tralization techniques appear to have been in use to justify the hazard-
ous decisions, but also one kind of justification not captured by the 
original theoretical framework. The decision-makers frequently told 
themselves and others that none of their actions were in conflict with 
the code of conduct or regulations for financial activities. This sixth 
technique can be called denial of rule violation. The underlying assump-
tion is that anything the codes and regulations are silent about is accept-
able. The phenomenon can also be seen as a form of loophole ethics 
(Kvalnes, 2015), a strategy to identify and exploit loopholes in an ethi-
cal framework, claiming to be loyal to the letter of the code, and ignor-
ing what may be called the underlying spirit of the code.
One analysis of the ethical roots of the financial crisis describes what 
can come after neutralization (Donaldson, 2012), where “bad practices 
can become institutionalized, and initial queasiness gives way to indus-
try-wide acceptance” (p. 6). It thus identifies the period that may follow 
in the aftermath of a process where moral misgivings about a particular 




3. Normalization of morally questionable behavior
In organizations where the stakeholders are concerned about not getting 
to stage 3 in this process, it is possible to be aware of signs of moral dis-
sonance, and to challenge neutralization attempts. It can be a part of the 
communication climate to bring attention to these phenomena, and to 
encourage people to speak up when they sense that colleagues or leaders 
are beginning to use neutralization techniques.
The idea that moral dissonance can give way to normalization of 
morally questionable behavior, through processes of moral neutrali-
zation, can be illustrated more or less anecdotally by pointing to con-
crete processes in organizations where that appears to be a reasonable 
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explanation of known phenomena. It can also find support in neurosci-
ence. One study has addresses how small acts of dishonesty can esca-
late into larger transgressions. Participants in an experiment that opened 
up for self-serving dishonesty became gradually more comfortable with 
lying. The researchers explain this in terms of brain adaptation. Initially, 
the lie registers as a dramatic deviation from the baseline, but with 
each new lie, the baseline changes, and the act of lying becomes nor-
malized. The brain ceases to respond to the dishonest act as a shocking 
or unusual event (Garrett, Lazzaro, Ariely, & Sharot, 2016). In hon-
esty research, the phenomenon has been called a “what-the-hell-effect” 
(Ariely, 2012; Mazar & Ariely, 2010), in an adoption of a concept orig-
inally used in research about eating, to describe people who succumb 
to temptations to violate a particular diet (Baumeister & Heatherton, 
1996; Polivy & Herman, 1985). One violation opens up for further 
ones, as it changes the baseline for what you can do.
Even the moral fallibility of the NG employees who allowed industry 
clients to dump hazardous chemicals among the non-hazardous mate-
rials can be studied through the lens of moral neutralization. Viewed 
from a distance, this practice appears to be a clear example of serious 
moral misbehavior, in that it contributes to unrepairable environmen-
tal damage. When interviewed about it, the employees failed to see 
anything wrong with the practice, and argued that (i) everybody else 
in the industry was doing it, (ii) they were only following orders from 
bosses, and (iii) it gave the company a considerable profit (Osmundsen, 
2017; Serafeim & Gombos, 2015). We can place arguments (i) under 
the heading of denial of responsibility, since the fact that it is common 
practice to do something appears to place it beyond decision-making 
and responsibility. Heath has suggested that the justification based on 
what everybody else is doing is not sufficiently captured in the origi-
nal theory, and has introduced it as a separate, extra category of neu-
tralization techniques (Heath, 2008). Argument (ii) is also to deny of 
responsibility, pushing it on to the bosses instead. Argument (iii) is an 
example of appeal to higher loyalties, placing the company’s interest 
ahead of environmental interest. It is also an argument that places the 
activity in the category of organizational misbehavior that benefits the 
organization (Umphress et al., 2010; Vardi & Weitz, 2016), typically 
138     Ø. Kvalnes
performed by employees who strongly identify with their organization, 
and are willing to break the law to protect its interests. Further studies 
of the actual justifications offered by NG employees is needed to docu-
ment the extent to which moral neutralization has occurred in the pro-
cesses leading up to habitual acceptance of unsustainable dumping of 
hazardous waste.
Studies in a range of disciplines show that our cognitive capacities are 
flexible, and that we can gradually come to accept and adopt behavior 
that initially appeared to be morally questionable. Organizational life 
can place us at the top of slippery slopes, where the first small steps into 
dishonesty and cheating can lead to major moral deviances later. One 
final example is from athletics. Tyler Hamilton was one of the cyclists 
in Lance Armstrong’s team, and for a long period, he was in the midst 
of the lies and deceptions designed to make systematic doping to take 
place without detection. When asked about the cheating aspect of the 
team’s activities, he responds:
I’ve always said that you could have hooked us up to the best lie detectors 
on the planet and asked us if we were cheating, and we’d have passed. Not 
because we were delusional – we knew we were breaking the rules - but 
because we didn’t think of it as cheating. It felt fair to break the rules, 
because we knew others were too. (Hamilton & Coyle, 2012, p. 95)
It is hard to say whether Hamilton and the others ever experienced sig-
nificant moral dissonance before engaging in doping, but here at least 
any traces of moral misgiving about competing under the influence of 
performance-enhancing drugs have disappeared. Similar processes can 
take place in other organizations and work environments. It is likely 
that these are the main causes of moral misbehavior in organizations, 
rather than a weakness of individual character.
4  Forgiveness
During a visit to Iceland in the autumn of 2016, the author of this 
book asked a group of local citizens whether they would consider giv-
ing the bankers who had contributed to the financial crisis in 2008, and 
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who had now served jail sentences for their involvement, the chance 
to start anew, with blank pages. Would they be willing to forgive these 
people, and let them put their past misbehavior behind them? The ini-
tial response from the group was that the thought had never occurred to 
them. It seemed so farfetched to imagine that those bankers could ever 
return in any kind of capacity of trust in the Icelandic society.
On the spot, the people around the table could provide a list of ten 
names of people who to their minds had severed ties with civic soci-
ety forever. They were individuals who in their roles within the financial 
sector had pursued personal wealth at the expense of naïve customers 
and regulators. The gradual exposure of their dealings evoked responses 
of public rage. In this small society, everybody knows who the bankers 
are, and they have trouble walking the streets of the capital Reykjavik 
without experiencing negative interferences. Even though they have 
now served prison sentences, they have never admitted any mistakes. 
It is also a widespread assumption that they have hidden considerable 
assets abroad, giving them financial security for the rest of their lives. 
Forgiveness is therefore out of the question, according to the people I 
talked to. The start of any process of that kind would have to include a 
confession and a willingness to give up assets built up at the expense of 
ordinary Icelanders who had lost all their saving during the crisis. There 
was also a consensus in this group that the bankers had exposed their 
characters during their active years at the head of the financial sector, 
and revealed themselves as untrustworthy. To the bankers’ defense, it 
can be noted that they were never invited to a reconciliation process, 
but faced criminal charges and were advised by lawyers to deny involve-
ment in any of wrongdoing, in order to avoid or reduce prison time. 
The legally induced path of denial led them away from of a process that 
could have included at least partial acceptance of responsibility and 
blame.
Forgiveness has also been a topic in NG. At one point, the com-
pany issued an amnesty to the employees. If they came forward with 
information about misbehavior within a four-week period, they would 
not be penalized, even if they had been involved in these transactions 
themselves. CEO Osmundsen explained: “We had recently established a 
vision for the company, a set of values, and a code of conduct that every 
employee had to sign. The next step was to announce a period where 
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people could come forward with information about misbehavior they 
knew about. Throughout December 2012, employees had the opportu-
nity to tell us about previous and current practices that went against the 
code of conduct. If they were involved in it themselves, we would for-
give them and let them continue in the company. If they decided not to 
inform us, and we detected wrongdoing after the amnesty period, there 
would be no mercy” (Osmundsen, 2017).
Top management in NG was soon tested on their ability to live by 
their words regarding the code of conduct and the promise of intoler-
ance to code violations after the amnesty period. “We found out that 
one employee had allowed hazardous waste that should have been put 
in a landfill, isolated from the surrounding environment, to be used by 
a client at a construction site. This was a very serious breach of the code 
of conduct. He was a very competent person, and a good earner for the 
company, but we had to terminate his employment. This was a test of 
our resolve to walk the talk in connection with our recently defined val-
ues and code of conduct. The amnesty period gave everybody an equal 
and fair chance, and this person had not taken it. We had to show a 
commitment to the shared vision for the company” (Osmundsen, 2017).
The dismissal of an employee who has violated a newly introduced 
code of conduct does not hinge on the contested idea that character is 
the main explanation of misconduct. It can rather be seen as a move to 
strengthen the cultural foundation for responsible behavior. Approaches 
to moral fallibility in organizations can follow paths similar to those 
suggested for fallibility at work in general. We can assume that lead-
ers and employees are prone to make small and large moral mistakes, 
more or less consciously taking shortcuts that go against their moral 
convictions. They depend upon a well-functioning barrier system in 
those situations, primarily in the shape of colleagues who intervene and 
bring their attention to the facts about what they are actually about to 
do. Even here, the communication climate affects whether the mistake 
leads to an unwanted outcome, or not. An effective barrier can break 
off the causal chain, and prevent the negative outcome from happening. 
Individuals who speak up and voice their concerns can influence the 
extent to which habits of overcharging clients, selling dubious products, 
allowing the industry to dump hazardous waste in unsafe environments, 
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are formed or not. The more people who are witness to a slippery slope 
occurrence at work, the less likely it is that anybody will take action and 
protest against it, as we know from studies of the bystander effect. Even 
here, responsibility to take action is likely to be split into tiny parts, and 
other people’s inaction is seen as evidence that there is nothing to be 
alarmed about. When the person who initiates misconduct at work is 
someone who usually behaves in morally exemplary ways, the colleagues 
witnessing it are likely to be slow or unable to pick it up, as suggested 
by studies of the confirmation fallacy. They expect more of the same 
from that colleague, and interpret his or her behavior in a favorable 
light, due to a more or less clean moral record up to now.
This chapter has outlined an ethics of fallibility consisting of a norma-
tive and a descriptive part. The former builds on duty ethics and con-
sequentialist ethics as alternative approaches to how one should deal 
with situations where people make mistakes. Teacher A spoke glow-
ingly to the wrong mother about her son, and later had to consider her 
next moves. She could listen to duty ethics, and do the honest thing of 
admitting the mistake, or take a lead from consequentialism, remaining 
silent in order to bring about the potentially energizing experience her 
mistake could create for the pupil in question. Further work is needed in 
order to provide a richer normative ethics of fallibility, and the two main 
traditions of ethics may provide conflicting advice even in other cases.
The descriptive part of an ethics of fallibility addresses why and how 
moral mistakes occur. We have seen that a person who experiences 
moral dissonance can engage in moral neutralization and attempt to 
justify to him or herself that the option in question is acceptable after 
all. The process can lead to a breakthrough, where moral misbehavior 
becomes the new norm. We are all vulnerable to becoming involved in 
processes of this kind, and depend upon colleagues, friends, family, and 
others to intervene to stop it from happening.
The normative and descriptive parts of this ethics come together 
in considerations about how organizations can counter and reduce 
moral misbehavior. The phenomenon of moral fallibility, or that peo-
ple sometimes act against their moral beliefs and convictions, can be 
dealt with through the use of knowledge about its causes. Organizations 
can encourage their leaders and employees to have their eyes open for 
142     Ø. Kvalnes
instances of moral neutralization, and to speak up when they notice 
them. A further challenge for researchers and practitioners is how to 
respond to people with a history of involvement in moral misbehavior. 
An initial response can be to claim that they have exposed their moral 
weaknesses once and for all, and cannot be trusted to change. Another 
is to look for realistic ways for people to reset their moral compasses, 
and re-experience moral dissonance in encounters with dubious alter-
natives, with the aim of giving people a new chance. The studies ref-
erenced in this chapter indicate that it is possible to incentivize people 
to refrain from organizational moral misbehavior, but they are unclear 
about the extent to which those who have transgressed can return to a 
state where they again experience moral dissonance at the thought of 
behaving in that manner. Icelandic bankers, Norwegian waste manage-
ment employees, and others who have evoked moral criticism through 
their actions can be invited into a process where the aim is to for-
give them. Such initiatives can gain momentum from an empirically 
informed descriptive ethics of fallibility that explains moral misbehavior 
in situational terms rather than by appeal to personal characteristics. We 
are morally fallible beings. Under unfortunate circumstances, anybody 
is capable of overstepping the boundaries for respectful engagement 
with others. This knowledge provides us with a platform for forgiveness, 
and for handing people a chance to be reinstated in our communities 
and start with a blank page.
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Conclusions
A choir stands on the podium, ready to perform Mozart’s Requiem in 
front of an expecting audience. The conductor enters the hall and finds 
his place in front of the singers. He turns to the audience and acknowl-
edges their applause. Then he gives his full attention to the choir, 
and provides them the tone from which they are supposed to start. 
Normally, the singers would adopt that tone immediately, and get ready 
for the task ahead. This time is different, because most of them imme-
diately sense that the tone the conductor has given them is far too deep. 
Instant unease spreads among the members of the choir. If they follow 
the instruction and start the performance from that tone, this will end 
badly. The conductor himself does not note the hesitancy and confusion 
among the singers. He is unaware that he has made a mistake. What 
happens in the next second or two will determine whether the perfor-
mance goes well or not. One or more of the singers need to step for-
ward and intervene in order to stop the chain of events set in motion 
by the conductor’s mistake. If none of them does so, they will soon be 
in the middle of a painful Mozart performance, unpleasant to their own 
ears and to those of the audience. There is no time to think the matter 
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through, so either somebody makes an impulsive and discreet inter-
vention, or they follow the conductor’s directions into sour singing of 
Mozart.
This critical moment in a concert hall is a miniature example of 
how human fallibility can affect the quality of what people are trying 
to achieve together. Excellence in this performance depends on the 
detection of error, and an initiative to halt the course of events it sets in 
motion. Musicologist and conductor Mette Kaaby sees it as a nightmare 
situation, one that should not happen but may nevertheless be a real-
ity. “A performance of Mozart’s Requiem is all about collective preci-
sion. The choir and their conductor has put down hundreds of hours 
of practice together, to get the details exactly right. They are supposed 
to breathe, move, and sing together as one entity. The conductor needs 
to be sensitive to what happens among the choir members, and should 
be able to note signs among them that something is wrong. When that 
does not happen, it can create a musical crisis.” (Kaaby, 2016).
The narrative about the conductor and the choir builds on an event 
that actually took place in a concert hall. What happened next was that 
one singer saved the day by discreetly correcting the tone from the con-
ductor. The other singers started from that new tone instead, and the 
performance went well. There was a barrier system in place to stop the 
conductor’s initial mistake from developing into a collective breakdown 
in the form of bad singing. The narrative also highlights other dimen-
sions of coping with fallibility at work, as will emerge in the concluding 
reflections below.
This book has addressed how individuals, groups, and organiza-
tions can handle fallibility at work. It has highlighted how mistakes are 
not necessarily bad, since they can generate breakthroughs in innova-
tive processes. Kaaby explains how there can be musical contexts where 
starting from a mishit tone can generate unexpected new dynamics 
among musicians. You open the wrong door, and explore what you find 
there, rather than turn around and insist on opening the door you were 
planning to open in the first place (Kaaby, 2016). Even in cases where 
mistakes lead to a bad outcome, there can be important learnings to 
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draw from them, insights into how it is possible to do things differently 
and better the next time.
These closing remarks will identify three main categories of under-
standing to which the book contributes. Bringing together narra-
tives and theory has provided insights regarding fallibility at work 
and (1) self-understanding, (2) process understanding, and (3) ethical 
understanding.
Self-Understanding
“Know yourself ” is the Socratic motto introduced at the beginning of 
the book, and self-understanding emerges as a crucial component in 
preparing individuals for work setting where people make mistakes. 
It starts in childhood, where the scope of action boys and girls get to 
explore the world crucially affects their ability to cope with risk and 
adversity as adults. It matters how tight and wide the safety net is. If it 
is everywhere and protects the children from anything that might harm 
them, crucial learning opportunities are likely to be lost. Risky play is 
a key component in a stoical program to make children autonomous, 
resilient, and able to bounce back from failure.
The process of getting to know yourself can take an inward direction, 
where the aim is to figure out what really matters in your own life, but 
also an outward direction, where you take in the extent to which you 
depend upon other people to thrive and do well. The narratives in this 
book demonstrate how dependent we are on colleagues to take action 
and intervene in critical quality moments. They illustrate that we are 
relational beings, to a stronger degree than we perhaps are aware of and 
acknowledge. The choir narrative resembles those from aviation, health-
care, and industry about events that are likely to end badly unless there 
is an initiative from someone close to the decision-maker. Individuals 
who do take such steps tend to see themselves as agents rather than 
pawns, as beings with a responsibility and a scope of action to make a 
positive difference to the ways things turn out. They do not see them-
selves as spectators, but rather as participators in the processes that 
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affect how things turn out. It also matters whether people consider 
themselves to have a growth mindset or one that is fixed and inflexible. 
Only the former approach a difficult situation, or even a failure, with 
the attitude that they can learn something from it.
Some of the narratives in this book are about ambitious individuals 
who want to demonstrate to themselves and their surroundings that 
they are independent and can manage difficult tasks on their own. The 
chapter on help discussed the reluctance some people—and men to a 
higher degree than women—have towards asking for support from oth-
ers. We have seen that the actual social cost of asking for help tends 
to be lower than it is been perceived to be. The normal outcome may 
even be a social gain. You are likely to be considered more competent if 
you seek support in the process of performing a complex task, not less. 
These findings are important to convey to doctor students and others 
who enter working life with the assumption that they are supposed to 
tackle obstacles and deal with complexity on their own.
Process Understanding
A common feature in the self-understanding of professionals who par-
take in the narratives in this book is that they grasp the extent to which 
they depend on the activities of other people to do well at work. It is 
an attitude towards self and others that also give direction to process 
understanding, in that it emphasizes teamwork and collaboration rather 
than separate individual efforts. We can define it further by appeal to 
three components of a team oriented, collaborative process understand-
ing. Dealing constructively with fallibility depends on:
A Barrier System
Reason’s barrier model explains how mistakes can be detected and 
stopped from developing into accidents through the use of technologi-
cal devices, rules and checklists, and human interventions. This book has 
highlighted the latter barrier element. People need to speak up when they 
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sense that something is wrong, or somebody has made a mistake. The psy-
chological phenomena of the sunk-cost fallacy, the bystander effect, and 
confirmation fallacy can make them hesitate, and thus pose a threat to the 
robustness of the barrier system. In the choir narrative above, there can be 
a bystander effect, in that many singers are present, and each of them may 
think that they only have a minor responsibility to intervene, and doubt 
their own judgement and assume that maybe it is only they who perceive 
the tone to be too deep. A confirmation trap can also be in place, if the 
conductor has a good reputation and no previous history of giving mis-
leading instructions. The singers will then tend to expect the next instruc-
tions he gives to be correct, and neglect information to the contrary.
Countering Passivity
We have seen that a major process challenge in many work contexts is to 
counter passivity among those who are witnesses to mistakes. One obsta-
cle is the well-documented phenomenon of omission bias, or of having a 
higher tolerance for bad outcomes of passive mistakes than for bad out-
comes of active mistakes. A dominant assumption is that doing something 
that you should not have done is a more serious mistake than refraining 
from doing something that you should have done, even when the outcomes 
are more or less equally bad. When choir members experience that a con-
ductor gives them the wrong tone, they can intervene at the risk of making 
an active mistake, or remain silent, at the risk of making a passive mistake. 
The most common approach in work settings appears to be the latter.
The chapter on Søbakken nursing home conveyed the need to balance 
risk and find a middle ground between moral hazard, where the decision-
maker feels insulated against any negative consequences of his or her 
own actions, and moral paralysis, where the decision-maker feels that the 
entire burden of the negative consequences will fall on him or her. The 
latter phenomenon is under-discussed in research on risk-taking at work, 
even though it appears to affect work processes both in childcare and edu-
cation, and in the treatment of elderly people. In both domains, moral 
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paralysis can lead to passivity and unhealthy, professionally imposed 
restrictions on the scope of action for young and old people. Moral paral-
ysis can occur in a range of other work settings, when employees choose 
passivity because they are afraid of making an active mistake, and thus 
end up making a passive mistake instead. One key contribution of this 
book—both in theoretical and practical terms—is to draw attention to 
the often unacknowledged and problematic tolerance for passive mistakes.
Other sources of passivity are the systems of holding back that make 
people into spectators in situations where they could have made a posi-
tive difference even by making a microscopic effort. In organizations, 
it makes sense to challenge systems of holding back, and be aware that 
they are tenacious. One colleague may assume about another that he or 
she would never be supportive in a critical situation, and the other may 
assume the same in return. The result is that none of them steps forward 
to help the other and both lose. It is possible to reveal those assump-
tions to be false, and move beyond them, but the systems of holding 
back are never overcome once and for all, but tend to reappear in new 
guises. This means that employees and leaders need to be alert to them, 
and take active steps to challenge the passivity they bring. In order to 
foster active engagement, we can appreciate, reward, and celebrate per-
sonal initiatives in critical quality moments.
Psychological Safety
The two doctors interviewed in chapter five both exemplify how openness 
about previous failures and mistakes can be a source of significant profes-
sional learning. When colleagues sit down together to analyze events that 
have not gone according to plan, with negative consequences, they build 
up a richer repertoire of possible responses to future events of the same 
kind. A precondition for honest conversations about one’s own mistakes 
is psychological safety. The participants need to sense that what they have 
to say will not be used against them. There is a shared assumption that 
it is safe to be open about one’s own experiences in not getting things 
right. The threefold definition of trust is also relevant as a component in 
this kind of safety. The person who shares the details of the mistake must 
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believe that the recipients have the ability, benevolence, and integrity to 
use the information constructively. Narratives about mistakes make the 
narrator vulnerable, since it is likely that the information they contain 
can be used against him or her. Leaders have a particular responsibility for 
creating the psychological safety that makes the sharing of mistakes pos-
sible, by offering protection against repercussions. When done construc-
tively, the emphasis is on the causes of why things went wrong and what 
can be done better next time, and not on attributions of blame.
Ethical Understanding
The narratives about fallibility at work also provide a source for ethi-
cal understanding. Events at Søbakken nursing home serve as an illus-
tration of the extent to which the ethical emphasis in an organization 
should be on avoiding harm or on doing good. The leaders Borvik and 
Norlin shifted the attention from the former to the latter, thus prioritiz-
ing the residents’ wishes for more activity and coming closer to life over 
protective measures. Creating awareness about the distinction between 
prescriptive and proscriptive ethics is in itself valuable, since it can gen-
erate rich discussions about priorities in the workplace.
One outtake from what doctor Westad told me is that it can make 
sense to immediately acknowledge a mistake, in order to stop victims 
from wrongfully blaming themselves for a terrible outcome. Both doctors 
who contributed to the discussion of learning from failure in healthcare 
see open talk about past mistakes as a genuinely future-oriented initia-
tive, when it is motivated by a wish to learn and do better next time.
An ethics of fallibility can have a normative component, addressing 
how one should respond to mistakes at work, and a descriptive compo-
nent, focusing on explanations of moral misconduct. Normative input can 
come from duty ethics and consequentialism, traditions that differ in their 
emphasis on whether moral qualities like respect, honesty, and fairness are 
more important than maximizing good outcomes. Descriptive input can 
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come from studies in moral psychology that aims to explain why people 
engage in moral misbehavior. The two components can come together in a 
stance on forgiveness, or on the extent to which people who have morally 
misbehaved deserve to get a new chance. We have seen that this can be an 
ongoing and concrete issue, as in the turnaround at Norsk Gjenvinning 
and in the aftermath of the Icelandic financial crisis. One of the main find-
ings in studies in moral psychology is that situational aspects have more 
predictive power than personal aspects, or that circumstances tend to influ-
ence behavior more than character. This tendency provides us with a gen-
eral reason to forgive people for their misdeeds, since it raises doubt about 
the sharp distinction between good and bad people. It may be reasonable 
to expect some sort of confession or admitting to a moral mistake for for-
giveness to take place. The parting idea in the final chapter of the book is 
that the process of forgiving (a normative endeavor) can be informed by 
insights from research in moral psychology (a descriptive endeavor).
Fallibility is a feature of human endeavors that we must learn to cope 
with, and the discussions in this book indicate that we can generate excel-
lent outcomes together by realizing that we are relational, interdependent 
beings. Each individual depends upon others for support, encourage-
ment, and help, but also for the constructive opposition in critical quality 
moments. When we overcome the systems of holding back, we are capa-
ble of producing what Esa Saarinen has called miracles of collaboration. 
Then we can shine and glow through the marvelous things we manage to 
do together, rather than one by one, as separate entities.
Future studies and reflections on fallibility at work will take place to 
the backdrop of automation, where more and more tasks are performed 
by intelligent robots that are capable of processing far more informa-
tion than any human being, at a dramatically higher speed. These 
robots may not be infallible, but in many contexts, they are likely to 
perform far better than humans, since they do not get tired, exhausted, 
distracted, sleepy, angry, or exhilarated, states that can negatively affect 
the quality of our decision-making and behavior in critical situations. 
Automation opens up for safer traffic, more reliable medical diagnoses, 
higher precision in financial analyses. quicker proofreading, and so on. 
Robots are likely to outperform human beings in a range of contexts, 
thus making many of us superfluous in work settings. Our fallibility is 
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part of the problem, but may also be a key to the solution, as we leave 
the activities that call for high precision and speed to the mechanical 
minds, and instead expand our scope of action in directions where trail 
and error are part of the thrill.
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